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CASE SUMMARIES 03/1/2024 – 03/31/2024

PENNSYLVANIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
CASE SUMMARIES
03/1/2024 – 03/31/2024

SUBSEQUENT TERMINATION PETITION

 

Johnny L. Pierson v. Consol Pennsylvania Coal Co. (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: March 28, 2024

Issue:

Whether the Employer failed to establish Claimant’s full recovery from his work injury since the last disability adjudication?

Background:

Claimant sustained an injury to his shoulder during the course and scope of his employment. Employer accepted the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable.  In 2017, Employer filed a petition to terminate Claimant’s workers’ compensation benefits.  WCJ Lawton denied the 2017 Termination Petition.  Employer filed a 2021 Termination Petition based upon a new IME.  The WCJ granted Employer’s 2021 Termination Petition.

Holding:

The Employer’s expert did not offer essentially the same testimony during both the 2017 and 2021 proceedings and the WCJ did not fail to make an express factual determination that Claimant’s physical condition had changed since the last adjudication.  In order to terminate benefits on the theory that a Claimant’s disability has reduced or ceased due to an improvement of physical ability, it is first necessary that the employer’s petition be based upon medical proof of a change in the Claimant’s physical condition. When asked whether there had been a change in Claimant’s condition from the first IME in 2017 and the second IME in 2021, employer’s expert testified that there had been a change in the four years between his examinations.  The expert further indicated that his second opinion of full recovery was based in part on documentation generated after the prior adjudication.  Employer’s expert unequivocally testified that Claimant’s work injury had fully healed since the prior adjudication, and that this injury was not the cause of Claimant’s continued complaints of pain.  There was substantial, competent evidence supporting a change in Claimant’s physical condition since the last adjudication and the date the WCJ found Claimant to be fully recovered.

Affirmed.

William Dalzell v. Forest Hills Borough-Allegheny (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: March 1, 2024

Issue:

Whether employer’s expert’s testimony failed to show the required change of condition since the last disability adjudication such that the WCJ’s finding of full recovery and termination of benefits is barred by the doctrine of res judicata?

Background:

Claimant sustained a lumbar strain during the course and scope of his employment as a maintenance worker for Employer. Employer accepted the injury by a Notice of Temporary Compensation Payable, which was later converted into a full Notice of Compensation Payable.  In 2020, Employer filed a petition to terminate Claimant’s workers’ compensation as of November 11, 2019.  The WCJ denied the 2020 Termination Petition finding that Claimant also sustained a T12 compression fracture as part of his injury, in addition to the lumbar strain.  On August 24, 2021, Claimant underwent an independent medical examination (IME) following which it was opined that Claimant had fully recovered from his work accident and that he could return to his regular-duty job as a maintenance worker for Employer. However, it was further opined that, based on Claimant’s unrelated diagnosis of osteoporosis, he should not perform any significant lifting. Employer filed the 2021 Termination Petition. The WCJ granted Employer’s 2021 Termination Petition.

Holding:

Employer’s evidence was not insufficient as a matter of law to establish a change in Claimant’s physical condition and employer’s expert did not fail to accept the adjudicated diagnosis from the prior proceeding. In order to terminate benefits on the theory that a Claimant’s disability has reduced or ceased due to an improvement of physical ability, it is first necessary that the employer’s petition be based upon medical proof of a change in the Claimant’s physical condition. Where there have been prior petitions to modify or terminate benefits, the employer must demonstrate a change in physical condition since the last disability determination.  An employer’s burden is met where its medical expert unequivocally opines within a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the Claimant is fully recovered, can return to work without restrictions necessitated by the work injury and there are no objective medical findings connecting the Claimant’s substantiated complaints of pain to the work injury. Such was the case here and the WCJ found the testimony credible.  Further, as Claimant’s present pain was attributable to his osteoporosis and factors unrelated to his 2019 work injury, Employer’s 2021 Termination Petition did not relitigate the adjudication initially reached in this matter but rather focused on the change in Claimant’s condition since that decision.  The doctrine of res judicata is not applicable.

Affirmed.

ATTORNEY FEES ON MEDICAL BILLING

 
Patrice Williams v. City of Philadelphia (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Published Opinion
Decided: March 21, 2024

Issues:

Whether the Board erred in affirming the WCJ’s denial of an attorney’s fee based on Claimant’s medical bills?

Background:

Claimant sustained work-related injuries during the scope and course of her employment with the City of Philadelphia as a correctional officer.  Claimant filed a Claim Petition, that was later amended to a Review Petition.  Claimant submitted a claim for counsel fees, and in support introduced a fee agreement executed with her counsel.  The Fee Agreement states, in pertinent part, “20% of all compensation payable to me for as long as I receive workers’ compensation benefits. This includes payment for all medical treatment and hospital bills. I understand that the medical provider may seek payment from me for twenty percent of the medical bills. I have been advised by my attorney that the provider cannot do so in accordance with Section 306(f.1)(7) of the Workers’ Compensation Act.  The WCJ granted the Review Petition, in part. Regarding Claimant’s requested counsel fee, the WCJ found that counsel’s fee was not approved with respect to future medical benefits, as these are unknown costs, and the WCJ did not believe it can be demonstrated that Claimant understands her potential future exposure and liability regarding presently unknown costs.  The Board affirmed the WCJ.

Holding:

The WCJ erred in approving a counsel fee limited to 20% of Claimant’s indemnity benefits and excluding any portion of her medical benefits. Claimant testified she understood that the Fee Agreement between herself and her counsel included 20% of both wage loss and medical benefits, and that her medical providers could “theoretically” try to obtain 20% of the medical bills from her. Claimant understood the significance of the Fee Agreement and its terms.  Section 306(f.1)(7)’s prohibition on “balance billing” is not limited to only the difference between a provider’s normal fee and the Medicare-approved reimbursement rate. Rather, it prohibits a provider from billing a Claimant for any costs related to care provided under the Act and any amounts reflecting the difference between the provider’s charge and the amount paid.  There may be policy reasons to regulate the counsel fee differently, depending on whether the fee was incurred for pursuing an award of medical compensation as opposed to indemnity compensation. These policy concerns should be addressed to the General Assembly.  A 20% counsel fee agreement applicable to all workers’ compensation benefits received by a Claimant is per se reasonable. A medical provider that provides medical services to treat a compensable injury under the Act may not recoup directly from a Claimant any portion of any payment deducted to pay a counsel fee.  The Board did not err in affirming the WCJ’s finding that Claimant does not suffer from lateral epicondylitis. The Board did err, however, in affirming the WCJ’s award of a counsel fee restricted to a percentage of Claimant’s indemnity benefits only. The Board’s order was affirmed with regard to the description of Claimant’s work injury. The Board’s order was reversed with regard to Claimant’s fee agreement with her counsel. The matter was remanded to the Board for further remand to the WCJ with instructions to approve, as written, the fee agreement introduced before the WCJ.

Affirmed, in part, and Reversed, in part.

 

PENALTY PETITION – SELF HELP

 

Anna Griffis v. Albert Einstein Healthcare Network (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: March 15, 2024

Issue:

Whether Employer is entitled to recoup its subrogation lien by retaining the fees and costs it would otherwise be obligated to pay over to Claimant on a weekly basis or is in violation of the Act?

Background:

Past History
Claimant was injured in the course of her employment on April 28, 2009, while employed by Employer. Her injuries were severe. She continues to be entitled to compensation for total disability.   Four years after the injury, Claimant settled a medical malpractice case in the total amount of $2.088 million. Claimant then refused to reimburse Employer’s already substantial subrogation lien electing instead to challenge Employer’s right to subrogation.  The WCJ’s Order of August 1, 2017 confirmed Employer’s right to subrogation, but Claimant continued to refuse to reimburse the lien.  In a May 10, 2018 Decision, the WCJ ordered Claimant to reimburse Employer for its lien and found that Employer was entitled to a full suspension of Claimant’s benefits until the lien was reimbursed.  This order was ultimately affirmed by the Board and by the Commonwealth Court.  Claimant has failed to offer any evidence or rational theory in support of the position that the lien has been reimbursed by Claimant.  Employer’s lien is not even close to being reimbursed. Because Claimant has failed to reimburse, Employer can recoup the amount due only by withholding the amount that would otherwise be due on a weekly basis.  Claimant has failed to prove a violation of the Act. Employer established subrogation rights in the award, which resulted in: (i) Claimant owing a lump sum subrogation lien to Employer for past double payment of benefits, which she has refused to pay, and (ii) the balance of recovery, serving as a credit Employer is entitled to take against payment of future indemnity benefits.

Present Litigation
During the grace period, Employer was to pay Claimant its pro rata share of the costs and fees associated with recovering the medical malpractice settlement. As a result of Claimant’s failure to reimburse the lien, Employer, as of October 3, 2017, stopped paying wage loss compensation benefits, as it was Employer’s only means of recouping the substantial lien.  Consequently, Claimant filed a Penalty Petition.  The WCJ reasoned that Employer’s “only way to get reimbursed is to stop paying compensation due until the debt has been recovered” given Claimant’s choice not to immediately reimburse the existing lien.  Because Employer can now only recover on the lien by withholding that the “pro rata” share, it may do so in a “grace period,” during which it is relieved of paying those pro rata fees and costs. The Board affirmed the WCJ.

Holding:

Employer is entitled to recoup its subrogation lien by retaining the fees and costs it would otherwise be obligated to pay over to Claimant on a weekly basis. The WCJ did not err in so reasoning, nor did the WCJ err in concluding that no violation of the Act had occurred, such that the Penalty Petition should be dismissed.  When Employer unilaterally stopped paying its pro rata share of costs and fees, even if such unilateral cessation did violate the Act, it did not warrant imposition of penalties because it was justified. Ongoing suspension of benefits was warranted until the lien is paid.  Here, the WCJ would only have erred in dismissing the Penalty Petition if, by the time it was filed in November 2020, the situation had fundamentally changed so as to render Employer’s continued refusal to pay improper, given the Court’s prior Order.  Because Employer stopped payment of any benefits as of October 3, 2017, the fact that it will take 356.35 weeks for Employer to be paid back in full means the subrogation lien will be satisfied around May 2024, assuming Claimant does not finally pay in full.  At the time Claimant filed the penalty petition, Employer was still under no obligation to make weekly payment of pro rata attorney’s fees and costs to Claimant. Accordingly, the WCJ did not err in finding no violation of the Act, and therefore, in dismissing the Penalty Petition.

Affirmed.

 

JUDICIAL DISCRETION – REOPENING RECORD

Lavern Powell v. Waverly Heights (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: March 5, 2024

Issue:

Whether the WCJ erred when the WCJ declined to reopen the record so that Claimant could submit additional evidence to prove that her work-related fall was the cause of her lower back surgery?

Background:

Claimant worked for Employer as a certified nursing assistant. Claimant suffered a work-related injury when she slipped and fell to the ground. Employer issued an amended Notice of Temporary Compensation, which provided indemnity benefits and described Claimant’s injury as a contusion of the buttocks and pain to the left side of the lower back.  Claimant filed a claim petition, alleging total disability and that her injuries included additional things. Employer filed a termination petition alleging that Claimant had fully recovered.  On April 6, 2022, the WCJ closed the record in this matter. Thereafter, on June 29, 2022, Claimant filed a review medical petition in which she alleged a worsening of her condition. Claimant sought to reopen the record to submit evidence that she underwent surgery on June 10, 2022. The WCJ denied Claimant’s request to reopen the record.  The WCJ granted in part and denied in part Claimant’s review petition, concluding that Claimant established that she had sustained a right ankle sprain but that she had failed to establish neck and back injuries or that her work-related injury required surgery. The WCJ granted Employer’s termination petition.  The WCJ gave two reasons for not reopening the record and dismissing the review medical petition as moot. First, the factual issue of whether Claimant’s work-related injury required surgery had been addressed throughout the proceedings, and the WCJ found Dr. Craven not to be credible on that issue. Second, before the close of the record, the WCJ gave Claimant time to depose her surgeon.  However, Claimant declined and used the time granted to re-depose Dr. Craven.  The Board affirmed.

Holding:

The WCJ has wide latitude to determine procedurally the best manner to move the petition through litigation to resolution.  The decision whether to reopen the record is left to the sound discretion of the WCJ and will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. There is no abuse of discretion when a party has had ample opportunity to present the evidence yet fails to do so before the record is closed. Throughout the proceedings, the parties introduced evidence regarding the extent of Claimant’s injuries and whether she needed surgery.  The WCJ also found that reopening the record for Claimant to submit evidence that she underwent surgery on June 10, 2022, was unnecessary because Dr. Craven and Dr. Mendez already extensively addressed the need for surgery, and Claimant had the opportunity to depose her surgeon, but failed to do so. Claimant never objected to the record being closed without evidence of Claimant’s upcoming surgery. At the time the WCJ closed the record, the parties had introduced substantial evidence regarding the nature and scope of Claimant’s work-related injuries and whether those injuries required surgery. Moreover, Claimant was given ample time to depose an additional medical expert but declined the opportunity. Under these circumstances, there was no abuse of the WCJ’s discretion in refusing Claimant’s request to reopen the record.

Affirmed.

 

 

JUDICIAL DISCRETION – ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS

 

Kathryn A. Lawry v. County of Butler (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Published Opinion
Decided: March 6, 2024

Issue:

Whether the Board violated fundamental WC principles by overturning the WCJ’s credibility determination?

Background:

Claimant suffered a work-related injury which Employer accepted as a right thumb strain/sprain. The injury was later expanded to include right ulnar collateral ligament tear and reflex sympathetic dystrophy (RSD)/complex regional pain syndrome (CRPS). In 2019, a WCJ denied Employer’s prior Termination Petition. The WCJ, in 2019, found that Employer failed to prove that Claimant’s physical condition had changed since a 2015 decision. In 2020, Employer filed the current Termination Petition alleging that Claimant fully recovered as of June 17, 2020. The WCJ Steiner denied Employer’s Termination Petition.  Ruling that, while Employer met its burden of proving that Claimant fully recovered from her right thumb strain/sprain and right ulnar collateral ligament tear, Employer failed to meet its burden of proving that Claimant fully recovered from her RSD/CRPS.  The WCJ explained that gold standard for diagnosing RSD or CRPS is the Budapest criteria, and Employer’s expert gave his opinion without specifically addressing it, and without any evidence of any recent objective diagnostic tests to determine whether Claimant had continuing RSD/CRPS. The Board reversed the WCJ’s decision holding that the WCJ’s determination that the expert’s testimony as to full recovery from RSD/CRPS, was not credible, based on failure to reference the Budapest criteria, and was arbitrary and capricious.

Holding:

The arbitrary and capricious standard is not only the traditional standard applied to credibility determinations. Credibility determinations are more than a series of individual findings. Rather, they represent the evaluation of a total package of testimony in the context of the record as a whole and reflect subtle nuances of reasoning that may not be fully articulated, nor even fully appreciated, by the fact-finder. The Court must view the reasoning as a whole and overturn the credibility determination only if it is arbitrary and capricious or so fundamentally dependent on a misapprehension of material facts, or so otherwise flawed, as to render it irrational.  Clearly, the WCJ’s credibility determination of Employer’s expert was not based on a single medical opinion as the Board declares. Rather, it was based on his extensive knowledge of the case from presiding over previous Termination Petitions, the expert’s heavy reliance on surveillance videos which he used to support his physical examination and opinions, Claimant’s expert’s credible, convincing, and persuasive medical records, and Claimant’s medical evidence. Although the WCJ may have misstated the Kesselring Court’s footnote regarding the Budapest criteria, viewing the WCJ’s reasoning as a whole, the Court did not feel that the WCJ’s determination was arbitrary and capricious or so fundamentally dependent on a misapprehension of material facts, or so otherwise flawed, as to render it irrational.

Reversed.

CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP

Reynaldo Hernandez, Sr. v. Four Seasons Produce, Inc. (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: March 5, 2024

Issue:

Whether the WCAB erred in affirming the WCJ’s denial of his claim FOR lack of causal relationship?

Background:

Claimant was a machine operator for Employer for 21 years, until February 23, 2021, when he was forced to retire because of back pain and radiating leg pain resulting from spinal stenosis.

Holding:

Claimant’s condition did not suddenly manifest itself in an incident on February 23, 2021, when he stopped working.  The WCJ found Employer’s testimony the more credible, determining that there was not an obvious causal connection between Claimant’s condition and his strenuous work activities given the degenerative process that underlay his injury. Claimant’s testimony alone was not sufficient to support a grant of the claim.   Even assuming that claimant’s expert’s testimony was unequivocal, to prove causation it must also be found to be credible. The WCJ is the ultimate factfinder and is empowered to determine witness credibility and evidentiary weight.  Here, the WCJ found that Employer’s expert was more credible that Claimant’s.

Affirmed.

IMPAIRMANT RATING EVALUATIONS

Darren Hoffman v. City of Philadelphia (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: March 19, 2024

Issue:

Whether retroactive application of Act 111 is unconstitutional?

Background:

In 2016, Claimant sustained a work-related injury to his right thumb and right upper extremity in the course of his employment with Employer.  On October 14, 2021, an IRE opined that Claimant had a whole-person impairment rating of 10% based on the American Medical Association’s Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (AMA Guides), Sixth Edition. Employer filed a modification petition and the WCJ modified Claimant’s total disability benefits to partial disability.  The Board affirmed.

Holding:

Claimant’s arguments on appeal have already been reviewed and rejected by the Court in precedential decisions. Accordingly, the Court followed its precedential decisions and rejected Claimant’s arguments.

