PENNSYLVANIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
CASE SUMMARIES
08/1/2024 – 08/31/2024
EXCLUSIVITY – STATUTORY EMPLOYER
Brian Feldman v. CP Acquisitions 25, Vito Braccia Construction, LLC et al.
APPEAL OF: VITO BRACCIA CONSTRUCTION, LLC
Superior Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: August 14, 2024
Issues:
Whether judgment notwithstanding the verdict is required because VBC is entitled to immunity as a statutory employer under the Workers’ Compensation Act?
Background:
Vito Braccia Construction (“VBC”) appeals from the judgment entered by the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas (“trial court”) in favor of Claimant. On appeal, VBC challenges the trial court’s denial of its request for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”) based upon VBC’s claimed immunity under the Workers’ Compensation Act. This case involves a workplace electrocution accident which inflicted grievous injuries on Feldman, while he was engaged in a tree removal project. Cross Properties had acquired property in Bala Cynwyd and had engaged different contractors to construct an apartment building on it. Cross Properties made arrangements for the removal of the trees and reached out to VBC to take on the tree removal project. VBC contacted Colonial Tree Service. The power lines were not discussed during this visit to the site. Following the site walk, Cross was given a price for the job, to which it agreed. Despite the known hazard posed by the power lines, there was no preplanning for the tree removal project, and it was admitted that VBC failed to live up to his safety responsibilities. Colonial removed the first four trees without incident. However, the fifth tree Colonial tried to remove was on SEPTA property and only five feet horizontally from a 138,000-volt overhead power line, well within the 15-foot radius that is considered dangerous. As the tree segment was being lifted, the electricity from the power line arced to the hoist line, and electrocuted Feldman.
Holding:
Here, the project in question was for the removal of trees located on adjacent properties which obstructed the view. The trees were of the type that dot an urban landscape, possibly as a visual or sound barrier between properties, and, based on the evidence presented, were dead or dying at the time Colonial was set to remove them. The trees in question were not “timber,” so section 302(a) of the Workers Compensation Act did not apply to the tree removal work performed. Section 302(b) states, in pertinent part: Any employer who permits the entry upon premises occupied by him or under his control of a laborer or an assistant hired by an employe or contractor, for the performance upon such premises of a part of such employer’s regular business entrusted to that employe or contractor, shall be liable for the payment of compensation to such laborer or assistant unless such hiring employe or contractor, if primarily liable for the payment of such compensation, has secured the payment thereof as provided for in this act. Even assuming that there was a valid contract between VBC and any of the Cross Properties entities for the tree removal, there is no evidence that VBC contracted with an owner or one in the position of an owner. Cross Properties requested that Mr. Braccia remove trees on the neighboring property to allow for an unobstructed view of the city. No entity associated with the tree removal project obtained SEPTA’s permission to enter upon its property and remove the tree that resulted in Claimant’s injuries. There was no contract with SEPTA, the owner of the property, nor was VBC authorized to permit subcontractors to enter upon SEPTA’s property. On this basis, VBC fails to satisfy the first element of the McDonald test, as he did not have a contract with the owner of the property or someone in the position of the owner of the property in question.
Affirmed.
PENSION OFFSETS AND VOLUNTARY REMOVAL
Thomas A. England v. Merion Construction, et al. (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Published Opinion
Decided: August 7, 2024
Issue:
Whether Merion was the employer directly liable for the payment of compensation, rather than Schnoll, and Schnoll was not entitled to a pension offset? Whether Claimant voluntarily removed himself from the workforce?
Background:
Claimant injured his left knee on August 11, 2010, while working as a union painter for Schnoll. Merion was the general contractor for the project where Claimant was injured, and Schnoll was a subcontractor. Claimant’s case proceeded along two different docket numbers. Schnoll filed a modification petition alleging Claimant had an earning power based on a labor market survey. The WCJ granted Schnoll’s modification petition. Meanwhile, Schnoll filed a petition to modify or suspend Claimant’s WC benefits based on Claimant’s receipt of a union disability pension. Schnoll also filed a second modification petition in 2016, based on Claimant’s alleged earning power of $1,346 per week. Claimant filed a petition to join Merion as an additional employer and New Hampshire as an additional insurer. Further, Schnoll filed a petition to suspend Claimant’s WC benefits on January 23, 2018, based on the allegation that Claimant had voluntarily withdrawn from the workforce. The WCJ circulated a decision granting Schnoll’s modification and suspension petitions and denying Claimant’s joinder, review, and penalty petitions. The Board affirmed two decisions.