Affirmed.

 

SUBROGATION – POLICE OFFICER

ALLOWANCE OF APPEAL TO THE PA SUPREME COURT – GRANTED
Barbara Tiano v. City of Philadelphia and PMA (WCAB)
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania – Petition for Allowance of Appeal – GRANTED
Holding:  March 20, 2024

The Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The issue, as stated by Petitioner, is:
Whether the Commonwealth Court’s decision conflicts with this Court’s decisions, such as City of Erie v. WCAB (Annunziata) (Pa. 2003), Oliver v. City of Pittsburgh (Pa. 2011), Stermel v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (City of Philadelphia) (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014), and Pennsylvania State Police v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Bushta) (Pa. 2018), because a self-insured, government entity, is prohibited from subrogating Heart and Lung Benefits Act Benefits from a third-party settlement received by Claimant, an employee, who was injured in the line of duty as a Philadelphia Police officer in a non-motor vehicle case.

Additionally, the parties were directed to address the statutory basis for subrogation as well as the application of Topelski v. Universal S. Side Autos, Inc., 407 Pa. 339, 180 A.2d 414 (1962), to non-motor vehicle accident cases in light of the recent line of aforementioned cases involving motor vehicle accidents.

 

PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATIVE REVIEW
As of March 31, 2024, the Senate L&I Committee is still reviewing these House Bills and it has not sent them back to the Senate for review, alteration or consideration.

Regular Session 2023-2024

House Bill 760

Short Title:      An Act amending the act of June 2, 1915 (P.L.736, No.338), known as the Workers’ Compensation Act, in liability and compensation, further providing for compensation payable in periodical installments.

Subject:           Direct Deposit for Workers’ Compensation

This bill seeks to amend Act 338 of 1915 (Workers’ Compensation Act) by allowing individuals who qualify for workers’ compensation to request their compensation through direct deposit into an account of their choosing. These types of payment methods would be similar to the methods that are currently used to pay benefits to those that qualify for Unemployment Compensation. Implementation of this change was recommended unanimously by the Workers’ Compensation Advisory Council (WCAC) last year.

Last Action:    Referred to LABOR AND INDUSTRY, May 9, 2023 [Senate]

House Bill 930

Short Title:      An Act amending the act of June 2, 1915 (P.L.736, No.338), known as the Workers’ Compensation Act, in liability and compensation, further providing for schedule of compensation.  Expanding Workers’ Compensation for Permanent Disfigurement

Subject:           Expanding Workers’ Compensation for Permanent Disfigurement

This bill seeks to extend existing workers’ compensation eligibility for permanent disfigurement from 275 weeks to 400 weeks and clarify that Claimants are not precluded from collecting both total or partial disability benefits and disfigurement benefits simultaneously. It would also provide workers’ compensation coverage for disfigurement regardless of where it occurs on their body.

Last Action:    Referred to LABOR AND INDUSTRY, May 9, 2023 [Senate]

 

NEW JERSEY WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
CASE SUMMARIES
03/01/2024 – 03/31/2024

CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP

Bello v. United PanAm Fin. Corp.
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division – Unpublished Opinion
NO. A-2986-21; 2024 WL 958364
Decided: 03/06/2024

Background:

Jeffrey Bello filed petitions seeking medical and temporary workers’ compensation benefits. The petitioner alleged that he suffered numerous injuries which were related to exposure to chemical fumes from the air conditioning system in his personal car, which was also used for work.

The petitioner was hired by respondent to sell auto financing at dealerships. He used his own car, but the respondent provided a gas card, credit card, and GPS-enabled company phones. The petitioner had his car serviced about 3 months after he started working for respondent. He testified that he noticed a chemical odor in the car. When he later turned on the air conditioner, he noticed a stronger chemical odor and “what felt like hot pepper” on his tongue. He testified that he was “coughing and spitting up blood.” He went to the emergency room that evening complaining of eye pain, throat pain, headache, and numerous other symptoms. The petitioner was diagnosed with chemical exposure. He purchased a new car and reported that he continued to have symptoms.

Respondent filed a workers’ compensation claim on the petitioner’s behalf with its insurance carrier, but the petitioner was terminated before receiving a determination. Following his termination, the petitioner was notified that his claim was denied. The petitioner then filed the petitions.

Both parties retained toxicology experts. Petitioner’s expert testified to prove causation. Both of respondent’s experts testified that they found no causal relationship between the complaints and diagnoses and alleged exposure to the chemical fumes from the car’s air conditioner. The WCJ found petitioner’s expert was not credible and that the petitioner’s evidence had little or no weight. The WCJ found that the respondent’s experts were credible and concluded the petitioner failed to establish a causal relationship.

Holding:

On Appeal, the petitioner argued the WCJ erred in dismissing the petitions based on the court’s qualification of the respondent’s experts and their testimony as well as finding his expert not credible.
The Court found no error in the WCJ’s qualification of respondent’s experts and testimony as well as the WCJ’s decision to discredit the testimony of the petitioner’s expert. The Court found no basis on which to disturb the court’s order.

Affirmed.

 

 

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LIEN

New Jersey Transit Corp. v. Joseph
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division – Unpublished Opinion
NO. A-1194-22; 2024 WL 1172784
Decided: 03/19/2024

Background:

Defendant Darshelle Joseph was injured during the course and scope of his employment with NJ Transit. Joseph brought a workers’ compensation action against NJ Transit as well as a third-party action against the tortfeasor involved in the accident. Joseph was notified of NJ Transit’s right to recover all money paid on the workers’ compensation claim from the third party potentially liable for the injuries.
NJ Transit paid Joseph workers’ compensation benefits. Joseph settled with his uninsured motorist insurance carrier and received payment. NJ Transit filed suit seeking reimbursement of its statutory workers’ compensation lien. The trial court denied NJ Transit’s application for order to show cause as premature. NJ Transit appealed.

Holding:

On Appeal, NJ Transit argues Joseph must reimburse NJ Transit for its statutory lien. NJ Transit also argued that the lien should be paid out of the sum recovered from the third-party. They additionally argued that this payment should be paid immediately upon resolution of the third-party action, regardless of the status of their workers’ compensation claim.
Section 40 of the Workers’ Compensation Act creates a lien in favor of the employer for benefits paid that attaches to the employees’ recovery against other tortfeasors. The court interpreted the statute to mean the employer’s right to reimbursement is conditioned on, and triggered by, the employee’s recovery of any sum from a third-party tortfeasor. The statute does not specify when the lien must be satisfied, but it makes clear the specific amount of the lien cannot be determined until the employer’s liability is finalized. When the employer has notified the third-party of its claim, therefore perfecting its lien, the lien is paid to the employer before the employee recovers from the third-party. The employer’s failure to perfect its lien does not prevent the lien from attaching. The employee is still required to reimburse their employer. The court further determined that the lien is not required to be satisfied immediately upon the employee’s recovery. Here, the court stated that there was no indication that the lien had any protection as the funds had already been disbursed. The matter was remanded to the trial court to ensure the lien is protected until the workers’ compensation action is resolved.

Vacated and Remanded.

COURSE AND SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT

Latshaw v. Lakewood Twp. Police Dep’t
NO. A-3702-21; 2024 WL 1250146
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division – Unpublished Opinion
Decided: 03/25/2024

Background:

Dawn Latshaw was employed by Lakewood Police Department (“Employer”) as a dispatcher. She was injured in a car accident while she was picking up food during a meal break. During the trip, she did not perform any work-related tasks. Latshaw filed a workers’ compensation claim for benefits. Employer argued she was not injured in the scope of work.
The case was tried before a WCJ. It was undisputed that, in accordance with the CNA, dispatchers were paid for their lunch breaks, even if they left the premises. Employer argued that the accident occurred while she was on a personal errand and therefore the injuries were not compensable. The WCJ found that Latshaw’s injuries were not compensable because she was injured on a personal errand.

Holding:

While the Appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Keim v. Above All Termite & Pest Control, 256 N.J. 47, 55 (2023).
There are four rules which define commencement and termination of employment in different scenarios. The scenarios include: (1) the premises rule; (2) the special mission rule; (3) the paid travel time rule; and (4) the authorized vehicle rule. Here, Latshaw was in her own car so the 4th scenario could not apply. The injury took place on her way back to the police station, so it was clearly not on the premises and covered by the premises rule. Latshaw was getting food for herself and was not required to leave the premises. She was not performing any work duties when the accident occurred. This is in contrast to the employee in Keim, who was injured while driving to get more supplies from his workplace at his employer’s discretion. Therefore, Latshaw is not covered under the special mission rule. Finally, the paid travel time rule applies when (1) the employee’s injury is sustained while going to and from a job site separate from the place of employment and (2) the employee is paid for the time spent traveling. While Latshaw stressed that she was paid for her time during her lunch break, this alone did not establish compensability. The rule establishes that the employee be travelling to and from a job site. Here, Latshaw was traveling to a personal destination.

Affirmed.

NEW JERSEY LEGISLATIVE UPDATE

Senate Bill 4059

This bill establishes the 21st Century Injured Workers’ Access to Justice Fund. This bill revises the cap on contingency fees to a prevailing party in workers’ compensation matters from 20 percent to 25 percent. In addition, it expands the application of the fee to orders for payment of medical and temporary disability benefits on motion and orders approving settlement of any kind.
Last Action: The bill did not move past the Senate.

 

 

CASE SUMMARIES 2/1/2024-2/29/2024

PENNSYLVANIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
CASE SUMMARIES
02/1/2024 – 02/29/2024

IMPAIRMANT RATING EVALUATIONS

 

Steven Conrad v. Department of Transportation (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Published Opinion
Decided: February 26, 2024

Issue:

Whether Act 111 is unconstitutional and cannot be applied to injuries before that date?

Background:

In 2005, Employer issued a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP) accepting liability for a work-related injury sustained by Claimant in the nature of a lower back strain; thereafter, Claimant began receiving temporary total disability benefits.  On September 20, 2011, Claimant underwent an impairment rating evaluation (IRE) which resulted in an impairment rating of less than 50%.  Based on the results of the IRE, the WCJ modified to partial effective September 20, 2011.  On November 1, 2016, before 500 weeks of payment of partial disability benefits expired, Claimant filed a Reinstatement Petition alleging that his impairment rating was invalid and unconstitutional.  A WCJ reinstated Claimant’s total disability benefits as of September 20, 2011. The Board amended the effective date to November 1, 2016, the date Claimant filed his Reinstatement Petition.  On August 11, 2020, Claimant underwent a new IRE pursuant to Act 111, which resulted in an impairment rating of 11%. Employer filed the instant Modification Petition.  The WCJ granted Employer’s Modification Petition under Act 111, to partial effective August 11, 2020. The WCJ also concluded that Employer was entitled to a credit for the weeks of partial disability paid pursuant to the first IRE between September 20, 2011, and November 1, 2016.  The Board affirmed.

Holding:

This Court noted that it has addressed various constitutional challenges to Act 111. Act 111 provided employers with a mechanism to modify a claimant’s disability status from total to partial.  Claimant’s constitutional argument was without supporting references to legal authority or facts that Act 111 unconstitutionally violates his right to equal protection. Claimant was treated no differently than anyone else who is eligible for workers’ compensation benefits; therefore, his equal protection rights could not have been violated. Claimant underwent an IRE which resulted in an impairment rating of 11%, and his disability status was modified to partial disability. Employer then properly received credit for the weeks of partial disability paid between September 20, 2011 and November 1, 2016, pursuant to the plain language of Act 111.

Affirmed.

 

COURSE AND SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT – TRAVELING EMPLOYEE

 

Jorge Martinez v. Lewis Tree Service (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Published Order
Decided: February 8, 2024

Issue:

Whether Claimant was a traveling employee, entitled to a presumption that he was in the course and scope of employment while driving home from work?

Background:

Claimant worked as a crew leader in Employer’s tree-trimming business. While driving home in his personal vehicle at the end of his workday, Claimant was injured in a motor vehicle accident.  Claimant filed a claim petition which asserted that he was a traveling employee with no fixed place of business.  The WCJ denied the claim petition, concluding that Claimant was not acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time of his injury because, generally, commuting to or from work does not constitute employment and Claimant’s evidence did not establish an exception to this general rule.  The Board affirmed.

Holding:

The court concluded that Claimant’s evidence did not establish that he was a traveling employee without a fixed place of employment. Accordingly, he was not acting in the course and scope of his employment when he was injured in a motor vehicle accident on his way home from work.  Generally, injuries sustained during an employee’s commute are not compensable.  There are exceptions to this rule and an injury sustained during an employee’s commute to or from work can be compensable where any of the following circumstances apply: (1) the employment contract included transportation to and from work; (2) the employee has no fixed place of work; (3) the employee is on special assignment for the employer; or (4) special circumstances are such that the employee was furthering the business of the employer.  Claimant is not eligible for benefits under any exception to the coming and going rule. The determination of whether a claimant is a traveling employee turns on whether the claimant’s job duties involve travel, whether the claimant works on the employer’s premises, or whether the claimant has no fixed place of work.  Claimant reported to the yard, where the truck and equipment needed to trim trees were stored. He then traveled to the location of the tree trimming job. Claimant drove his personal vehicle, not Employer’s vehicle, to and from his home, and Claimant’s workday started at Employer’s yard, not at his home. Claimant was not reimbursed for travel expenses and did not store equipment at his home. Claimant had a fixed place of work, albeit one of short duration.  A change of work location during the day or from day to day does not make a claimant a traveling employee.  Rather, the traveling employee is one whose travel in his own vehicle is essential to furtherance of the employer’s business along with his transportation of the supplies which were stored at his home for his use in his work. Claimant was not furthering the business of Employer while commuting home in his own vehicle from the yard where he began his workday.

Affirmed.

 

 

JUDICIAL DISCRETION

Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board v. Dominick Demace, Jr. (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: February 26, 2024

Issue:

Whether the WCAB erred in affirming the decision of the WCJ denying Employer’s termination petition and expanding the nature of Claimant’s work injury?

Background:

Claimant was injured in an auto accident in the course of his employment as a Maintenance Repairman for Employer. Employer accepted Claimant’s injury as strains or tears to his neck and lower back caused by a motor vehicle accident. In 2021 Employer filed the petition to terminate benefits as of the date of an independent medical examination (IME) of Claimant.  The WCJ amended the work injury to include the additional diagnosis and denied Employer’s termination petition. The Board affirmed.

Holding:

Employer argues that Claimant’s Expert’s medical testimony was incompetent because he did not review Claimant’s full medical history, including documentation from his previous primary care provider, but rather reviewed summaries prepared by a member of his office staff.  However, the WCJ is the ultimate fact finder and is empowered to determine witness credibility and evidentiary weight. The WCJ, therefore, is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness, including medical witnesses. Unless made arbitrarily or capriciously, a WCJ’s credibility determinations will be upheld on appeal. It is of no moment that the record contained evidence to support findings other than those made by the WCJ, as the analysis is only whether there is evidence to support the findings actually made.  It was within the ultimate purview of the WCJ to resolve conflicting evidence in making his findings and Claimant as the prevailing party is entitled to every reasonably deducible inference therefrom.  There was substantial, competent evidence to support the findings made by the WCJ.

Affirmed

 

JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND THE STANDARD FOR A REHEARING

Augustine Sesay v. SEPTA (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: January 31, 2024

Issues:

Whether the Board erred in affirming the WCJ’s finding that Claimant is capable of returning to his pre-injury position with Employer?  Whether Attorney incompetence compelled a rehearing?

Background:

Claimant sustained a work injury to his eye during the course and scope of his employment with Employer. Employer issued a Notice of Temporary Compensation Payable (NTCP), agreeing to pay medical and indemnity benefits for an injury described as a laceration of Claimant’s eye/face. The NTCP converted to a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Later Employer filed the Suspension Petition based on a specific job offer made by Employer.  Claimant then filed a Review Petition, averring an incorrect NCP work-injury description.  The WCJ found that Claimant’s work injury description should be expanded to include traumatic hyphemia and macular edema, but not vitreous degeneration and/or specific loss of use of the right eye as a result of the work incident. The WCJ concluded that Claimant was physically able to perform the position offered by Employer.  The Board affirmed.  Claimant appealed, pro se.

Holding:

The Court concluded that Claimant’s issues on appeal were either waived or without merit and the WCJ did not err or abuse her discretion in issuing her Decision and Order and the Court affirmed the Board.  There is no dispute that Employer offered Claimant his pre-injury position. The position was within Claimant’s medical capabilities. Because PTSD was not added to Claimant’s injury description, it could not serve as a valid ground to challenge the WCJ’s finding that Claimant can return to work.  For attorney incompetence to amount to cause shown for a rehearing, the claimant must satisfy two elements: (i) objective incompetence on the part of counsel, and (ii) manifest injustice to the claimant flowing from that objective incompetence.  There was no evidence in the record that would establish either objective incompetence or manifest injustice.  The record was insufficient to establish that the attorney’s decision to not present certain evidence was born of incompetence and not reasonable legal strategy.  Further, the admission of the evidence would not necessarily have changed the WCJ’s decision. Although this issue was waived, the Court nevertheless would have affirmed the Board if it properly was before them.

Affirmed.

 

COURSE AND SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT – PERSONAL ANIMUS

Andrew Ferreria v. West German Motor Import
Superior Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: February 15, 2024

Issue:

Whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law when it applied workers’ compensation immunity?

Background:

Claimant was employed by Employer as an automobile detailer. Co-defendants, who were also employed by Employer, physically attacked Claimant. As a result, Claimant sustained bodily injuries. Claimant filed a complaint against Employer for negligence.  Specifically, Claimant alleged that Employer was negligent in allowing the co-defendants to work in the vicinity of Claimant, and that Employer was negligent by failing to timely intervene while the incident was in progress. Employer filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings arguing that Claimant’s claimed injury and negligence against it was barred under the exclusive remedy provision of the WCA.  Claimant argued that the motion should be denied because there is an issue of material fact that needs to be determined by the court. Claimant argued that this case falls under the “personal animus” exception under the WCA. For the exception to apply, the assailant must have intended to inflict the injury for personal reasons unrelated to his employment.  Claimant argued that the motivation of the two co-defendants was a question of fact that had to be determined by the trier of fact.  None of the allegations alleged established that the attack was for personal reasons.  The Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings was granted.  Claimant appealed.

Holding:

Where an injury is covered by the WCA, workers’ compensation is the employee’s sole remedy against employer and the employee may not bring a tort action against the employer.  If the employee was acting in the course of employment when the injury occurred, the injury is presumed to be work-related, and the burden is on the party asserting the personal animus/third party attack exception to prove that the exception applies, and the injury is therefore not covered by the WCA.  Claimant asserted that while he was working for Employer, co-workers physically attacked him, and the attack caused him to sustain physical injuries, emotional injuries, and financial damages. Claimant did not plead any facts asserting that the attack was motivated by personal animosity that was unrelated to his employment. Claimant failed to satisfy the personal animus exception to the exclusivity of the WCA. Claimant’s appeal was denied.

Affirmed.

SPECIFIC LOSS

ALLOWANCE OF APPEAL TO THE PA SUPREME COURT – GRANTED

Jennifer Jackiw v. Soft Pretzel Franchise (WCAB)
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
February 14, 2024

The PA Supreme Court agreed to hear a case that was reported by the Commonwealth Court on August 10, 2023, wherein the Commonwealth Court held that the Board did not err in affirming the WCJ’s application of precedent and in limiting her compensation rate.  The Commonwealth Court dissent suggested that precedent should be set aside.

The PA Supreme Court held:
AND NOW, this 14th day of February 2024, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. The issue, rephrased for clarity, is:

Did the Commonwealth Court err in applying Section 306(a) of the Workers’ Compensation Act, 77 P.S. § 511, rather than Section 306(c), 77 P.S. § 513, to determine the benefit rate for the specific loss of a body part, based upon its decision in Walton v. Cooper Hosiery Co., 48 Pa. Cmwlth. 284, 409 A.2d 518 (1980)?

PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATIVE REVIEW

As of February 29, 2024, the Senate L&I Committee is still reviewing these House Bills and it has not sent them back to the Senate for review, alteration or consideration.

Regular Session 2023-2024

House Bill 760

Short Title:      An Act amending the act of June 2, 1915 (P.L.736, No.338), known as the Workers’ Compensation Act, in liability and compensation, further providing for compensation payable in periodical installments.
Subject:    Direct Deposit for Workers’ Compensation
This bill seeks to amend Act 338 of 1915 (Workers’ Compensation Act) by allowing individuals who qualify for workers’ compensation to request their compensation through direct deposit into an account of their choosing. These types of payment methods would be similar to the methods that are currently used to pay benefits to those that qualify for Unemployment Compensation. Implementation of this change was recommended unanimously by the Workers’ Compensation Advisory Council (WCAC) last year.
Last Action:    Referred to LABOR AND INDUSTRY, May 9, 2023 [Senate]

House Bill 930

Short Title: An Act amending the act of June 2, 1915 (P.L.736, No.338), known as the Workers’ Compensation Act, in liability and compensation, further providing for schedule of compensation.  Expanding Workers’ Compensation for Permanent Disfigurement
Subject:   Expanding Workers’ Compensation for Permanent Disfigurement
This bill seeks to extend existing workers’ compensation eligibility for permanent disfigurement from 275 weeks to 400 weeks and clarify that claimants are not precluded from collecting both total or partial disability benefits and disfigurement benefits simultaneously. It would also provide workers’ compensation coverage for disfigurement regardless of where it occurs on their body.
Last Action:    Referred to LABOR AND INDUSTRY, May 9, 2023 [Senate]

NEW JERSEY WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
CASE SUMMARIES
02/01/2024 – 02/29/2024

BURDENS IN ESTABLISHING COMPENSABILITY

Driscoll v. Costco
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division – Unpublished Opinion
A-2789-21; 2024 WL 676498
Decided: 02/20/2024

Background:

Laura Driscoll injured her back while lifting a case of water bottles during the course of her employment with Costco. She had no prior history of back injuries. Driscoll treated and was returned to work with a twenty-pound lifting restriction by an orthopedic spine specialist.

Upon Driscoll’s return to work, she was assigned to work inventory which she claimed involved repetitive lifting and bending. Driscoll claimed this aggravated her back and she left work early. Driscoll then filed her first Claim Petition asserting her initial back injury where she lifted water bottles. Driscoll filed a second claim alleging a new injury to her back and an aggravation of her initial back injury.

Driscoll continued to receive authorized treatment. She then moved for Medical and Temporary Benefits and began receiving unauthorized pain management treatment, which included steroid injections. Driscoll’s authorized treatment providers determined she had reached maximum medical improvement and she was cleared to work full duty as nothing else could be done from a pain management standpoint.

A WCJ found that Driscoll’s claim for medical benefits was limited to the time period she was treated by the physician who performed steroid injections. The Judge stated that there was no testimony or medical records for treatment after this time period and it was Driscoll’s burden to present medical evidence in support of her claim. The Judge did find that Driscoll did sustain a second injury in the course of her employment, but that further treatment would be of little benefit.

Holding:

On Appeal, Driscoll challenged the sufficiency of the judge of compensation’s credibility and factual findings.

The Court stated that the petitioner bears the burden of providing medical evidence establishing the compensability of their claim. The Court also recognized that there may be a point where the pain or disability experienced by the worker does not warrant active treatment.

Here, the WCJ’s findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence on the record. Additionally, the Judge fully explained his reasons for denying the discovery motions prior to the testimonial hearing and therefore the Judge’s decision should not be disturbed.

Affirmed.

 

 

EMPLOYER’S BEWARE

Please be aware that a Federal Court Judge in New Jersey has awarded sanctions to an Employer for failure to properly preserve video of an incident concerning a slip and fall.  The Employer did preserve the video, however, the Court found that the Employer’s failure to preserve only 5 minutes prior to the time of the incident was improper and awarded sanctions against the Employer for its oversight.  The Court reasoned that in order to assess the situation more than 5 minutes before the incident needed to be viewed to know how long the spill was present, how employees addressed it, etc.  The Court suggests that at least 2 hours prior to the incident should have been preserved.  As such, we would ask that our clients please be aware of this ruling and make sure that not only are videos preserved, but an appropriate amount of time both prior to and after the incident be preserved.

 

NEW JERSEY LEGISLATIVE UPDATE

Senate Bill 4059

This bill establishes the 21st Century Injured Workers’ Access to Justice Fund. This bill revises the cap on contingency fees to a prevailing party in workers’ compensation matters from 20 percent to 25 percent. In addition, it expands the application of the fee to orders for payment of medical and temporary disability benefits on motion and orders approving settlement of any kind.

Last Action: Reported from Senate Committee with Amendments, 2nd Reading, December 14, 2023

CASE SUMMARIES 1/1/2024-1/31/2024

PENNSYLVANIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
CASE SUMMARIES
01/1/2024 – 01/31/2024

STANDARD FOR A REHEARING WITH THE APPEAL BOARD

Jesse R. May v. Dana Corporation (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: January 12, 2024

Issue:

Whether the Board exceeded its discretion by denying the claimant the right to a rehearing?

Background:

On August 1, 2018, Claimant, pro se, filed Petitions against Employer, which were consolidated and assigned to a WCJ. Claimant was represented by his former counsel and, with the assistance of said counsel, executed four C&R Agreements in 2003. The C&R Agreements were approved by a WCJ after the WCJ confirmed, at hearings and based on Claimant’s own credible testimony, that Claimant entered the agreements with full understanding of the terms, conditions, and legal significance. In the four C&R Agreements, Claimant agreed to resolve wage loss benefits for work-related injuries. However, Claimant reserved the right to receive continuing payment from Employer for medical expenses for these injuries, with the exception of the C&R Agreement pertaining to his 1993 work-related injury. Essentially, in his Petitions, Claimant alleged that Employer failed to pay certain medical bills under the C&R Agreements and sought to set aside or otherwise void the four C&R Agreements. The WCJ denied the Petitions, concluding that Claimant failed to establish that Employer intentionally failed to pay reasonable and necessary medical bills, that Employer violated the Workers’ Compensation Act, or that the C&R Agreements should be set aside. The Board affirmed the WCJ’s order denying Claimant’s Petitions. Subsequently, Claimant filed a pro se petition for review.

Holding:

The case, Frymiare, stands for the proposition that, where an employer has an obligation to pay medical expenses, the obligation may not be avoided on the basis that some other source may have initially defrayed the costs.  However, the right to subrogation under Section 319 must be established by agreement or contested litigation at hearings held during the pendency of claim proceedings. Further, the right to subrogation must be timely invoked, and a party asserting subrogation rights must exercise reasonable diligence in protecting its interest.  When the claimant has properly preserved a Section 319 claim, Frymiare stands for the proposition that where an employer is obligated to reimburse reasonable and necessary medical expenses under the Act, it must reimburse them, whether that is to a third-party payor via subrogation or directly to the claimant.  A claimant must preserve a claim for direct compensation.  An untimely claim for subrogation or direct compensation cannot serve as sufficient basis for a penalty petition.  Three months after the WCJ had granted his claim petition, Claimant demanded subrogation as constructive trustee for Insurer for the costs of his hospitalization. This subrogation claim was patently untimely, as the demand occurred well after the conclusion of the claim hearing.  In fact, it was not until February 2021, long after a WCJ had granted his claim petition, that Claimant first sought direct compensation from Employer.  Claimant has offered no explanation for his tardiness, nor has he offered to prove an earlier request for direct compensation.  Claimant failed to establish a timely Section 319 claim.  Therefore, the WCJ adjudicating Claimant’s claim petition did not rule on it. Employer was under no legal obligation to pay for Claimant’s hospitalization. Absent a ruling that Insurer was entitled to subrogation or that Claimant was entitled to direct compensation, Claimant failed to establish a violation of the Act. The Board properly affirmed the denial of Claimant’s penalty petition.

Affirmed.

 

MEDICAL FEE REVIEWS

Federated Insurance Company v. Summit Pharmacy (Bureau of WC Fee Review)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Published Opinion
Decided: January 2, 2024

Issue:

Whether the Bureau’s adoption and use of Red Book values in payment disputes is inconsistent with Section 306(f.1)(3)(vi)(A) of the Workers’ Compensation Act which limits the reimbursement of pharmaceuticals to 110% of the AWP of the product?

Background:

Federated Insurance Company (Petitioner) petitioned for review of the Order of the Bureau Fee Review Hearing Office in which a Bureau Hearing Officer ordered Petitioner to pay Summit Pharmacy (Respondent) approximately $72,500 to reimburse Respondent for generic drugs provided to Claimant for her work-related injuries.  In ordering reimbursement in this amount, the Hearing Officer used the “Red Book” values for the prescriptions at issue, which the Bureau adopted as the average wholesale price (AWP) to be used in resolving payment disputes over pharmaceuticals. The Red Book is a privately published, electronic compendium of pharmaceutical and over-the-counter drug “AWPs” available online. It is updated regularly to reflect changes in prices.  At the time relevant to this matter, the publisher of the Red Book was IBM Health Watson, although the publisher can, and does, change.   In its statement of policy, IBM Health Watson indicates that the AWP it publishes is, in most cases, the manufacturer’s suggested AWP and does not reflect the actual AWP charged by a wholesaler, that the values used in the Red Book are reported to it by the manufacturer, and that IBM Health Watson does not independently analyze the data to ascertain the amounts paid by providers, such as pharmacies, to wholesalers.  Beginning in 2019, Respondent submitted to Petitioner, and Petitioner paid to Respondent, bills for drugs dispensed to Claimant which were billed at a wholesale price proposed by Respondent.  Petitioner determined that Respondent’s billed pricing was far above the actual AWP of the drugs, as reported in the National Average Drug Acquisition Cost Index (NADAC). Thus, Petitioner began adjusting its payments to be 110% of AWP as determined using NADAC.  Respondent filed applications for fee review.  The Bureau’s Fee Review Section issued determinations applying a different cost index, known as “Red Book,” based upon the cost containment regulations promulgated under the Act.  The Hearing Officer affirmed the Bureau’s fee review determinations.

Holding:

The Court, in a previous matter, already construed the AWP by using its plain meaning, not as a term of art. The plain meaning of AWP is a price that is an industry average not one that is charged by a single manufacturer, and is a number derived by averaging the wholesale prices of all manufacturers or wholesalers.  The Bureau’s regulatory adoption and use of the Red Book’s values as the “AWP” to resolve payment disputes for pharmaceuticals is inconsistent with the phrase “AWP” as interpreted by the Court.  The Red Book’s values cannot be used as AWP as a matter of law because they are inconsistent with the Act.  A remand was required for further proceedings to determine the appropriate reimbursement due to Respondent.  The court ordered that the Bureau has the obligation to identify a “Nationally recognized schedule” that it will use to determine the AWP of prescription drugs to resolve payment disputes and give notice of that schedule in the Pennsylvania Bulletin annually. The court directed the Bureau to promptly identify and publish in the Pennsylvania Bulletin a “Nationally recognized schedule,” that provides an AWP for pharmaceuticals that comports with Section 306(f.1)(3)(vi)(A) of the Act.

Reversed and Remanded.

 

 

SUBROGATION – MEDICAL BILL LIENS

Wesley Wheatley v. Pyramid Hotel Group (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: January 25, 2024

Issue:

Whether Claimant should be compensated directly for the costs of his in-patient hospitalization and other costs?

Background:

Claimant was employed as a cook by Pyramid Hotel Group (Employer). He suffered an injury that resulted in an aggravation of his preexisting asthma, preexisting Type 2 diabetes, and ultimately resulted in diabetic ketoacidosis. Claimant was hospitalized for five days, and Claimant’s private healthcare carrier (Insurer) covered the costs of his hospitalization and treatment.  Subsequently, Claimant filed a claim petition pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Act.  The WCJ granted his claim petition, found that he had sustained a work-related injury, and ordered Employer to pay Claimant total disability benefits and Claimant’s reasonable and necessary medical expenses related to his work-related injury.   After the decision was circulated, Claimant demanded payment for the costs of his hospitalization as constructive trustee for Insurer. Claimant filed a penalty petition asserting unpaid medical bills.  Employer responded that Insurer’s subrogation rights were waived as untimely raised and that Claimant lacked standing to assert Insurer’s lien. The petition was denied.  Claimant appealed to the Board and the Board affirmed.

Holding:

The case, Frymiare, stands for the proposition that, where an employer has an obligation to pay medical expenses, the obligation may not be avoided on the basis that some other source may have initially defrayed the costs.  However, the right to subrogation under Section 319 must be established by agreement or contested litigation at hearings held during the pendency of claim proceedings. Further, the right to subrogation must be timely invoked, and a party asserting subrogation rights must exercise reasonable diligence in protecting its interest.  When the claimant has properly preserved a Section 319 claim, Frymiare stands for the proposition that where an employer is obligated to reimburse reasonable and necessary medical expenses under the Act, it must reimburse them, whether that is to a third-party payor via subrogation or directly to the claimant.  A claimant must preserve a claim for direct compensation.  An untimely claim for subrogation or direct compensation cannot serve as sufficient basis for a penalty petition.  Three months after the WCJ had granted his claim petition, Claimant demanded subrogation as constructive trustee for Insurer for the costs of his hospitalization. This subrogation claim was patently untimely, as the demand occurred well after the conclusion of the claim hearing.  In fact, it was not until February 2021, long after a WCJ had granted his claim petition, that Claimant first sought direct compensation from Employer.  Claimant has offered no explanation for his tardiness, nor has he offered to prove an earlier request for direct compensation.  Claimant failed to establish a timely Section 319 claim.  Therefore, the WCJ adjudicating Claimant’s claim petition did not rule on it. Employer was under no legal obligation to pay for Claimant’s hospitalization. Absent a ruling that Insurer was entitled to subrogation or that Claimant was entitled to direct compensation, Claimant failed to establish a violation of the Act. The Board properly affirmed the denial of Claimant’s penalty petition.

Affirmed.

TERMINATION PETITION – STANDARD FOR A SUBSEQUENT TERMINATION

Marriott International, Inc. v. Renee C. Loguidice (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: January 3, 2024 

Issue:

Whether Employer met its burden of proof on the Second Termination Petition?