Holding:
The Court determined that the relevant law supports the WCJ’s conclusions that (1) Schnoll was the employer directly liable for the payment of compensation, (2) Schnoll was entitled to a pension offset in the amount of $133.47 per week as of March 1, 2011, (3) Claimant had an earning power of $1,346 per week as of November 12, 2016, and (4) Claimant voluntarily withdrew from the workforce as of January 9, 2018. The record supports the WCJ’s conclusion that Schnoll, rather than Merion, was the employer directly liable for the payment of compensation. Further, the WCJ considered the totality of the circumstances and concluded Claimant voluntarily withdrew from workforce. The WCJ cited a lack of medical evidence that Claimant was totally disabled and Claimant’s lack of effort to return to work despite his ability to do so. The WCJ found no evidence that returning to work would endanger Claimant’s union benefits, so long as he did not work for a business that competed with the union. Further, the WCJ found Claimant was capable of performing the jobs identified in the labor market survey and observed Claimant appeared to be sabotaging his job search by calling potential employers and telling them he was a ‘convicted felon’ with no indication that the crimes were in the past and he has since had a clean record. Claimant testified that he contacted nearly every potential employer identified in the LMS. Regardless, Claimant testified he was not planning on returning to work and would “probably” not accept any of the jobs, even if they were offered to him, because it would affect his Social Security disability and union pension. The purpose of the pension is not to provide benefits to individuals who are capable of gainful employment. The loss of Claimant’s pension is a purely financial calculation and not a valid reason not to return to the workforce. Finally, an employer does not bear the initial burden of proving the nonexistence of a vacancy during the relevant time period. Rather, a claimant may present evidence that during the period in which the employer had a duty to offer a specific job, the employer had a specific job vacancy that it intended to fill that the claimant was capable of performing. The burden then shifts to the employer to rebut the claimant’s evidence. The credible testimony established that Schnoll did not have any specific vacancies within Claimant’s vocational abilities and medical restrictions.
Affirmed
PENSION OFFSETS AND SUBSEQUENT RE-EMPLOYMENT
Bradford County, et al v. Paul PASKO (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Published Opinion
Decided: August 14, 2024
Issue:
Whether Employer may claim a pension offset credit pursuant to Section 204(a) of the Act where it would prevent the worker from receiving any wage loss benefits?
Background:
Claimant began working for Employer as a wastewater treatment plant operator in 1993, and he retired after 25 years of service. When he retired, Claimant withdrew a lump sum from his employer-funded pension and began receiving a monthly pension benefit of $1,668.23. After his retirement, and prior to the injury, Claimant returned to work for Employer on a part time, per diem, basis. In June 2020, Claimant injured his back at work. His average weekly wage at the time of that injury was $277.41 per week, with a disability rate of $249.67. Due to the injury, Claimant did not work for nearly a year before he resumed working on a per diem basis in a light-duty position. His receipt of his pension benefits was uninterrupted. Employer asserted an offset. The WCJ determined that the Employer was entitled to a credit against the wage loss benefits it owed Claimant, for the pension benefits Claimant received from March 3, 2020, to February 18, 2021. Claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board), and the Board reversed.
Holding:
The Court reviewed the history of the Act and the Offset provisions and applied statutory interpretation principles to its analysis. The offsets all work roughly to ensure that a claimant is made whole by receiving wage loss benefits in an amount no greater than that the claimant could reasonably have expected had the claimant not been injured, relatedly preventing any double payment on the part of an employer. The credits reflect a legislative intent to benefit employers by decreasing their liability for payment of wage loss benefits in certain scenarios, however, the claimant is made whole through the receipt of a combination of wage loss benefits and other benefits of an amount roughly approximating what they expected to earn had they been able to keep working. The Court had to choose between a “literal” reading of the provision, and a “contest-sensitive” approach. The Court did not believe that a literal reading of the pension offset would meet the stated goals of the provision in this case because it would not eliminate double recovery for Claimant’s wage loss, rather, it would eliminate any recovery for his current wage loss. When Claimant retired, Employer would reasonably have expected it would be required to continue paying Claimant’s pension. It always should have reasonably expected to pay, after Claimant retired, both the pension, and additional wages on top of the pension for someone to perform the work. Allowing a credit in this context would not prevent double recovery of the wage loss associated with the work injury, it would prevent any recovery of that wage loss. When Claimant retired, he went back to work expecting to supplement his pension, and reasonably expected that he would earn wages on top of the pension. Allowing the credit prevents Claimant from recovering with respect to a wage loss that had nothing to do with his pension. The Court concluded that Section 204(a) was ambiguous and affirmed the Board. The Court also noted that the “absurdity doctrine” would also prevent using a literal interpretation of the statute here. Section 204(a)’s pension offset is not available where the compensable injury occurs within the context of a retiree’s subsequent, part-time employment with a former employer.