Background:

Claimant, a bartender, tripped and fell at work, and Employer accepted an upper back injury pursuant to a Notice of Temporary Compensation Payable that converted by operation of law. In 2018, Employer filed Termination and Suspension Petitions. Thereafter, Claimant filed a Petition to Review seeking to expand the description of her work injury. In 2019, a WCJ granted the Petition to Review and denied the Termination and Suspension Petitions.  However, this first WCJ did conclude that Claimant had recovered from a lumbar strain and sprain and, therefore, granted the Termination Petition in that respect.  In 2020, Employer filed a second Termination Petition, which was assigned to a second WCJ.  The second WCJ held that Employer sustained its burden of proving that Claimant was fully recovered from her work injuries as of January 14, 2020 and granted Employer’s second Termination Petition. Claimant appealed to the Board.  The Board reversed, citing Lewis and Browne for the proposition that to terminate benefits, an employer whose termination petition was previously denied must show an actual change in the claimant’s physical condition since the last disability determination. To show an actual change of condition, the Board held Employer’s expert was required to assume that the radiculopathy was work-related.

Holding:

The Board exceeded its authority by reweighing the evidence and not viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Employer, the prevailing party before the WCJ, or as a whole.  When the record is viewed in its entirety, it reflects that Employer’s expert accepted the judicially determined work injuries, distinguishing this matter from Lewis and Browne, and based his opinion of full recovery from those injuries on his physical examination of Claimant and other evidence.  Employer’s expert’s testimony is legally competent to support the grant of the Second Termination Petition. Once an employer sets forth the change in physical condition required to properly bring a petition to terminate benefits, it still bears a high burden.  Employer’s expert’s entire testimony reflects that he did not dispute or disagree with Claimant’s adjudicated injuries, but opined, based on his physical examination of January 14, 2020, and his belief that Claimant’s responses during that physical exam were incredible, that Claimant had fully recovered. Accordingly, that testimony is legally competent, and the Board erred in finding otherwise on this basis.  Employer’s expert accepted the adjudicated work injuries and opined that Claimant was fully recovered from those work injuries. This opinion is legally competent and, as it was found credible by the second WCJ insofar as it satisfies Employer’s burden of proving a change in Claimant’s physical condition.

Reversed.

RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

Marie Louise Boulin v. Brandywine Senior Care, Inc. (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Published Opinion
Decided: January 2, 2024

Issues:

Whether the WCJ’s decision was erroneous and not supported by substantial evidence of record, and amounted to abuses of discretion?

Background:

Claimant sustained a work-related injury on August 28, 2018, while working for Brandywine Senior Care, Inc. Throughout 2019, the parties filed various petitions, which the WCJ resolved in a January 31, 2020 opinion and order.  Various additional petitions and appeals were filed and disposed of.  Claimant, now pro se, appealed a WCJ’s 2021 decision, which the Board affirmed.  In the present matter as to additional petitions, a new WCJ determined that Employer met its burden of proof on its motion to dismiss on the basis of res judicata principles and denied and dismissed Claimant’s petitions with prejudice. The Board affirmed.

Holding:

The WCJ did not err in finding Claimant’s petitions were barred by res judicata principles.  The WCJ concluded that Claimant’s April 2022 petitions, in essence, sought to relitigate an earlier determination that Claimant had fully recovered from her adjudicated injuries other than the right calcaneal fracture and that Claimant had fully recovered from the right calcaneal fracture.  Claimant was represented by counsel in both prior WCJ proceedings and had a full and fair opportunity to establish the ongoing nature of her injuries in the litigation before the WCJ and to rebut Employer’s termination evidence.  To the extent that Claimant’s petitions seek to challenge the WCJs’ determinations, those matters were previously litigated and are collaterally estopped.  A claimant seeking reinstatement of benefits following a termination carries a heavy burden because the claimant has been adjudicated to be fully recovered.  Claimant must establish that disability has increased or recurred since the prior decision and that the physical condition has changed in some manner.  Furthermore, although res judicata principles may not preclude a post-termination reinstatement petition, when a claimant attempts to relitigate the prior termination rather than trying to meet the requisite burden, reinstatement is not warranted.  Although the WCJ and Board decisions are both framed in terms of res judicata principles, they also amount to conclusions that Claimant did not meet the post-reinstatement termination burden. Claimant asserted that the WCJ’s description of her injury failed to include various additional ailments from the August 2018 incident and that she continued to suffer from symptoms rendering her disabled; therefore, her benefits should be reinstated. However, the decisions were fully and fairly litigated while Claimant was represented by counsel and became final after Claimant’s unsuccessful appeals. Claimant’s claims are therefore barred by res judicata principles.  Although WCJ Rago denied and dismissed Claimant’s reinstatement petition (along with her other petitions) as barred by res judicata principles, the practical effect of the WCJ’s determination is that Claimant failed to meet the post-termination reinstatement burden of showing a change in her condition and increasing or recurring disability. The WCJ did not err in denying Claimant’s reinstatement petition and the Board did not err in affirming that determination.

Affirmed.

REASONABLE CONTEST

Sharon Auxier v. Trinity Health Corporation (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: January 9, 2024

Issue:

Whether the Board overstepped its authority when it partially reversed the WCJ’s award of counsel fees on the basis that Employer’s contest was entirely unreasonable?

Background:

Claimant filed a Claim Petition alleging that she sustained an injury in the course of her employment with Employer, as the result of an Employer-provided desk chair that was allegedly ill-suited for sustained sitting. The Claim Petition further alleged that one of Employer’s own doctors administered an injection into Claimant’s spine that greatly increased the pain and caused radicular pain down the leg.  Employer had issued a medical-only Temporary Notice of Compensation Payable, and a few months later, followed with a Notice Stopping Temporary Compensation, asserting that the injury was not work-related.  In a 2020 decision, the WCJ granted the Claim Petition, and ordered Employer to pay a quantum meruit fee of $12,025.00 to Claimant’s counsel.  Employer appealed to the Board, which affirmed the WCJ in part, and vacated and remanded in part.  The Board concluded that the WCJ erred in awarding counsel fees.  The Board remanded with the instruction that a WCJ was to recalculate fees in accordance with its opinion. The parties signed a stipulation of facts allowing for a $1,525.00 counsel fee. After the WCJ dealt with the remand, the Claimant appealed to the Board.  The Board affirmed.

Holding:

The burden of proving a reasonable contest is on the employer, and unless the employer establishes that its contest was prompted to resolve a genuinely disputed issue, the court will presume that the contest was unreasonable. The Board’s sole basis for determining that Employer had any reasonable contest is that Claimant’s Bertolotti’s Syndrome was preexisting to the work injury. However, it is well settled that an employer is liable for an employee’s disability when that disability is caused by a combination of work-related and non-work-related factors, so long as the work-related cause is a substantial contributing factor to the disability.  The Board’s effort to reapportion the award of counsel fees on a pro rata basis was arbitrary and without foundation.  While the issue of a contest’s reasonableness raises a question of law, case law instructs that the question is a fact-dependent one. The WCJ ‘s conclusion that Employer engaged in an unreasonable contest follows logically from his factual finding that Employer was aware of its causal role in Claimant’s injury just days after it occurred. That finding is supported by substantial evidence.  The Court reversed the Board’s order and reinstated the WCJ’s decision.

Reversed.

 

FATAL CLAIM PETITION

TA Operating LLC v. Leonard Maurer (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: January 17, 2024

Issue:

Whether the Board erred in affirming the WCJ’s decision because claimant’s expert’s opinion regarding the cause of Decedent’s cardiac arrest is premised on facts not contained in the evidentiary record?

Background:

Decedent collapsed while at work and passed away shortly thereafter. Claimant filed the fatal claim petition seeking widow benefits, alleging Decedent’s death resulted from a cardiac arrest while in the course and scope of his employment with Employer. Employer filed an answer denying that the cardiac arrest was work related.  Claimant’s expert opined that Decedent’s cause of death was performing significant physical work in a hot environment, that created a condition of cardiac arrest. While he acknowledged that coronary artery disease probably contributed to Decedent’s death, he stressed that Decedent’s cardiac arrest and death could have happened in the absence of coronary artery disease and that the immediate cause, the proximate cause of the event was precipitated by the work he was doing in that hot environment.  The expert conceded that Decedent smoked one pack of cigarettes a day at the time of his death, and there was a period of time where he smoked two to three packs a day and that long-term cigarette use is a substantial risk factor for the development of coronary artery disease. He also conceded that Decedent was at the lower end of the obese definition and obesity is a stressor for the heart. Decedent also had a family history of cardiac issues as his father had coronary artery disease at the age of 59.   The WCJ issued a decision and order granting the fatal claim petition. The Board affirmed.

Holding:

The expert based his testimony upon uncontroverted facts that Decedent was working in 90-degree weather changing a tractor trailer tire alongside a road when he reported feeling short of breath and subsequently collapsed in his work vehicle.  While the expert admitted that he did not know specifically how far into the tire change Decedent got before he collapsed, this was not relevant and did not render his opinion equivocal. The courts have repeatedly rejected the argument in cardiac arrest cases that a claimant needs to prove exactly what the decedent was doing prior to the event.  It was undisputed that Decedent had a very physical job and that his daily job duties involved strenuous physical activity. It was further undisputed that Decedent was responding to a roadside service call for a flat tire on a tractor trailer at the time of his death, and that this type of call was within his usual job duties.  Evidence of how much and what type of activity Decedent was performing that day is not a prerequisite to compensation.

Affirmed.

APPEALS – TIMELINESS

Wesley Wheatley v. Pyramid Hotel Group (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Published Opinion
Decided: January 11, 2024

Issue:

Whether the Board erred by denying his appeal as untimely because he appealed to the Commonwealth Court on September 29, 2021, reasonably believing that since the issues on remand had been resolved, and the parties had previously timely appealed to the Board, finality had been achieved?

Background:

Claimant filed a Claim Petition alleging that he sustained a work-related aggravation of preexisting allergic and asthmatic pathology, respiratory system injuries, and endocrine system acquired diabetes on October 8, 2018. On May 13, 2020, the WCJ granted the Claim Petition. Claimant and Employer appealed from the WCJ’s decision to the Board.  On March 25, 2021, the Board affirmed the WCJ ‘s decision in part, reversed it in part, and remanded the matter.  On August 31, 2021, the WCJ issued an amended decision and order simply granting the Claim Petition in accordance with the Stipulation.  Neither party appealed from the August 2021 Order.   On September 29, 2021, Claimant appealed from the Board’s March 25, 2021 order to the Commonwealth Court.  The Court quashed Claimant’s appeal.

Holding:

Following a Board remand to the WCJ, any aggrieved party must then file an appeal with the Board or ask the Board to certify its original determination as final for appeal to the Commonwealth Court. A Board order remanding a case to the WCJ for further action is interlocutory and cannot be appealed until the WCJ has issued the subsequent order.  After that, the Board, not the Court, must review it before this Court can undertake its appellate review.  Claimant did not appeal to the Board within 20 days of receiving the WCJ ‘s decision on remand.  Section 423(a) of the Act authorizes the Board to extend the time for taking an appeal upon cause shown.  Limited circumstances exist in which an untimely appeal may be considered.  Allowable exceptions include cases involving fraud, a breakdown in the administrative process, or when there is a non-negligent failure to file a timely appeal which was corrected within a very short time, during which any prejudice to the other side of the controversy would necessarily be minimal.  Claimant did not raise to the Board or this Court any non-negligent circumstances or fraud or its equivalent that may have allowed his appeals to proceed nunc pro tunc. Accordingly, neither equity nor the fact that Employer did not challenge Claimant’s Petition is dispositive here.  The Board properly denied Claimant’s Petition as untimely filed.

Affirmed.

JUDICIAL DISCRETION

James Wygant v. Kebert Construction (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: January 29, 2024

Issue:

Whether the Judge’s decision granting the petition was in error?

Background:

Claimant sustained a work injury on December 14, 2014, while he was employed by Employer as a mechanic. The injury was recognized as a low back strain, and Claimant received weekly benefits based on an average weekly wage of $694.47, resulting in a weekly compensation rate of $466.00, for total disability. Employer filed the Modification Petition, based on a labor market survey. Claimant then filed review petitions, seeking to expand the description of the injury and a Penalty Petition asserting that Employer refused to approve and pay for a spinal cord stimulator.  The WCJ partially granted Claimant’s Review Petitions, granted Employer’s Modification Petition, and denied Claimant’s Penalty Petition. Claimant and Employer appealed to the Board, which affirmed the WCJ’s decision.  Claimant then petitioned the Court for review.

Holding:

A WCJ may modify a claimant’s benefits when a claimant’s disability has ended or decreased pursuant to Section 413(a) of the Act.  As to the Modification Petition, Claimant’s argument that the opinions of Employer’s experts were equivocal or incompetent because they failed to account for Claimant’s RSD/CRPS when they approved him for light-duty work, was misplaced. The expansion of Claimant’s work injury became effective as of the date the WCJ granted Claimant’s Review Petitions but is not applicable to earlier dates. Thus, although Claimant argued that his job limitations in 2017 should have accounted for his additional injuries, the WCJ disagreed, and his findings were supported by substantial evidence in the record. Claimant’s argument on the Penalty Petition failed for a similar reason. When Employer denied payment for the spinal cord stimulator, the relevant additional diagnoses were not part of the injury but became part of Claimant’s recognized injury only when the WCJ granted Claimant’s Review Petitions. Employer was only obligated to pay for the spinal cord stimulator once the WCJ determined that the work injury included those additional injuries. The decision was not arbitrary or capricious, or so fundamentally dependent on a misapprehension of material facts, or so otherwise flawed, as to render it irrational.  Further, it was based upon substantial evidence.

Affirmed.

Chester County Hospital and BASIS, Inc. v. Eileen Bangert (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: January 29, 2024

Issues:

Whether the WCJ and the Board erred in finding that Claimant met her burden of proof under the claim petition?

Background:

Claimant worked as a registered nurse for Employer when she injured her lower back. Employer sent Claimant for physical therapy and issued a notice of compensation denial.  Claimant then filed a claim petition alleging that she sustained an aggravation to her prior work-related back injury. Claimant also filed a penalty petition.  Claimant stated that she worked for Employer in a light-duty position in the hospital nursery because of an earlier work injury to her back. That injury occurred in 1994, and after physical therapy, injections, and medication, she underwent back surgery in 1995. Although Claimant returned to work in December 1997, she never fully recovered from this injury.  The WCJ granted Claimant’s claim petition and denied her penalty petition. The WCJ found that Claimant met her burden of proving that in 2021 she sustained a work injury in the nature of an exacerbation of post-laminectomy syndrome, exacerbation of lumbar radiculopathy, and exacerbation of lower back pain. Employer appealed to the Board and affirmed.

Holding:

For a claimant’s medical evidence to be competent, it cannot be equivocal. Viewing claimant’s expert’s testimony in its entirety, he offered an unequivocal opinion that Claimant’s 2021 work injury consisted of an exacerbation of post-laminectomy syndrome, exacerbation of lumbar radiculopathy, and exacerbation of lower back pain. He fully explained how he arrived at those medical diagnoses, which was corroborated by Claimant’s testimony, medical records, and his own clinical observations. Further, he fully addressed the Claimant’s preexisting chronic back pain and the reason why he determined Claimant suffered a work injury in 2021.  The WCJ’s credibility determinations are binding on appeal.  This Court will not disturb a WCJ’s findings if there is substantial evidence in the record to support the findings. It is irrelevant whether the record contains evidence to support findings other than those made by the WCJ.  The WCJ did not overlook evidence of Claimant’s preexisting conditions. Rather, the WCJ considered the testimony of both medical experts on Claimant’s work injury, medical history, and medical records, and he resolved the conflict between them in favor of Claimant.

Affirmed.

EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP – INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR

Wilfredo Ayala v. Fundamental Labor Strategies, Inc. (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion.
Decided: January 2, 2024

Issue:

Whether the Board erred in concluding claimant was an independent contractor at the time of his injury?

Background:

Claimant, a commercial truck driver, began working as a delivery driver for FLS in March 2019. Claimant filed a claim petition alleging he sustained a lumbar disc injury while unloading a window during the course and scope of his employment with FLS.  Based on the testimony presented, the WCJ found Claimant did not establish an employment relationship with FLS and dismissed Claimant’s claim petitions and petition for penalties. The Board affirmed the WCJ’s Decision.

Holding:

For a claimant to receive WC benefits, the claimant must prove an employer-employee relationship exists because an independent contractor is not entitled to benefits.  While no factor is dispositive, control over the work and the manner it is performed are primary factors in determining employment status. Where an alleged employer has the right to select the employee, the right and power to discharge the employee, the power to direct the manner of performance, and the power to control the employee, there is sufficient control to establish an employer-employee relationship. Additionally, payment of wages and payroll deductions are a significant consideration, as is a tax filing noting self-employment. While requests about the manner of work may have come from the clients, FLS did not dictate to Claimant which assignments to accept, how to complete the assignments, what routes to travel, and what times to drive each day or for how long. FLS did not provide a uniform or the vehicles for Claimant to drive, nor did FLS train Claimant. While none of these facts were individually dispositive, taken as a whole, these findings reflect Claimant controlled the time and manner of his work, primarily by his ability to accept or reject assignments.  The Court may not reweigh the evidence or second-guess the WCJ’s credibility determinations.  Further, substantial evidence in the record supports the WCJ’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.  Therefore, the Board did not err in affirming the WCJ’s Decision that Claimant was an independent contractor. As an independent contractor, Claimant was not entitled to WC benefits.

Affirmed.

IMPAIRMENT RATING EVALUATIONS

German Sanchez v. Petrolongo Contractors, Inc. (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unreported Memorandum Opinion
Decided: January 10, 2024

Issue:

Whether the IRE was premature because 104 weeks had not passed since Act 111’s enactment when the IRE was scheduled?

Backgrounds:

The facts were not in dispute. In 2004 Claimant suffered a work injury after being pinned against a wall by a backhoe. Claimant suffered a lumber sprain and strain. Claimant was ordered to attend an IRE, which was originally scheduled for January 15, 2019, and which claimant did not attend until September 5, 2019. Based on his evaluation, Claimant had a 33% impairment rating.  At the modification Petition hearing, Claimant argued the IRE was premature.  The WCJ modified Claimant’s benefits to TPD as of January 15, 2019, the date the IRE was originally scheduled.  Claimant appealed to the Board arguing that an IRE could not be performed until 104 weeks after Act 111 became effective. The Board affirmed.

Holding:

Act 111 plainly provides for credit of weeks of temporary total and partial disability benefits previously paid and that the General Assembly explicitly provided the credit provisions were to be given retroactive effect. The plain language of Section 3 of Act 111 explicitly gives employers credit for previous weeks of disability benefits paid.  The IRE was not premature.

Affirmed.

PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATIVE REVIEW

As noted previously, there are presently pending before the Pennsylvania General Assembly, a number of Bills which seek to amend the Pennsylvania Worker’s Compensation Act in various ways.  When these Bills are proposed by Pa House members, they go through the House’s Labor and Industry Committee.   When, and if, the Bill is passed by the House, it must go through the Pa Senate for additional review.   As of this date, two of the proposed Bills have passed the House, and are under review by the Pa. Senate’s Labor and Industry Committee.  They are summarized below.  We are monitoring these bills.  As of January 31, 2024, the Senate L&I Committee is still reviewing these House Bills and it has not sent them back to the Senate for review, alteration or consideration.

Regular Session 2023-2024

House Bill 760

Short Title:      An Act amending the act of June 2, 1915 (P.L.736, No.338), known as the Workers’ Compensation Act, in liability and compensation, further providing for compensation payable in periodical installments.

Subject:         Direct Deposit for Workers’ Compensation

This bill seeks to amend Act 338 of 1915 (Workers’ Compensation Act) by allowing individuals who qualify for workers’ compensation to request their compensation through direct deposit into an account of their choosing. These types of payment methods would be similar to the methods that are currently used to pay benefits to those that qualify for Unemployment Compensation. Implementation of this change was recommended unanimously by the Workers’ Compensation Advisory Council (WCAC) last year.

Last Action:    Referred to LABOR AND INDUSTRY, May 9, 2023 [Senate]

 

House Bill 930

Short Title:      An Act amending the act of June 2, 1915 (P.L.736, No.338), known as the Workers’ Compensation Act, in liability and compensation, further providing for schedule of compensation.  Expanding Workers’ Compensation for Permanent Disfigurement

Subject:           Expanding Workers’ Compensation for Permanent Disfigurement

This bill seeks to extend existing workers’ compensation eligibility for permanent disfigurement from 275 weeks to 400 weeks and clarify that claimants are not precluded from collecting both total or partial disability benefits and disfigurement benefits simultaneously. It would also provide workers’ compensation coverage for disfigurement regardless of where it occurs on their body.

Last Action:    Referred to LABOR AND INDUSTRY, May 9, 2023 [Senate]

 

NEW JERSEY WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

CASE SUMMARIES

01/01/2024 – 01/31/2024

DISABILITY BENEFITS

 

Hughes v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division – Unpublished Opinion
NO. A-1188-22; 2024 WL 336544
Decided: 01/30/2024

Background:

Hughes used to work as a police officer for Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. He suffered a cardiac injury while on the job and filed a claim, asserting he was totally and permanently disabled. A WCJ determined Hughes was thirty three and one third percent partially disabled. In a different trial, a WCJ determined that Hughes’ disability had increased to forty five percent of permanent partial total. The decision was based on testimony presented at trial as well as medical records.

 

Holding:

On Appeal, Hughes argued that he proved that he had become one hundred percent disabled. He additionally argued for the first time that the WCJ should have required Port Authority to pay a Medicare lien.

The court concluded that the WCJ’s decision is supported by credible evidence in the record. The decision was based on his conclusion that Hughes’s disability had not changed drastically over time as well as his assessment of medical evidence. Hughes argued that the WCJ should have given more weight to the opinion of his medical expert that he was one hundred percent disabled. The court disagreed with this argument and found that the WCJ fully articulated a well-reasoned conclusion for rejecting the expert’s opinion.

The court also noted that there was no significance in finding that Hughes was entitled to Social Security disability benefits as the Social Security Administration has different standards and statutes than the Workers’ Compensation Court.

The court declined to consider the Medicare lien issue as Hughes did not present any evidence of this during the trial.

Affirmed.

 

NEW JERSEY LEGISLATIVE UPDATE

Assembly Bill 5909/ Senate Bill 4267

This bill revises workers’ compensation coverage to include coverage for injuries to volunteer as well as part-time public safety and law enforcement workers when the injury occurs in response to an emergency.

Last Action: Passed Senate, January 8, 2024

Senate Bill 4059

This bill establishes the 21st Century Injured Workers’ Access to Justice Fund. This bill revises the cap on contingency fees to a prevailing party in workers’ compensation matters from 20 percent to 25 percent. In addition, it expands the application of the fee to orders for payment of medical and temporary disability benefits on motion and orders approving settlement of any kind.

Last Action: Reported from Senate Committee with Amendments, 2nd Reading, December 14, 2023

 

CASE SUMMARIES 12/1/2023-12/31/2023

PENNSYLVANIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
CASE SUMMARIES
12/1/2023 – 12/31/2023

 

EMPLOYER AND CO-EMPLOYEE IMMUNITY FROM LAWSUITS

John Brown v. George Gaydos, t/d/b/a Gaydos Construction
Superior Court of Pennsylvania – Published Opinion
Decided: December 7, 2023

Issue:

Whether the Court erroneously concluded that Defendant construction company was immune from third-party liability as Plaintiff’s co-employee?

Background:

In 2007 or 2008, Gaydos began doing general construction work as a sole proprietor using the name Gaydos Construction.  For the business, Gaydos purchased various trucks and tools. On April 9, 2016, Gaydos and his cousin, Raymond, signed a partnership agreement to operate a business under the name ACS.  All concrete and masonry jobs were bid and performed by ACS. The construction equipment and tools were owned by Gaydos, including a skid loader. Gaydos and Raymond agreed that each of them would furnish any equipment or tools they owned individually that were needed to perform the work on ACS’s jobs. They agreed that ACS would not own those tools and equipment and would not compensate either of them for use of those tools and equipment.  Plaintiff began working as an ACS employee on September 1, 2016. On that day, the skid loader owned by Gaydos was at the site. As Plaintiff attempted to enter the skid loader, the arm of the skid loader caught his body, seriously injuring him.  He thereafter made a claim for workers’ compensation benefits from ACS.  The workers’ compensation claim was not disputed.  Plaintiff initiated the civil action against Gaydos, alleging his negligence in improperly maintaining the skid loader and failing to supervise or train Plaintiff on its use.  Gaydos filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that Plaintiff’s claims were barred by the WC Act.

Holding:

In exchange for receiving workers’ compensation benefits without having to prove negligence, employees may not sue their employers in tort for injuries they incurred in the course of their employment.  Nevertheless, the courts of this Commonwealth have recognized the “dual capacity” doctrine, where an employer normally shielded from tort liability by the exclusive remedy principle may become liable in tort to his own employee if he occupies, in addition to his capacity as employer, a second capacity that confers on him obligations independent of those imposed on him as an employer.  This doctrine is inapplicable when the employee’s compensable injury occurred while he was actually engaged in the performance of his job.  Gaydos held an ownership interest in ACS and had the ability to direct ACS employees, including Plaintiff, with respect to the work to be performed and the equipment that could be used for each task. However, as an LLC, ACS was a distinct legal entity and, therefore, Gaydos was not personally responsible for ACS’s legal obligations, such as maintaining workers’ compensation insurance for its employees. Plaintiff filed his workers’ compensation claim against ACS rather than Gaydos.  As Gaydos did not directly employ Plaintiff and did not exert exclusive control over ACS, there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Gaydos was Plaintiff’s “master” under the WC Act. The trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Gaydos on the basis of the employer immunity.  The trial court also erred in granting summary judgment on the alternative basis that Gaydos was Plaintiff’s co-employee at the time of the accident, and, therefore, entitled to immunity.  The mere fact that both parties held positions of employment with the same employer at the time of the accident is not sufficient to show that they were in the same employ at the time of the accident. Rather, the act or omission must occur while both employees are in the course of their performance of duties for the employer.  There is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Gaydos was acting in furtherance of his duties as an employee/co-owner of ACS at the time of Plaintiff’s injury.

Reversed and Remanded.

FILING A TERMINATION PETITION WHILE AN APPEAL IS PENDING


Joseph Marvelli v. U.S. Foods, Inc. (WCAB)

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: December 21, 2023

 

Issue:

Whether the WCJ erred by addressing Employer’s Termination Petition while Claimant’s appeal of the injury description, as determined by another WCJ was still pending before the Board?

Background:

Claimant experienced sudden pain in his neck, shoulders, and upper back. Employer accepted liability for the injury through a medical-only Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP), which described the injury as a strain or tear of the shoulder.  Claimant submitted Claim, Reinstatement, and Review Petitions, in which he alleged that the injury description should be expanded to include injuries to his neck and back, including lumbar radiculopathy.  Employer filed a Review Petition of its own, in which it sought to amend the injury description from a shoulder injury to a strain of the cervical spine, consistent with the results of an IME of Claimant.  The WCJ amended the description of the work injury to a “cervical spine strain with strain of the surrounding paravertebral area.”  On appeal to the Board, Claimant argued that his proposed amendment of the injury description was erroneously rejected.   While Claimant’s appeal of first WCJ decision was pending before the Board, Employer filed a Termination Petition, in which it alleged that Claimant was fully recovered from his work injury as of March 15, 2019.  The WCJ dismissed it on the basis that the injury description was not settled and currently on appeal to the Board.  The Board vacated the WCJ’s dismissal of the Termination Petition and remanded for a decision on its merits.  On remand, the WCJ granted the Termination Petition.

Holding:

Employer was not barred from filing its Termination Petition while his appeal was pending before the Board.  Bechtel Power Corporation holds that when an appeal is pending, a party may not file a petition that would essentially relitigate issues identical to those to be reviewed on appeal.  However, the prohibition of a subsequent petition applies when both the issues and facts in the two petitions are identical. Alternately, when the petitions are based on different sets of facts, there is no re-litigation of issues that have already been decided and a party is not barred from filing a subsequent petition while the previous petition is on appeal.  Employer’s Termination Petition did not seek to relitigate any factual findings settled by the previous litigation.  Further, it was based on a different set of facts from those underlying Claimant’s Claim, Reinstatement, and Review Petitions.  Most notably, Employer’s Termination Petition did not challenge the injury description as it was already determined by first WCJ.

Affirmed.

IMPAIRMENT RATING EVALUATIONS

 

Craig A. Davis v. XPO LTL Solutions (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: December 22, 2023

Issue:

Whether the WCJ erred in reinstating Claimant’s benefits as of the date he filed his Reinstatement Petition?

Background:

In 2013 Claimant sustained a lower back injury during the course and scope of his employment as a dock worker with Employer. Employer requested an IRE, which determined that Claimant had a 6% impairment rating under the 6th Edition of the American Medical Association Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (AMA Guides) and 10% impairment based on the 4th Edition of the AMA Guides.  Employer filed a Notice of Change, modifying Claimant’s disability status from total to partial as of the date of the IRE. Claimant did not contest the Notice of Change at the time of its filing.  On February 4, 2021, before the 500 weeks of his partial disability expired, Claimant filed a Reinstatement Petition seeking a reinstatement of his TTD benefits effective the date of the IRE.  The WCJ granted the reinstatement of Claimant’s benefits back to TTD status as of the date Claimant filed the Reinstatement Petition.  The Board affirmed.

Holding:

Claimant did not challenge the decision modifying benefits. Claimant did not file his Reinstatement Petition seeking reinstatement in the instant case until February 4, 2021. Therefore, the WCJ correctly reinstated Claimant’s total disability status as of the date he filed his Reinstatement Petition, rather the date of the IRE.

Affirmed

JUDICIAL DISCRETION

Lorraine Majette v. Allentown School District (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: December 22, 2023

Issue:

Whether the WCJ failed to consider and appropriately weigh her evidence, and is the decision supported by substantial evidence?

Background:

Claimant was a special education teacher with Employer. Claimant filed the Claim Petition alleging that during her morning duty two boys fighting in the hallway struck Claimant in her back and she was slammed into a wall.  Claimant sought ongoing full disability benefits beginning that date.  The WCJ found Claimant met her burden of proving she sustained a compensable work injury on February 19, 2019.  The WCJ did not include shoulder injuries or rotator cuff tears in the description of Claimant’s injury.  The WCJ further found Claimant fully recovered from her back injuries as of January 9, 2020 and suspended her wage loss benefits on that date.  The Board affirmed the WCJ Decision, concluding the WCJ did not err when she found Claimant did not sustain a work-related injury to her shoulders.

Holding:

After considering Claimant’s testimony and the medical evidence presented, the WCJ found Claimant suffered a work injury, albeit not the full extent she alleged in her Claim Petition. The WCJ made reasonable credibility determinations and weighed the evidence, which a WCJ has authority to do in workers’ compensation cases. Ultimately, Claimant did not meet her burden of proving the incident at work caused a shoulder injury.  Substantial evidence supports the WCJ’s findings, and the Board did not err when it affirmed the WCJ Order.

Affirmed.

 

George Roscoe v. City of Philadelphia (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: December 20, 2023 

Issue:

Whether the WCJ improperly admitted and credited the amended IRE report?

Background:

On March 20, 2003, Claimant suffered a right knee fracture. Since then, his disability status has alternated between total and partial. In 2012, the parties resolved a petition for modification via stipulation that changed Claimant’s disability status from total disability to partial disability. The 2012 modification was deemed effective as of August 15, 2011.  On August 12, 2020, Claimant filed a petition seeking to reinstate total disability because he alleged that the IRE conducted in 2011 was unconstitutional. On February 8, 2021, this petition was granted, and Claimant’s total disability status and benefits were reinstated as of August 12, 2020.  An IRE on August 12, 2021 concluded that Claimant was 3% impaired. During her testimony, the IRE doctor noted an error she had made in her initial report. That same day, October 1, 2021, she issued an amended IRE report correcting the error, opining a 4% impairment. The WCJ granted Employer’s modification petition and modified Claimant’s benefits to temporary partial disability as of October 1, 2021.

Holding:

The amended IRE report was not inadmissible and could be credited by the WCJ.  The admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the WCJ. A WCJ’s determination regarding the admission of evidence will not be overturned without a showing of an abuse of that discretion.  The WCJ acted within her discretion in admitting the amended IRE report.

Affirmed.

 

ALLEGED ATTORNEY NEGLIGENCE

 

Kelly A. Finck v. Union County Commissioners (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: December 18, 2023

Issues:

Whether Claimant’s counsel was ineffective by failing to present additional evidence?

Background:

On October 30, 2016, Claimant allegedly slipped and fell on a wet floor while working as a cook, injuring her hip. Claimant filed her first claim petition on February 10, 2017.  Thereafter, Employer offered Claimant a light-duty, part-time position as a receptionist, and Claimant worked in that capacity from August 24 until October 10, 2017.  Prior to returning to light-duty work, Claimant’s husband was convicted of an election-related offense and sentenced to a period of incarceration. The light-duty position Claimant was assigned was located just outside the election board’s office, and, as a result, Claimant had frequent contact with individuals she blamed for her husband’s arrest.  On April 11, 2018, Claimant filed a second claim petition alleging anxiety disorder and panic attacks caused by actions of other County employees.  The WCJ denied and dismissed both claim petitions. The Board affirmed.

Holding:

While the effective assistance of counsel is not constitutionally mandated in the workers’ compensation context, proven incompetency may constitute cause shown for a rehearing under Section 426 of the Act.  However, an attorney’s mere misjudgment about a strategic choice, which was a conscious and deliberate decision, will not be sufficient to warrant a reversal of the Board’s discretionary decision to deny a rehearing.  For attorney incompetence to amount to “cause shown” in this context, the claimant must satisfy two elements: (i) objective incompetence on the part of counsel, and (ii) manifest injustice to the claimant flowing from that objective incompetence.  Here, Claimant’s counsel reasonably could have concluded that further evidence in an already evidence-rich case could divert the WCJ’s attention from the most important issues. Counsel could have reasonably concluded that further cross-examination, too, would detract from the overall message of Claimant’s case, unduly burden the witnesses, and prejudice Claimant’s case. And finally, counsel could have reasonably concluded that the “gossiping” of which Claimant complained was not sufficiently egregious or prejudicial to Claimant’s case to distract from the issues to which counsel wanted to direct the WCJ’s attention.  Further, the record belies any suggestion of incompetence. Therefore, the claimant has failed to meet the standard.

Affirmed.

 

OFFSETS – SEVERENCE BENEFITS

Warminster Township v. Sean Murray (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: December 20, 2023

Issue:

Whether the Board’s conclusion that Employer was not entitled to a credit for severance benefits that Claimant received under his separation agreement was correct?

Background:

Claimant worked as a skilled laborer in Employer’s public works department for 13 years.  Claimant went on paid leave in March 2019 due to an ongoing injury to his right knee. Claimant never returned to work and ultimately signed a separation agreement on December 6, 2019, resigning his position and releasing Employer from liability for various legal claims in exchange for one year’s salary.