Affirmed.
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON
The dissent believed that Section 204(a) does not reveal a gap in the legislative scheme that may be treated as an indication of ambiguity and that the literal interpretation was correct. The dissent expressed that the majority abandoned its role and assumed that of the General Assembly in order to address an alleged wrong. Because Section 204(a) is unambiguous, the Majority’s approach was improper.
JUDICIAL DISCRETION – REASONED DECISION
Berks Area Regional Transportation Authority v. Thomas Bennett (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Published Opinion
Decided: August 21, 2024
Issue:
Whether the WCJ’s decision was adequately reasoned regarding the descriptions of Claimant’s injuries?
Background:
Employer petitioned for review of the order of the Appeal Board, which affirmed in part, and reversed in part, the order of the WCJ. Claimant filed a claim petition in which he alleged that, on June 12, 2021, he sustained injuries to his left knee, lower back, and right hip while opening and closing a gate within the course and scope of his work as a bus operator for Employer. In his decision, the WCJ credited the testimony of Claimant and Claimant’s expert. The WCJ found that Claimant suffered from a left knee injury, a right hip injury, and a low back injury with radiculopathy as a result of the work injury in this matter. The WCJ granted the claim petition of Claimant, concluding that Claimant sustained work-related injuries to his lower back, right hip, and left knee. The Board affirmed.
Holding:
A WCJ’s decision must provide a summary of the relevant testimony, necessary determinations of credibility, and findings of facts based on the evidence presented. To the extent that the WCJ’s decision lacks sufficient specificity as to the description, extent, and/or scope of the work-related injuries, the WCJ has failed to issue a “reasoned decision” as required by Section 422(a) of the Act and remand is required. The WCJ credited the medical testimony of Claimant’s medical expert and, where not conflicting, the testimony of Employer’s medical expert. This credited medical testimony included diagnoses of a sprain of the lumbar spine, lumbago with sciatica, and a left knee meniscal tear. Despite crediting this evidence, however, the WCJ described Claimant’s left knee and low back injuries in generic terms instead of making findings of specific diagnoses. The WCJ’s injury descriptions are too general and lacking in particularity to constitute a reasoned decision. The Court remanded the matter to the Board with instruction that it be further remanded to the WCJ for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the description, extent, and/or scope of Claimant’s left knee and low back injuries.
Reversed in part, and Remanded.
JUDICIAL DISCRETION
Chester Water Authority v. Charles Swiggett (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: August 28, 202
Issue:
Whether the WCJ’s finding that Claimant sustained a new or aggravated low back injury was supported by substantial evidence?
Background:
Claimant worked for Employer as a laborer and suffered a low back injury after shoveling snow. In 2018 the WCJ determined that Claimant sustained an aggravation of facet joint pathology at L3-4 and L4-5 and, thus, awarded compensation benefits. Claimant’s benefits were suspended based upon his return to work without loss of earnings in 2017. In 2020, Employer filed a petition to terminate compensation benefits and in 2021, the WCJ granted Employer’s termination petition. Thereafter, Claimant filed a claim petition alleging that on January 20, 2021, he sustained a repetitive low back injury and a reinstatement petition alleging a worsening and a recurrence of the prior condition at that time. The WCJ denied Claimant’s reinstatement petition. However, the WCJ granted the claim petition. The Board affirmed the WCJ’s grant of the claim petition. Employer appealed.
Holding:
The relevant inquiry in a substantial evidence analysis is not whether there is evidence in the record which supports a factual finding contrary to that made by the WCJ, but, rather, whether there is any evidence which supports the WCJ’s factual finding. The record supports the WCJ’s finding that the January 20, 2021, work incident caused an aggravation of Claimant’s pre-existing lumbar spine degenerative disease and lumbar radiculopathy. The WCJ’s finding that Claimant sustained a work-related aggravation of lumbar spine degenerative disease and lumbar radiculopathy is supported by substantial evidence.