Holding:

The Court affirmed the Board’s order in part and reversed in part. The Court reversed to the extent the Board concluded Employer was not entitled to a credit for net severance benefits Claimant received under his separation agreement and remanded to the Board with instructions to further remand to the WCJ for calculation of the correct credit, consistent.  Employer should have received a credit for payments made to Claimant under the separation agreement, which fell squarely within the definition of a “severance benefit.”  Claimant’s separation agreement provided he would receive one year’s salary, totaling $48,422.40, “subject to all required withholdings and deductions, with the exception of any deductions for pension and health insurance.”

Reversed and Remanded.

 

MENTAL/MENTAL INJURIES

Erin Smith v. Warwick School District, et al (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: December 20, 2023

Issue:

Whether the Board erred in concluding Claimant failed to establish the existence of an abnormal working condition?

Background:

On April 20, 2017, Claimant filed a Claim Petition alleging that on April 23, 2014, while working as a teacher, she experienced disabling psychological injuries because “Employer intentionally, recklessly, and/or negligently falsely accused the Claimant of child abuse.” The WCJ found Employer’s discipline of Claimant for her actions regarding a student was “unusual.” Further, the WCJ found Claimant met her burden of proving a psychological injury, “adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood,” and it resulted from her experiences during April and May 2014. The WCJ granted Claimant’s Claim Petition and awarded her benefits.  Both the School District and Claimant appealed the WCJ decision to the Board.  The Board disagreed with the WCJ’s conclusion that Claimant established the existence of an “abnormal working condition.”

Holding:

In this mental/mental case, Claimant must prove she suffered the injury caused by her employment and that an abnormal working condition caused the mental injury.  Psychological injury cases are highly fact-specific and must be considered in the context of specific employment.  The WCJ found an abnormal working condition existed because the particular discipline Employer meted out, a five-day suspension without pay, was unusual given the lack of evidence to support it.  However, as the Board indicated, not agreeing on the ultimate decision by the administration, obtained through the proper procedures, does not create an abnormal working condition.  The WCJ credited Employer’s witnesses who testified the events were not highly unusual or extraordinary, including that it was not unusual for complaints of suspected child abuse being made to authorities, nor was it unusual for a school district to investigate allegations of suspected child abuse and it was not unusual for a school district to discipline an employee for deficiencies in performance, for an employee or union to file a grievance, for an arbitrator to partially grant and partially deny a grievance, for a school district to remove a teacher from a classroom and place her in an administrative office during an investigation, nor was it unusual for a school district to change the assignment of a teacher. Additionally, an independent consultant, testified the circumstances Claimant encountered were not unusual. This type of situation was not completely out of the ordinary for a teacher to potentially experience, and the investigation was done with professionalism and through the proper procedures.  Disagreeing with the result of a proper investigation does not transform that investigation into an abnormal working condition.  This Court did conclude abnormal working conditions existed when an employer accused its office manager of embezzlement and threatened her with jail, despite knowing the accusation was false. Miller v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (New Wilmington Fam. Prac.).  This Court also held abnormal working conditions existed when an employer falsely accused an office clerk of committing a wrongful act, intimidated her, and threatened to terminate her employment, all despite knowing the accusation was false. U.S. Airways v. Workers’ Comp. Unlike in the present case, in Miller and U.S. Airways, employers knowingly made false accusations and participated in other intimidating or aggressive actions. In the case of Claimant, someone filed a complaint with the authorities and Employer investigated it with professionalism and with proper procedures.  The Board did not err in reversing the WCJ when the Board held Claimant failed to establish the existence of an abnormal working condition in her “mental/mental” claim for workers’ compensation benefits.

Affirmed.

CONCURRENT EMPLOYMENT

Resources for Human Development, Inc., et al v. Sherry Dixon (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Published Opinion
Decided: December 20, 2023

Issue:

Whether the WCJ’s decision increasing Claimant’s AWW to include her concurrent employment for Public Partnerships was erroneous?

Background:

Claimant, a home health aide, sustained a work-related injury when a patient fell onto her. Employer accepted an injury in the nature of a multiple trunk strain or tear.  The NTCP listed Claimant’s weekly compensation rate as $468.00 based on an AWW of $520.00. Claimant filed the Review Petition, alleging that her AWW did not include wages from her concurrent employment as a private duty home health aide with Public Partnerships.  The WCJ found Claimant had concurrent employment.  The Board affirmed.

Holding:

The WCJ correctly distinguished that the law does not require Claimant to have been working for Public Partnerships on her actual day of injury to receive a higher AWW, and that Claimant’s longstanding and ongoing employment with Public Partnerships constituted concurrent employment.  Claimant was concurrently employed at the time of her injury. The employment relationship remained sufficiently intact so as to constitute concurrent employment for purposes of Section 309(e).  Further, substantial evidence supported the WCJ’s findings, and the conclusions were consistent with Section 306(e) and precedent.

Affirmed.

 

EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP – BORROWED SERVANT

Anthony Mason v. NE Architectural Products et al.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: December 21, 2023

Issue:

Whether the trial court erred in ruling that Plaintiff was Daron’s borrowed employee as a matter of law?

Background:

Mason (Plaintiff) instituted a negligence action following a work-related injury he suffered while working at defendant Daron’s manufacturing plant. Approximately a month prior to the injury, Plaintiff went to Express Services, Inc. (Express), a temporary employment agency, in search of employment.  When Plaintiff arrived at Daron for work, one of Daron’s supervisors gave him a tour of the facility, and provided him with hearing protection, eyewear, and gloves. Daron had a “brief” discussion with Plaintiff concerning his job responsibilities.  The accident occurred when Plaintiff stopped the conveyer belt after noticing “a brick was angled improperly” as it entered the palletizer.  Plaintiff initiated this negligence action against Daron and Daron thereafter filed an answer and new matter, and later, a motion for summary judgement, asserting it was statutorily immune from liability as Plaintiff ‘s employer. The trial court granted Daron’s motion and entered judgment in its favor.

 

Holding:

The trial court found Daron was immune from liability under the WCA because Plaintiff was his “borrowed employee,” as Plaintiff passed under the Daron’s right of control with regard not only to the work to be done but also to the manner of performing it. The Court found no error here.  There was no contract between Express and Daron and, therefore, no explicit language describing the relationship between the parties.   Daron directed Plaintiff as to the manor of his work and trained him how to do it.  The focus is on whether Daron had the right to control not only the work to be done but also the manner of performing it, regardless of whether Daron “actually exercised” that control.   Accordingly, the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion when it determined, as a matter of law, that Plaintiff was Daron’s “borrowed employee” at the time of his accident, and that, therefore, Daron is immune from civil liability under the WCA.

Affirmed.

 

 

MEDICAL FEE REVIEWS

Pennsylvania L.C.B. v. 3B Pain Management (Bureau of WC Fee Review H.O.)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: December 4, 2023

Issue:

Whether the Hearing Officer erred by ruling that Employer was liable for payment of Claimant’s medical and chiropractic treatment?

Background:

Claimant fell in the parking lot outside Employer’s store. Claimant filed a claim petition alleging that he sustained an injury in the course and scope of his employment.  The WCJ granted the Claim Petition, describing Claimant’s injury as a “meniscal tear of the right knee and chondromalacia of the femoral and tibial condyle of the right knee.” Provider administered chiropractic treatment to Claimant. This treatment consisted of spinal manipulation relating to low back pain, manipulation of Claimant’s knees and his right hip for pain, low level laser treatment on his right knee, and therapeutic massage for unidentified muscle spasms. Provider billed Employer’s TPA for this treatment as it related to Claimant’s work injury. TPA denied payment for a large part of these invoices on the basis that the procedure codes were not valid reimbursable codes and/or were invalid for reimbursement under the Act.  Provider filed a fee review application and the Bureau’s Fee Review Section determined that the amount owed for each invoice was $0. Provider contested the fee review determinations, and the Hearing Office assigned the Hearing Officer to conduct hearings. At the hearings, TPA argued that Provider’s invoices were for treatments to Claimant’s right knee, left knee, left hip, and back, which were not related to Claimant’s accepted work injury. Provider asserted that, because TPA’s denials were based on a lack of causal relationship between the treatment and the work injury, TPA was required to seek utilization review.  The Hearing Officer determined that Provider was entitled to reimbursement for all of the treatment it provided to Claimant because Employer/TPA had neither sought UR of Provider’s treatment, nor filed a review petition related to said treatment. Employer appealed to this Court.

Holding:

The fee review process is limited to the timeliness of the employer’s payment (or denial) and the correct amount of reimbursement owed to the provider.  The fee review process presupposes that liability has been established.  Once liability for a work injury has been established, the employer may file a modification petition to change the scope of the accepted injury, or it can seek UR.  A claimant may be under treatment for an array of medical problems, only some of which relate to the work injury. It is for the UR organization to sort this out.  If the treatment was prescribed for a medical problem that is not work-related, a fortiori it is not reasonable or necessary for treatment of the accepted work injury.  Here, Employer’s claim that the disputed treatment was not related to Claimant’s work injury was just another way of stating that it was not a reasonable or necessary ‘procedure’ for treating Claimant’s ‘diagnosis.’  Employer was obligated to seek UR to dispute liability for Claimant’s treatment.

Affirmed.

 

ORDER THAT OPINION BE REPORTED

 

Bernice Bennett v. Jeld Wen, Inc. (WCAB)

On December 15, 2023, upon consideration of Respondent Jeld-Wen, Inc.’s Motion for Publication of Memorandum Opinion (Motion), the Court granted the Motion.  The Memorandum Opinion, filed October 6, 2023, will be designated an opinion and will be reported.

Issues:

Whether the Board usurped the jurisdiction of the Hearing Office by granting a de novo hearing and allowing appeals nunc pro tunc of unappealed decisions of the Bureau?  Whether the Board erred in reversing the WCJ’s assessment of penalties?

Background:

Claimant sustained a work-related injury in 2010.  By a C&R Agreement approved by the WCJ on October 19, 2017 the parties resolved the wage loss and specific loss claims relative to Claimant’s work injury. The C&R Agreement indicated that Employer reserved the right to either continue administering Claimant’s medical benefits in accordance with the Act or to fund a CMS-approved MSA.  Later Claimant’s doctor prescribed a compound cream. When Carrier did not issue payment, Pharmacy filed Fee Review Applications with the Medical Fee Review Section of the Bureau.  Ultimately, 12 administrative determinations were issued ordering payment of the bills with interest, which Employer did not appeal. Employer made no payments to Pharmacy for those dates of service.  Eventually, Claimant filed the Penalty Petition.  The WCJ issued a July 2020 Decision finding that Claimant had met her burden of proving that Employer violated the Act.  The Board granted Employer’s Petition for Hearing.  The Board concluded that a de novo hearing under Section 425 was warranted to address the issue of a prohibited self-referral and to allow for submission of Hearing Officer Torrey’s Fee Review Decision into evidence.  The Board concluded that while Claimant had established that there were unpaid bills, Employer consistently defended its actions, arguing that the bills were not payable because of the relationship between prescriber and Pharmacy and asserting that its attempts to obtain the information of that relationship were consistently rebuffed.  The Board held that while any penalty would be paid to Claimant, the WCJ directed Employer to pay Pharmacy tens of thousands of dollars, allowing for the potential that prescriber and Pharmacy would reap a financial benefit from Claimant’s Penalty Petition.  Any penalty award to Claimant is tied to the potential improper conduct of her physician and pharmacy. The Board concluded that, if the improper conduct was confirmed, it would decline to allow financial benefit from it.   In the interest of justice, the Board vacated the WCJ’s grant of the Penalty Petition and award of unreasonable contest fees and ordered a de novo hearing before the Board, after which the Board would decide the issue of the Penalty Petition.  After the de novo hearing, the Board affirmed that, Employer established that it had not violated the Act, and the Board denied and dismissed the Penalty Petition.

Holding:

The Board did not abuse its discretion or err in granting the Section 425 de novo hearing under these highly unusual circumstances, or in relying on the evidence presented therein that confirmed the unpaid bills were the result of a prohibited self-referral for which no claim for payment could be made under Section 306(f.1)(3)(iii), we affirm the Board’s denial of the Penalty Petition and Claimant’s request for unreasonable contest attorneys’ fees.

Affirmed.

 

PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATIVE REVIEW

As noted previously, there are presently pending before the Pennsylvania General Assembly, a number of Bills which seek to amend the Pennsylvania Worker’s Compensation Act in various ways.  When these Bills are proposed by Pa House members, they go through the House’s Labor and Industry Committee.   When, and if, the Bill is passed by the House, it must go through the Pa Senate for additional review.   As of this date, two of the proposed Bills have passed the House, and are under review by the Pa. Senate’s Labor and Industry Committee.  They are summarized below.  We are monitoring these bills.  As of December 31, 2023, the Senate L&I Committee is still reviewing these House Bills and it has not sent them back to the Senate for review, alteration or consideration.

Regular Session 2023-2024

House Bill 760

Short Title:      An Act amending the act of June 2, 1915 (P.L.736, No.338), known as the Workers’ Compensation Act, in liability and compensation, further providing for compensation payable in periodical installments.

Subject:           Direct Deposit for Workers’ Compensation

This bill seeks to amend Act 338 of 1915 (Workers’ Compensation Act) by allowing individuals who qualify for workers’ compensation to request their compensation through direct deposit into an account of their choosing. These types of payment methods would be similar to the methods that are currently used to pay benefits to those that qualify for Unemployment Compensation. Implementation of this change was recommended unanimously by the Workers’ Compensation Advisory Council (WCAC) last year.

Last Action:    Referred to LABOR AND INDUSTRY, May 9, 2023 [Senate]

 

House Bill 930

Short Title:      An Act amending the act of June 2, 1915 (P.L.736, No.338), known as the Workers’ Compensation Act, in liability and compensation, further providing for schedule of compensation.  Expanding Workers’ Compensation for Permanent Disfigurement

Subject:           Expanding Workers’ Compensation for Permanent Disfigurement

This bill seeks to extend existing workers’ compensation eligibility for permanent disfigurement from 275 weeks to 400 weeks and clarify that claimants are not precluded from collecting both total or partial disability benefits and disfigurement benefits simultaneously. It would also provide workers’ compensation coverage for disfigurement regardless of where it occurs on their body.

Last Action:    Referred to LABOR AND INDUSTRY, May 9, 2023 [Senate]

NEW JERSEY WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

CASE SUMMARIES

12/01/2023 – 12/31/2023

EMPLOYMENT STATUS AND SCHOOL

Soto v. Hoosier Care, Inc.

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division – Unpublished Opinion
NO. A-0507-22; 2023 WL 8539408
Decided: 12/11/2023

Background:

Soto was injured while working for Hoosier. Soto filed a claim petition alleging injuries to her neck, head, back, and shoulder. The claim was settled and approved by a workers’ compensation judge. The agreement acknowledged Soto’s “re-opener” rights, which allow her two years to seek additional medical care as well as an increase in permanent or temporary disability.

Following her injury, Soto worked for different agencies and began taking classes at a college. Ultimately, Soto was out of work after the agency she worked for closed and she received unemployment benefits while remaining a full-time college student.

Soto filed an application for a review or modification of her compensation award a year after her award, alleging she suffered additional pain and had worsened range of motion in her neck and shoulder. Soto was evaluated again by her medical expert who determined she had additional issues with her spine and that her work injury was a material contributing factor.

Hoosier provided medical benefits but declined to provide temporary disability benefits. A WCJ ordered temporary disability benefits and found that Soto was both working and going to college; specifically finding that Soto did not voluntarily leave the workforce. Hoosier moved for reconsideration, which the WCJ denied.

Holding:

 

On Appeal, Hoosier argued that Soto did not meet her burden of proof “because she was unemployed at the time of her application and failed to prove that she would have been working ‘but for the work related injury.’”

The Court found that the argument is without merit. Soto became unemployed because her employer went out of business. She continued to search for employment and collect unemployment benefits at the time of her application. “[C]ollege attendance alone is not dispositive of her employment status.” The WCJ found that Soto’s testimony that she continued to work and seek employment while also attending school was credible. The record supports that she would have been working if not for the disability.

This case is distinguishable from Tamecki v. Johns-Manville Products Corporation. In that case, a college student was injured during a temporary summer position and received temporary disability benefits until his return to school. Here, Soto testified that her college status did not change her involuntary employment status.

Additionally, Soto established through her medical examiner that her injuries worsened and that the worsened injuries were causally related to her work injury.

Affirmed.

INTENTIONAL WRONG EXCEPTION

 

Hueman v. Hueman

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division – Unpublished Opinion
NO. A-1593-21; 2023 WL 8539709
Decided: 12/11/2023

Background:

A company agreed to perform masonry work as a contractor for a home construction project. The contractor, Wayne, would often hire his cousin, Glen, to help him with masonry jobs and he would be paid in cash with his employment never formally reported. Glen agreed to help with the masonry job and would mix the mortar using a mortar mix which Wayne had modified. Glen used the mixer several times without issue before suffering an injury to the eye when he attempted to start the mixer. The injury resulted in the removal of his eye and the need for a prosthetic.

Glen filed a claim petition. He additionally sued for negligence, which Wayne argued was barred by the Workers’ Compensation Act. Glen testified that although he never received instruction on how to use the mixer, he had experience with it from working on other masonry jobs. He also testified that Wayne had indicated to him that he had insurance. Wayne testified that at the time of the incident, he was unaware of his statutory requirement to have workers’ compensation insurance as he mostly worked by himself. He additionally testified that the modification to the mixer was a common practice in the industry. Wayne’s medical expert concluded that “Glen’s injuries were not ‘attributable to an intentional act’ by the defendants” because the modification was a “long-standing industry practice” and there was not a substantial certainty that the modification would cause the injuries.

Wayne moved for summary judgment arguing that Glen’s claims were barred by the Workers Compensation Act because Glen was an employee, and the modification was not an intentional wrong. Glen alleged the claims were not barred by the Act because Wayne failed to obtain required workers’ compensation insurance and Glen was a casual employee. The court granted Wayne’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed Glen’s complaint with prejudice. The court determined that Glen was Wayne’s employee.

The court found that Wayne’s failure to have workers’ compensation insurance “was not dispositive to permit plaintiff to assert a third-party negligence claim” because it was not an exception to the workers’ compensation bar. The Uninsured Employers’ Fund was intended for situations like this.

Holding:

On Appeal, Glen claims the Fund does not compensate Glen adequately because it does not allow for permanent disability recovery. They additionally argue that there is an issue of material fact as to whether Wayne knew the modification could result in Glen’s injury.

The Court stated that the legislature anticipated situations where employers failed to or refused to compensate their employees under the statute.  The Legislature created the Fund and there is also the ability to bring civil and criminal suits.

To demonstrate an intention harm, the employee “must satisfy a two-prong test involving the employer’s conduct and ‘the context in which that conduct takes place.’” To prove the conduct prong, “the employee must ‘establish the employer knew that its actions were substantially certain to result in injury or death to the employee.’” To prove the context prong, “the employee must demonstrate ‘the resulting injury and the circumstances of its infliction were more than a fact of life of industrial employment and plainly beyond anything Legislature intended the WCA to immunize.’”

Here, the Court did not find that Wayne’s actions satisfy the high bar to apply the intentional wrong exception. There is no evidence that Wayne knew the modified mixer would result in injury. In addition, the modification was common practice in the industry.

Affirmed.

Rodriguez v. Shelbourne Spring, LLC, Green Power Developers, LLC, Unity Construction, Rocco A. Dimichino, Sundance Electrical Co., LLC, SF Johnson Electric, Inc., Facility Solutions Group, Johnson Controls Security Solutions, LLC, Managed Business Communications, Inc., SIR Electric, LLC v. Hartford Underwriters Insurance Company

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division – Unpublished Opinion
NO. A-2079-22; 2023 WL 8868415
Decided: 12/22/2023

Background:

Dionicio Rodriguez (Rodriguez) received benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act from his Employer SIR Electric, LLC (SIR) after being injured at work. Then Rodriguez filed an action against SIR alleging his injuries were caused by SIR’s negligence, recklessness, and intentional misconduct. SIR wanted defense coverage for the tort claims from Hartford under its employer’s liability insurance policy. The coverage included employer’s liability and workers’ compensation insurance. Hartford denied coverage and asserted it had no duty to defend based on its Employer’s Liability EII exclusion. SIR then filed a third party complaint that Hartford had a duty to defend the negligence claims. Hartford filed a motion to dismiss, which was granted.

Holding:

On Appeal, SIR argued that even though Rodriguez received workers’ compensation benefits, Hartford had a duty to defend the tort lawsuit. SIR additionally argued that Hartford did not have to indemnify SIR for Rodriguez’s claim.

The Workers’ Compensation Act provides that “workers’ compensation is the exclusive remedy, absent proof of an intentional wrong.” Therefore, the tort claims were obligations imposed by workers’ compensation law. However, there is an exception for an injury caused by the employer’s intentional wrong. “[A]n employee seeking to prove an employer committed an intentional wrong must demonstrate either (1) that the employer had a subjective desire to injure, or (2) that ‘based on all the facts and circumstances of the case … the employer knew that an injury was substantially certain to result.’” Substantially certain is a high bar.

The Judge properly found that the exclusionary language in other cases was distinguishable from Hartford’s Employer’s Liability EEI exclusion because the policy was unambiguous because it stated did not provide insurance coverage for “any and all intentional wrongs within the exception allowed under the” Workers’ Compensation Act.

Affirmed.

 

PRE-EXISTING CONDITION

 

Smith v. H&H Transportation, Inc.

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division – Unpublished Opinion
NO. A-3568-21; 2023 WL 8801267
Decided: 12/20/2023

Background:

Donald Smith (Smith) was hired by Employer as a truck driver. Smith was in an accident while driving a truck and sustained injuries to both legs, his left hip, and back. Before the accident, Smith had a history of back pain and received treatment. Smith was seen by an orthopedic surgeon who found that his thoracic and lumbar sprain symptoms were causally related to his injury but also found that his disc abnormalities were not related because they were a degenerative condition. The surgeon further found that Smith could return to work and Employer terminated temporary disability benefits.

Smith filed a Claim Petition and asserted low back pain, leg pain, and knee pain. Smith then was seen by a neurosurgeon who found Smith had several issues and performed five procedures on his back. Smith then filed a Motion for Temporary and Medical Benefits for medications and physical therapy for his back based on the neurosurgeon’s certification and records. Employer opposed the motion.

The Judge found that Smith’s medical records indicated longstanding degenerative issues instead of an acutely post traumatic injury. The Judge further found that work injury did not accelerate or exacerbate his existing issues and ultimately concluded that Smith’s need for treatment was not causally related. Smith appealed.

Holding:

On Appeal, Smith argued the Judge gave undue weight to the orthopedic surgeon’s opinion and that the Judge ignored facts on the record. Specifically, his previous physical examinations and lack of medical treatment for his back prior to the accident.

The Court found that the Judge’s decision was supported by the record. The Judge credited the orthopedic surgeon’s opinion that the injury was not caused or aggravated by the accident and found this opinion to be “credible, logical and consistent, both medically and factually.” His opinion was supported by a comparison of CT scans which showed no worsening of the disc herniation. In contrast, the Judge found the neurosurgeon’s opinion was not supported by the objective testing as it actually contradicted it. The Judge found that there was definite objective proof that there was no evidence of acute T7-T8 pathology related to the accident. The Judge’s findings were reached on sufficient credible evidence in the record, therefore the Court declined to substitute their own factfinding.

Affirmed.

 

ACCIDENTAL DISABILITY RETIREMENT BENEFITS

Hurley v. Board of Trustees, Police & Fireman’s Retirement System of New Jersey

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division – Unpublished Opinion
NO. A-2590-21; 2023 WL 8311306
Decided: 12/01/2023

Background:

Hurley was an officer for the Atlantic City Police Department and was in an accident on October 11, 2015 where his police vehicle was struck by another vehicle while on patrol. Following the accident, he was diagnosed with post-concussive disorder and a traumatic brain injury. He treated with workers’ compensation doctors and received physical therapy. The Board of Trustees of the Police and Fireman’s Retirement System (Board) denied Hurley’s request for accidental disability retirement benefits based on the accident. The Board found that Hurley was totally and permanently disabled, but that his “disability was ‘the result of a pre-existing disease alone or a pre-existing disease that [was] aggravated or accelerated by the work effort.’”

Hurley appealed to the Office of Administrative Law. The ALJ heard testimony from Hurley and his expert witnesses. Dr. Gollin, an expert witness in psychiatry, determined that “Hurley suffered from post-concussive syndrome in addition to depressive disorder as a result of the accident.” He further stated that Hurley is permanently disabled as a result of the accident and his prognosis for recovery is very poor. Dr. Pilchman, an expert in psychology, determined Hurley was disabled with an eighty-three percent possibility of being unable to function safely in his job. Dr. Pilchman additionally diagnosed him with post-concussive disorder and major depression as a result of the accident.

Dr. Filippone, the Board’s expert witness in psychology, found no convincing evidence that Hurley was suffering from post-concussive syndrome. He further opined that Hurley was malingering. Dr. Filippone determined that Hurley had a psychological disorder, but it was not caused by the accident.

The ALJ affirmed the Board’s decision denying Hurley’s request for benefits. The Board found Dr. Filippone’s testimony persuasive and concluded Hurley was permanently or totally disabled, but not as a result of the 2015 work-related accident.

Holding:

On Appeal, Hurley argues the ALJ should not have required him to satisfy the test in Patterson v. Board of Trustees, Police & Firemen’s Retirement System, 194 N.J. 29, 33 (2008). He further argued that his disability is a direct result of the 2015 accident.

The Court agreed with Hurley that Patterson is not the appropriate test because Hurley alleged a physical and mental disability. Hurley had to meet the requirements in Richardson v. Board of Trustees, Police & Firemen’s Retirement System, 192 N.J. 189, 192 (2007). This requires Hurley to prove that the mental issues he suffers from were a direct result of the October 2015 accident.

The Court concluded that the ALJ relied on Dr. Filippone’s testimony and reasonably found that “Hurley had a pre-existing condition and failed to satisfy the Richardson requirements for accidental disability retirement benefits.” As a fact-finder, the ALJ has discretion to accept or reject an expert’s testimony, given that there is evidence in the record to support the determination. There was substantial credible evidence in the record supporting the determination that Hurley’s disability was not the direct result of the October 2015 accident.

Affirmed.

Smith v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division – Unpublished Opinion
NO. A-2606-21; 2023 WL 8715198
Decided: 12/18/2023

Background:

Smith worked as a police officer with the Camden County Police Department. Smith injured herself while restraining a man when responding to a call. Following the incident, she treated with doctors, had procedures, and received physical therapy. A functional capacity examination (FCE) was performed, and Smith was advised by her doctor that she had reached maximal medical improvement and she was discharged from care. Based on the results of the FCE, the doctor did not believe that Smith could return to work as a police officer.

Smith applied for accidental disability retirement benefits. In her application, she claimed to be totally and permanently disabled as a result of the injuries suffered in her work accident. The Board denied the application and concluded Smith did not sustain a permanent and total injury. The Board further concluded that any injury she suffered was not a direct result of the work incident.

Smith appealed and the case was heard by the Office of Administrative Law. An administrative law judge (ALJ) determined the Board’s decision was appropriate as Smith failed to present credible evidence that she was totally and permanently disabled and failed to demonstrate that her injuries were the direct result of the work incident. Smith then filed exceptions with the Board, who affirmed the denial. Next, Smith appealed that decision.

Holding:

On Appeal, Smith argued that she is totally and permanently disabled from the performance of her job as a police officer. She additionally argued that her disability is a direct result of the work incident and that she is entitled to accident disability retirement benefits.

To qualify for accidental disability retirement benefits under the statute, the member must prove permanent and total disability. The ALJ had to determine, based on credible evidence in the record, which expert’s opinion was more credible. The Court determined that there was more than enough evidence in the record to conclude that Smith did not meet her burden to prove that she suffered a total and permanent disability. Even if she had proved she suffered a total and permanent disability, she was still required to prove additional prongs to obtain accidental disability retirement benefits. These prongs include a direct causal connection between the incident and her disability. The ALJ correctly determined that Smith’s medical expert failed to present credible evidence that the shoulder injury was a direct result of the work incident. The ALJ relied on the Board’s medical expert who determined there was a lack of evidence that “she suffered a total and permanent injury as a direct result of a powerful blow or similar forceful trauma to her shoulder during” the work incident. The Court was satisfied with the Board’s adoption of the ALJ’s decision as it “was based on substantial credible evidence in the record and was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.”

Affirmed.

 

NEW JERSEY LEGISLATIVE UPDATES

Senate Bill 3309

This bill sets the maximum fees for evaluating physicians for petitioners for the written reports at $1,000. This is an increase of $400 from the previous maximum of $600. In addition, this bill also allows a psychologist, nurse practitioner, or licensed clinical social worker who provides psychological treatment to be paid a fee for testimony or a report.

Last Action: This bill was approved on July 20, 2023 and went into effect immediately.

Proposed Senate Bill 4059

This bill establishes the 21st Century Injured Workers’ Access to Justice Fund. This bill revises the cap on contingency fees to a prevailing party in workers’ compensation matters from 20 percent to 25 percent. In addition, it expands the application of the fee to orders for payment of medical and temporary disability benefits on motion and orders approving settlement of any kind.

Last Action: Reported out of Assembly Committee with Amendments, 2nd Reading, November 30, 2023

 

 

 

CASE SUMMARIES 11/1/2023-11/30/2023

PENNSYLVANIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

CASE SUMMARIES

11/1/2023 – 11/30/2023

 

PENALTY – PAYMENT FOR CBD OIL

Mark R. Schmidt v. Schmidt, Kirifides And Rassias, PC (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Published Opinion
Decided: November 14, 2023

Issues:

Whether the Board erred by: (1) violating the standard of review by disregarding the WCJ’s findings of fact and engaging in its own fact finding, in reaching its conclusions, and failing to accord all reasonable inferences to the prevailing party, Claimant herein; (2) expressly refusing to define whether CBD oil is a medicine or supply within the meaning of the Act; (3) concluding that a claimant is required to submit the type of billing forms and medical reports required of treatment providers to obtain reimbursement for the costs of medicines and supplies to treat his work injuries; (4) concluding it would violate federal law to direct an insurer to reimburse Claimant for an over-the-counter dietary supplement; and (5) theorizing about the effect on insurers if required to pay for over-the-counter medicines or supplies, and disregarding the Act’s humanitarian objectives regarding Claimant’s right to treatment and the goal of enabling injured workers to return to/continue to work?

Background:

In the course of his employment with Employer, Claimant sustained a work injury.  Specifically, he sustained an aggravation of a preexisting degenerative disc disease at the levels of L4-5 and L5-S1 with radiculopathy. In 2018, a WCJ granted a Claim Petition for Claimant’s lower back injury and awarded Claimant all reasonable, necessary and related medical expenses.  Claimant opposed increasing his pain medication as such would affect his ability to think, focus, and represent clients. After seeking different alternatives, such as aqua therapy, injections, and surgery, Dr. Murphy prescribed CBD oil in lieu of increasing Claimant’s medication dosages.  Claimant supplied the CBD oil prescription and receipts to Employer, and Employer refused to reimburse Claimant’s out-of-pocket CBD oil expenses on the basis that CBD oil is not a pharmaceutical drug.  Claimant filed a Penalty Petition, alleging therein that Employer violated the Act by failing to reimburse him for out-of-pocket costs for medical treatment.  The WCJ granted the Penalty Petition.  The Board reversed.

Holding:

The Board erred by: (1) violating the standard of review by disregarding WCJ DiLorenzo’s findings of fact and engaging in its own fact finding, in reaching its conclusions, and failing to accord all reasonable inferences to the prevailing party, Claimant herein; (2) expressly refusing to define whether CBD oil is a medicine or supply within the meaning of the Act; (3) concluding that a claimant is required to submit the type of billing forms and medical reports required of treatment providers to obtain reimbursement for the costs of medicines and supplies to treat his work injuries; (4) concluding it would violate federal law to direct an insurer to reimburse Claimant for an over-the-counter dietary supplement; and (5) theorizing about the effect on insurers if required to pay for over-the-counter medicines or supplies, and disregarding the Act’s humanitarian objectives regarding Claimant’s right to treatment and the goal of enabling injured workers to return to/continue to work.

Claimant was prescribed CBD oil to treat Claimant’s work injury and CBD oil is a supply for which Employer is responsible to pay under the Act.  The WCJ’s findings are supported by substantial record evidence.  The Board erred by violating the standard of review by disregarding the WCJ’s findings of fact and engaging in its own fact finding.  Further, nothing in the Act restricts compensable medicine and supplies to items which can only be obtained through a pharmacist, nor is there any statutory language prohibiting reimbursement for medicines and supplies which can be obtained over the counter.  If Employer did not believe that CBD oil is a reasonable and necessary medical treatment for Claimant’s pain, it had the remedy of submitting that claim to the UR process.  Whether a treatment is FDA approved for a particular purpose should be raised within the framework of the UR process as it is a challenge to the reasonableness and necessity of the treatment.   The Court held that CBD oil is a supply for purposes of Section 306(f.1)(1)(i) of the Act.  Further, because Claimant is not a health care provider, Claimant was not required to submit an HCFA form and/or periodic medical reports in order to receive reimbursement from Employer.  Claimant only had to submit his doctor’s prescription for CBD oil to treat the pain caused by his work injury and his receipts therefore, which he did.  The Court disagreed that requiring Employer to pay for the CBD would violate federal law. CBD is not marijuana or medical marijuana and does not fall under the federal restrictions related to those substances.  CBD is lawfully sold over the counter in Pennsylvania and all over the United States, which is exactly how Claimant obtained it here.

Reversed.

DISSENTING OPINION BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON

The dissent noted that the legal status of hemp products is in flux and that the medicinal use of these substances raises important policy and regulatory questions that must be answered by the Legislature, not by the Court.  Also, the dissent did not believe that claimant’s non-provider status excused him from submitting proper documentation in order to trigger reimbursement requirements or that CBD oil is subject to reimbursement by an employer or its insurer under the current provisions of the WC Act.

CONCURRING OPINION BY JUDGE WALLACE

Judge Wallace agreed with the Majority’s analysis but wished to provide her belief that CBD oil is a medicine rather than a supply under the Workers’ Compensation Act.

 

NOTICE

Newman & Company v. Mark Warner (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: November 30, 2023

Issues:

Whether the WCJ erred by not denying and dismissing the Petition because Claimant failed to prove that he gave Employer timely notice of his alleged work-related injury; Whether the WCJ erred by failing to allow Employer to take an offset for Claimant’s post-injury earnings from a subsequent employer?