Affirmed.
IMPAIRMENT RATING EVALUATIONS
Kevin Bernard v. City of Philadelphia (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: August 13, 2024
Issue:
Whether the retroactive application of Act 111, which enacted the IRE provisions in Section 306(a.3), violates the Pennsylvania Constitution and is an unlawful delegation of legislative authority?
Background:
Claimant sustained an injury and the City accepted injuries to Claimant’s left knee, right hand, face, and teeth. On April 14, 2022, the city filed its Modification Petition alleging that Claimant’s benefits should be modified from total to partial disability based on the results of a March 10, 2022 IRE. The WCJ found that Claimant reached maximum medical improvement and that, in accordance with the Sixth Edition, second printing of the AMA Guides, Claimant had a WBI of 12%. Accordingly, the WCJ granted the City’s Modification Petition. The Board affirmed.
Holding:
Act 111 does not violate the remedies clause in article I, section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Further, Claimant’s argument that applying the IRE provisions in Act 111 to injuries he sustained prior to Act 111’s effective date deprives Claimant of a vested, constitutional right to wage loss benefits, has been rejected by the court on numerous occasions. The retroactive application of Act 111 does not unconstitutionally deprive Claimant of a vested right. Claimant’s argument that he has suffered a loss of vested rights ignores the plain language of Section 413(a) of the Act, which provides that a WCJ may, at any time, modify, reinstate, suspend, or terminate” an award of benefits upon proof that a claimant’s disability has “increased, decreased, recurred, or has temporarily or finally ceased.” Finally, Act 111 does not represent an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. The WCJ did not err in granting the City’s Modification Petition.
Affirmed.
Janice Hines v. Aria Health (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: August 22, 2024
Issue:
Whether it was error to grant a modification of Claimant’s disability status where the IRE reviewer limited the scope of the IRE to address only part of the injury?
Background:
Claimant sustained a work-related injury which Employer accepted as a crush injury to her right hand. By a decision in 2011, the description of Claimant’s injury was expanded to include reflex sympathetic dystrophy/complex regional pain syndrome (RSD/CRPS or CRPS). In January 2015, Claimant underwent an IRE pursuant to former Section 306(a.2) of the Act, which yielded a whole-person impairment rating of less than 50%. Employer subsequently filed a modification petition seeking to convert Claimant’s total disability status to partial disability. Claimant opposed the modification petition and filed review petitions seeking to enlarge the description of her work injury. In 2019, a WCJ denied Employer’s modification petition, concluding that the IRE was invalid under Protz II. The WCJ also found that Claimant’s work injury coupled with her extensive and prolonged use of medications for the injury led to digestive and dental issues. Claimant underwent a new IRE performed pursuant to Act 111. Employer subsequently filed a modification petition based upon this new IRE. WCJ Bowers issued a decision and order granting Employer’s modification petition and changing Claimant’s benefit status from total to partial as of the date of the IRE. The Board affirmed.
Holding:
A physician performing an IRE is not limited by the injury as accepted through the notice of compensation payable or prior workers’ compensation decisions. An IRE physician must apply professional judgment to assess conditions that could be fairly attributable to a compensable injury. A WCJ may reject an IRE that fails to address conditions attributable to that injury. See Duffey; Sicilia. The reviewer considered Claimant’s right hand crush injury and her diagnosis of right lower extremity CRPS when calculating her impairment rating. She may have had the diagnosis, but no current impairment. Also, while the reviewer did not assess Claimant’s dental deterioration or her in-patient colonoscopy preparation, he testified that these conditions would not change Claimant’s impairment rating. Further, Claimant did not mention either condition when Dr. Schwartz asked if she had any other symptoms or complaints. Claimant’s argument that she was not MMI, as her symptoms and examination findings were neither stable nor static had no merit, where they had had been stable for years. The reviewer was aware of Claimant’s treatment and that he took these into account. MMI is not predicated on the elimination of symptoms and/or subjective complaints. Also, MMI can be determined if recovery has reached the stage where symptoms can be expected to remain stable with the passage of time or can be managed with palliative measures that do not alter the underlying impairment substantially, within medical probability.
Affirmed.
PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF APPEAL TO THE PA SUPREME COURT FROM THE ORDER OF THE COMMONWEALTH COURT
MEDICAL FEE SCHEDULE
Federated Insurance Co. v. Summit Pharmacy (Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Fee Review Hearing Office)
August 27, 2024
Petition of: Summit Pharmacy
The Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The issues, as stated by petitioner are:
(1) Did Commonwealth Court exceed its authority when it substituted its judgment for that of the General Assembly, by limiting the authority of the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation to specify which prescription drug fee schedule it may choose to resolve disputes, 34 Pa. Code § 127.131(b), when that function is properly reserved for the legislature and the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation?
(2) By invalidating the Red Book as the standard for determining the “average wholesale price” of pharmaceutical products, did Commonwealth Court err by construing “average wholesale price” according to its common meaning rather than according to its meaning within the pharmaceutical industry?
(3) Did Commonwealth [Court] err by sub silentio invalidating all statutes or regulations in Pennsylvania that base payment for pharmaceuticals on the Red Book, including childhood immunizations and the PACE Program, both of which are also based on Red Book values?
The Petition for Supersedeas and/or Stay Pending Appeal is DENIED.
PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATIVE REVIEW
As of August 31, 2024, the Senate L&I Committee is still reviewing these House Bills and it has not sent them back to the Senate for review, alteration, or consideration.
Regular Session 2023-2024
House Bill 760
Short Title: An Act amending the act of June 2, 1915 (P.L.736, No.338), known as the Workers’ Compensation Act, in liability and compensation, further providing for compensation payable in periodical installments.
Subject: Direct Deposit for Workers’ Compensation
This bill seeks to amend Act 338 of 1915 (Workers’ Compensation Act) by allowing individuals who qualify for workers’ compensation to request their compensation through direct deposit into an account of their choosing. These types of payment methods would be similar to the methods that are currently used to pay benefits to those that qualify for Unemployment Compensation. Implementation of this change was recommended unanimously by the Workers’ Compensation Advisory Council (WCAC) last year. This proposed legislation was presented to the Pennsylvania Bar Association, House of Delegates, at the House meeting on May 10, 2024, and received overwhelming support.
Last Action: Referred to LABOR AND INDUSTRY, May 9, 2023 [Senate]
House Bill 930
Short Title: An Act amending the act of June 2, 1915 (P.L.736, No.338), known as the Workers’ Compensation Act, in liability and compensation, further providing for schedule of compensation. Expanding Workers’ Compensation for Permanent Disfigurement
Subject: Expanding Workers’ Compensation for Permanent Disfigurement
This bill seeks to extend existing workers’ compensation eligibility for permanent disfigurement from 275 weeks to 400 weeks and clarify that Claimants are not precluded from collecting both total or partial disability benefits and disfigurement benefits simultaneously. It would also provide workers’ compensation coverage for disfigurement regardless of where it occurs on their body.
Last Action: Referred to LABOR AND INDUSTRY, May 9, 2023 [Senate]
NEW JERSEY WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
CASE SUMMARIES
08/01/2024 – 08/31/2024
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COVERAGE
Urena v. A&D Freight Logistics, LLC
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division – Unpublished Opinion
NO. A-2302-21; 2024 WL 3561974
Decided: 07/29/202
Background:
A fatal accident involving decedent Carlos Urena Valverde (Decedent) occurred on March 31, 2017. Decedent owned an LLC and was assigned to transport materials through a container company, which was insured by New Jersey Casualty Insurance Company (NJCIC), and a freight company, which was insured by New Jersey Property Liability Insurance Guarantee Association (NJPLIGA). The LLC was insured by Hartford. Petitioner, the decedent’s wife, filed claim petitions for dependency benefits against the LLC, freight company, container company, and their insurers. Hartford filed an answer claiming the policy was cancelled before the accident and moved to dismiss for lack of coverage. The other insurers disputed employment liability. Hartford presented witnesses ad the court found that Hartford failed to establish that it properly effectuated cancellation of its policy. The court also found all three carriers were equally responsible for providing dependency benefits to the petitioner. Hartford moved for reconsideration and was allowed to reopen discovery and present additional witnesses. After additional testimony, the court entered a supplemental decision and concluded that Hartford had not properly cancelled the policy. The court entered an order denying Hartford’s motion to dismiss for lack of coverage and requiring all the insurers to pay dependency benefits in equal shares.
Holding:
On Appeal, Hartford argued that the evidence established the required elements of cancellation by a preponderance of the evidence, Hartford complied with all requirements of the policy at issue, and the trial court was correct in determining freight was employer of the decedent.
The court stated that with workers’ compensation insurance, “a carrier effectuates a cancellation after providing both notice of cancellation by registered mail to the insured and ‘like notice’ to the Bureau with a certified statement confirming notice was sent to the insured.” The court found that Hartford did not effectively cancel the policy as they did not file a certified statement when they electronically transmitted the data. There was ample evidence in the record to support the court’s decision that that Hartford failed to comply with N.J.S.A. 34:15-81(b).
A special employee relationship exists when: “the employee has made a contract of hire, express or implied, with the special employer; the work being done is essentially that of the special employer; and the special employer has the right to control the details of the work.” Additional factors may be considered, but the most important factor “is whether the borrowing employer had the right to control the special employee’s work.” The court concluded that the decedent was a special employee based on factors that satisfied the three prongs. The court’s decision was supported by ample evidence in the record.
Affirmed.
INTENTIONAL WRONG EXCEPTION
Busby v. Seabrook Bros. & Sons, Inc.
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division – Unpublished Opinion
NO. A-1925-21; 2024 WL 3648144
Decided: 08/05/2024
Background:
Kyle Busby (Plaintiff) injured his hand while cleaning a commercial mixing machine, which was owned and controlled by Employer, that became activated. A guard had to be removed to clean the machine and the plaintiff was never trained on proper procedures to prevent injury when cleaning the machine. Plaintiff filed a personal injury lawsuit against Employer and alleged that the Employer’s actions created a substantial certainty of harm, that constituted intentional wrongs. The court found that the employer did not engage in deliberate or affirmative acts. The court determined that the accident was due to the failure to provide proper training on how to clean the machine, which was more akin to negligence. It also found no evidence of prior injuries or close calls. The court found that the prongs of the intentional wrong test were not satisfied.
Holding:
On Appeal, Plaintiff argues that he raised material issues of fact regarding the conduct and context prong, that the court did not properly consider his expert report, and that the court considered evidence outside the record. Plaintiff asserts that cleaning without the guard was common practice, and this created a situation that was substantially certain to cause injury. He further argues that an affirmative act is not required to show an intentional wrong when the injury was caused by the absence of a safety guard. The plaintiff also asserted that the Employer’s failure to train on proper procedures when the dangerous machinery is being cleaned created a substantial certainty of injury. He additionally was pressured to work quickly.
The intentional wrong test is satisfied when the two conditions are satisfied: “the employer must know that his actions are substantially certain to result in injury or death to the employee and the resulting injury and the circumstances of its infliction on the worker must be more than a fact of life of industrial employment and plainly beyond anything the Legislature intended the Workers’ Compensation Act to immunize.” An employer’s intentional wrong has only been found in rare circumstances.
Here, the Court found that the Employer’s failure to train on proper cleaning procedures and failure to have proper procedures in place were reasonably found to be insufficient affirmative acts to establish an intentional wrong. The Court additionally found that consideration of the expert’s report did not require the court to deny summary judgment.
Affirmed.
NEW JERSEY LEGISLATIVE UPDATE
Senate Bill 2822/ A3986
Revises workers’ compensation law to increase contingency attorney fee cap in contingency cases from 20 percent to 25 percent.
Last Action: 8/22/2024 Approved P.L.2024, c.55.
What this means: The existing legislation was amended from a 20 percent limit for attorney fees for workers’ compensation cases to a 25 percent limit. The increase is to account for the increasing complexity of the modern day workers’ compensation attorney and to allow for better representation. There are concerns that this increase will raise the cost of workers’ compensation for employers and small businesses.
Assembly Bill 4371/S1943
Requires workers’ compensation, PIP, and health insurance coverage for the medical use of cannabis under certain circumstances.
Last Action: May 16, 2024 – Introduced, Referred to Assembly Financial Institutions and Insurance Committee
Assembly Bill 4283
Provides personal liability for owner, executive officer, or executive director of employer for failure to pay for workers’ compensation coverage.
Last Action: May 6, 2024 – Introduced, Referred to Assembly Labor Committee
Assembly Bill 4559
Concerns certain workers’ compensation supplemental benefits and funding method.
Last Action: June 13, 2024 – Introduced, Referred to Assembly La