Background:

On May 14, 2021, Claimant filed the Petition, asserting that on October 28, 2020, he sustained a right leg wound with complications that, he explained, developed from driving a cab-over truck 12 to 15 hours a day, and required hospitalization. Employer denied a work-related injury in a Notice of Compensation Denial dated May 27, 2021.  The WCJ directed Employer to pay total disability benefits as of April 23, 2021, and ongoing.  Employer appealed to the Board, and the Board affirmed.

Holding:

The discovery rule under Section 311 permits that employees who suffer an injury that is not readily and immediately ascertainable have the same rights under the Act as those employees who sustain an injury as long as they proceed with reasonable diligence.  In order to trigger the running of the 120-day period for notice, a claimant must have: (1) knowledge or constructive knowledge, (2) of a disability which, (3) exists, (4) results from an occupational disease or injury, and (5) has a possible relationship to the employment. The WCJ has exclusive province over questions of credibility and evidentiary weight. Based upon the WCJ’s supported findings, the Court concluded that Claimant met his burden of proving he gave Employer notice of his injury as required under Section 311.  The WCJ found that Claimant only learned his injuries were work related when his doctor so informed him in April or May of 2021. This finding is directly supported by the testimony.  However, the Board’s decision was affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Board’s decision was affirmed insofar as it affirmed the WCJ’s conclusion that Claimant provided timely notice of his injury to Employer, that the WCJ’s decision was reasoned, and that the WCJ’s credibility determinations were supported by substantial evidence. The Court reversed on the issue of the total benefits awarded between April 2021 and September 2021. Claimant had earnings from Health Care Builders during that time. The matter was remanded for consideration of whether Employer was entitled to a credit for Claimant’s post-injury earnings.

AFFIRMED, in part, REVERSED, in part, and REMANDED.

 

EXCLUSIVITY

Robert and Rosemary McHenry v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, et al.
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Published Opinion
Decided: November 14, 2023

Issue:

Whether the trial court erred or abused its discretion in exercising subject matter jurisdiction over, and refusing to dismiss or stay the action, where McHenry was diagnosed with asbestosis and failed to provide the workers’ compensation authorities an opportunity to determine whether his claims are within the exclusive remedies of The Pennsylvania Occupational Disease Act?

Background:

In 2018, McHenry commenced this civil tort action in the trial court, alleging that McHenry had contracted asbestosis from exposure to asbestos-containing products during his lifetime. McHenry worked as a mechanic for Goodyear for approximately 12 months, from 1990 until 1991, in Philadelphia and in New Jersey. McHenry received his diagnosis in May 2017.  Goodyear filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. According to Goodyear, any claims by McHenry arising from his employment with Goodyear are subject to the exclusive and primary jurisdiction of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The trial court denied the motion without prejudice.

Holding:

The Court’s recent decision in Herold was instructive. The Herold Court determined that the former employee’s civil action could proceed in common pleas court, recognizing an exception to the exclusivity provision defined at Section 303 of the ODA. The Herold Court recognized an exception to the exclusive remedy mandate because this latency persisted far longer than the four-year limitations period recognized by the ODA and McHenry’s occupational disease is not compensable under the ODA.  However, Section 301(i) of the ODA contains a savings clause that provides certain, more limited, compensation for several enumerated diseases, including asbestosis.  Nevertheless, the Court found that exclusivity did not apply here.  McHenry was diagnosed with asbestosis, an occupational disease, in 2017 and he retired approximately 15 years prior to this diagnosis. Additionally, McHenry has not worked full time in nearly 40 years, and he last worked in 2000.  Therefore, McHenry suffers from a medical disability that had no effect upon his earning power. He is therefore not entitled to benefits under the ODA. Because his occupational disease is not compensable, the ODA exclusivity provision is not applicable.  Where a former employee’s occupational disease is not compensable because it did not result in total disability such as would trigger the ODA savings clause, that former employee is not subject to the exclusive remedies defined in the ODA and may proceed with civil proceedings filed in the courts of common pleas.

Affirmed.

 

MENTAL/MENTAL INJURIES

Premium Transportation Staffing v. Robert Welker (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Published Opinion
Decided: November 30, 2023

Issue:

Whether the Board erred in affirming the WCJ’s conclusion that the truck fire constituted an abnormal working condition?

Background:

Claimant filed a claim petition alleging that he sustained these injuries in February 2015, when the tractor-trailer he was driving caught on fire. He later withdrew any allegation of a physical injury, leaving only the PTSD claim. The parties agreed to bifurcate the proceeding, separating the question of whether the truck fire experienced by Claimant constituted an abnormal working condition from the question of whether the truck fire caused Claimant to sustain a disabling work injury.  Based on the account of the fire, the WCJ issued an interlocutory order holding that Claimant had been exposed to an abnormal working condition sufficient to establish a compensable “mental/mental” injury.  Employer argued that the WCJ erred in concluding that the truck fire constituted an abnormal working condition. Employer contended that Claimant had been trained to handle high stress events, such as truck fires, and the situation was foreseeable for a truck driver. This is best illustrated by the fact that another truck driver following Claimant pulled over and put out the fire using his own extinguisher. Further, the fire on Claimant’s truck was relatively minor; did not cause any burns; and was successfully and quickly extinguished. Employer argued that, at most, Claimant sustained a subjective reaction to a normal working condition.  The Board affirmed the WCJ decision in its entirety.

Holding:

For an award of workers’ compensation benefits for a psychic injury, the claimant must prove by objective evidence a mental injury is other than a subjective reaction to normal working conditions. Where a psychic injury is claimed, regardless of whether it is manifested through psychic symptoms alone or physical symptoms as well, the claimant must establish that the injury arose from abnormal working conditions in order to recover benefits.  Whether a claimant has been exposed to abnormal working conditions is a mixed question of fact and law, and the question must be evaluated in the context of specific employment.  Here, Claimant experienced an employment event that was not an everyday occurrence, and it was singular for him. However, the truck fire he experienced bears little semblance to the “extraordinarily unusual” events that have been found to be abnormal.  Claimant’s truck was equipped with a fire extinguisher; his pre-trip inspection ensured that fire extinguishers were onboard; and he had seen truck fires and the burned remains of trucks. In short, the record established that in Claimant’s “line of work,” truck drivers “experience” and “anticipate” fires.  Claimant was able to retreat from the danger without difficulty and, eventually, assist in the resolution of the fire.  The court rejected the Claimant’s contention that mitigation factors, such as knowledge of the risk and training therefore, are irrelevant to the question of whether an employment event constitutes an abnormal working condition. Whether a serious, even dangerous, event constitutes an abnormal working condition is highly fact sensitive. Here, the truck fire that caused Claimant to exit his truck did not, in itself, constitute an abnormal working condition in a profession where drivers are trained to anticipate such an event and are equipped to respond. This does not mean that all truck fires constitute a normal working condition in the truck driving profession. However, there must be something “extraordinarily unusual” about a particular truck fire before it can be held to be an abnormal working condition.

Reversed.

 

HEARING LOSS

Firstenergy Nuclear Operating Company v. Paul G. Koch, Jr. (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: November 16, 2023

Issues:

Whether the Board erred in affirming the award of benefits because Employer’s medical expert gave uncontradicted testimony that Claimant’s hearing loss occurred too late to have been work-related?

Background:

Claimant filed a Claim Petition on January 29, 2019 alleging that long-term workplace exposure to hazardous noise led to a partial loss of his hearing.  Claimant alleges that he was continually exposed to hazardous noise during his 39-year tenure.  The WCJ concluded that Claimant suffered a binaural hearing loss of 26.57% as the result of that exposure and awarded Claimant approximately 69 weeks of benefits. The Board affirmed.

Holding:

Section 306(c)(8)(i) of the Act provides that benefits may be awarded to an employee who has sustained a “permanent loss of hearing which is medically established as an occupational hearing loss caused by long-term exposure to hazardous occupational noise.” A claimant seeking such benefits carries the burden of establishing he suffered permanent hearing loss of 10% or greater, and that the hearing loss is medically established to be work-related and caused by the long-term exposure to hazardous occupational noise. Claimant provided such evidence, and this evidence was found credible by the WCJ.   Claimant’s last exposure to occupational noise occurred on February 2, 2016; meanwhile, the hearing test from which came the conclusion that Claimant suffered a 26.57% hearing loss was administered in March 2019, more than three years later. Nevertheless, Employer’s argument that it is unknown what Claimant’s hearing impairment was at the time of his last noise exposure was meritless.  Neither Section 306(c)(viii) nor any other Act provision requires that a hearing test be administered on or before Claimant’s last day of employment. Section 306(c)(8)(viii) clearly states that the claim shall be barred unless a petition is filed within three years after the date of last exposure to hazardous occupational noise in the employ of the employer against whom benefits are sought. Section 306(c)(8)’s three-year limit is the only deadline imposed on those seeking compensation for a work-related hearing loss.  The WCJ’s findings in this case are supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Board affirmed.

Affirmed.

 

JUDICIAL DISCRETION

John R. Sherman v. County of Mercer (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unreported Memorandum Opinion
Decided: November 6, 2023

Issue:

Whether the WCJ and Board erred in failing to grant his Claim Petition for the loss of the use of his left eye due to the work injury?

Background:

While in the scope and course of his employment as a Correctional Officer with the Employer, Claimant was accidently sprayed in his left eye with a chemical disinfectant. Claimant filed a Claim Petition, seeking payment of medical bills and counsel fees, for a left eye injury. Claimant did not allege a loss of wages but reserved the right to seek wage loss and the loss of use of his left eye. Employer filed a Notice of Compensation Denial, denying that Claimant sustained a work injury.  Claimant later amended the Claim Petition to include a wage claim for the loss of the use of his left eye.  Based on his credibility determinations, the WCJ specifically rejected any contention that Claimant lost vision or suffered a loss of vision for all practical intents and purposes in the left eye due to chemical exposure.  The WCJ granted the Claim Petition to award medical benefits only, finding that Claimant sustained a temporary non-disabling eye injury. Claimant appealed to the Board, and the Board affirmed.

Holding:

The WCJ did not find the opinions of Claimant’s medical expert credible on the issue of the cause of the loss of use of the left eye and instead found the opinions of Employer’s medical expert credible on that issue. Employer’s expert testified that Claimant’s loss of eyesight was due to anterior optic neuropathy which was unrelated to the chemical splash at work or to any alleged hypertensive crisis immediately following the chemical splash.  Claimant failed to establish this connection by unequivocal credible medical evidence.  Claimant’s criticisms of this testimony is really an attack on the WCJ’s credibility determinations, which are not subject to review on appeal. Credibility determinations are solely within the discretion of the WCJ and are not reviewable on appeal.

Affirmed.

 

IMPAIRMENT RATING EVALUATIONS

Kenneth Elliott v. City of Pittsburgh (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unreported Memorandum Opinion
Decided: November 6, 2023

Issues:

Whether Act 111 violates the due process and due course of law protections of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the “reasonable compensation” requirements of article III, section 18 of the Pennsylvania Constitution?

Background:

In 2003, Claimant sustained a back injury in the course and scope of his employment with Employer. In December 2012, he underwent an IRE provided for in former Section 306(a.2) of the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act (Act), which resulted in an impairment rating of less than 50%. Employer then filed a modification petition, and in a March 2014 decision and order, a WCJ modified Claimant’s disability status from total to partial as of the December 2012 IRE date.  In April 2021, Claimant filed a reinstatement petition seeking a return to total disability status based on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Protz.  The WCJ ordered the reinstatement to be effective as of the date of Claimant’s reinstatement petition.  Claimant appealed to the Board, arguing that his reinstatement should have been effective as of the 2012 modification date. The Board affirmed the WCJ’s decision.  After the April 2021 reinstatement of Claimant’s TTD benefit status, Employer filed a modification petition based on a second IRE on September 8, 2021, which returned an impairment rating of 8%.   The WCJ granted Employer’s modification petition.  The Board affirmed.  The effect of these decisions was that Employer no longer pays Claimant any benefits, as his 500 weeks of TPD have expired.

Holding:

Claimant failed to show that Act 111’s provisions allowing employers to credit previously paid benefits weeks violate either due process or due course of law principles. Claimant has also failed to show that by reenacting the IRE process, Act 111 violates article III, section 18 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, relating to reasonable compensation.

Affirmed.

 

Richard J. Dennell v. City of Philadelphia (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: November 17, 2023

Issue:

Whether Act 111 is unconstitutional?

Background:

In 2010, Claimant sustained injuries while tackling a suspect in the course of his employment as a police officer with the City of Philadelphia.  Employer issued a Notice of Compensation Payable acknowledging Claimant’s work injury as strains and contusions of the low back and left leg. The NCP recited that Employer had begun paying salary continuation benefits under the Heart and Lung Act in lieu of workers’ compensation. Benefits were suspended as of the date of injury.  On July 20, 2018, Employer issued another NCP stating that disability payments resumed on July 22, 2018.  On November 18, 2021, an IRE was conducted and concluded that Claimant had a whole-person impairment rating of four percent (4%) based on the American Medical Association’s Impairment Guides (AMA Guides), Sixth Edition (second printing April 2009). Based on this determination, Employer filed a modification petition. After a hearing, the WCJ modified Claimant’s workers’ compensation disability benefits, from total to partial, as of the date of the IRE.  The Board affirmed the WCJ’s decision.

Holding:

Claimant’s constitutional arguments have been considered and rejected by this Court.  Act 111 is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.   The court rejected Claimant’s premise of vested rights.  A claimant has no vested right to workers’ compensation benefits by reason of Section 413(a) of the Act.  Also, Act 111 does not violate the separation of powers required by the Pennsylvania Constitution.

Affirmed.

 

TERMINATION PETITION – DECONDITIONING

James F. Buckley v. Suburban Propane Partners (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: November 1, 2023

Issues:

Whether the Board erred in affirming the WCJ, as Employer failed to establish that any work restrictions Claimant required upon returning to work were not causally related to his work injury?

Background

Claimant suffered a work injury to his lower back and neck.  Employer issued a medical-only NCP, accepting liability for Claimant’s work injury, which the NCP described as a “lower back area injury.” Claimant worked light duty for approximately six months before his physician took him out of work. Employer issued an amended NCP, in recognition of Claimant’s right to wage loss benefits.   A few years later, Employer filed a termination petition, alleging that Claimant had fully recovered from his work injury, based on an IME of Claimant on June 29, 2021.   The WCJ granted Employer’s termination petition, finding that Claimant was frequently evasive and that he was not a credible witness.   Further, the WCJ noted that claimant’s doctor did not appear to treat Claimant, but merely saw claimant often enough to establish a record that he could use for testimony, and he did not have pre-injury medical records and thus little knowledge of Claimant’s pre-injury condition. Claimant appealed to the Board, which affirmed.

Holding:

The WCJ has exclusive province over questions of credibility and evidentiary weight, and the WCJ may accept or reject the testimony of any witness, including a medical witness, in whole or in part. Unless made arbitrarily or capriciously, a WCJ’s credibility determinations will be upheld on appeal.   Here, the credible testimony was that Claimant’s deconditioned state was the result of the lengthy period of time he had been out of work, not his work injury or any pain or treatment related thereto.  The restrictions were not necessitated by the work injury itself, and the employer’s medical expert credibly testified that the claimant had fully recovered from the work injury, his employer met the burden of proof required to terminate his benefits.  Based on the evidence presented, substantial evidence supported that Claimant had fully recovered from his work injury.

Affirmed.

 

MEDICAL REVIEW AND RES JUDICATA

Bernice Bennett v. Jeld-Wen, Inc. (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Decision
Decided: November 20, 2023

Issue:

Whether the WCJ erred in rejecting claimant’s medical expert’s opinion on causation and in finding that Claimant was barred from seeking to include the left trigger thumb as part of her work-related injuries?

Background:

Claimant sustained a work-related injury in 2010 that was, ultimately, determined to include complex regional pain syndrome (CRPS) of the left upper extremity. In October 2017, Claimant and Employer entered into the C&R Agreement, which provided as follows: The parties agree that the nature of the injury or injuries by Claimant are CRPS of the left upper extremity and cervical scarring only. Claimant acknowledges that she did not suffer any other mental, physical, specific loss, disfigurement, or other scarring injuries with[in] the scope of employment.  The C&R Agreement settled all aspects of Claimant’s Workers’ Compensation claim, with the exception of medical benefits.  In 2020 Claimant underwent multiple trigger finger surgeries and sought payment of medical bills from the Surgery Center.  Claimant filed the Review Petition.  The WCJ found that Claimant did not meet her burden of proving that a left trigger thumb surgery and associated scar revision surgery were causally related to Claimant’s work injury as defined by an executed and WCJ-approved Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The WCJ also found that Claimant was barred by res judicata from seeking to expand her work injury beyond that set forth in the C&R Agreement.  The Board affirmed.

Holding:

This is not a fee review proceeding; it is a Review Petition over which the WCJ plainly had jurisdiction. Further, while an employer was obligated to pay the reasonable medical expenses causally related to the work injury, it may still deny payment based on causation, but opens itself up to a penalty if it is incorrect.  Thus, contrary to Claimant’s assertion, Employer could deny payment for medical bills based on causation without invoking the UR process, and because the WCJ found that the trigger thumb was not causally related to the accepted work injury, Employer was not required to retroactively pay for Claimant’s treatments or liable for penalties, had they been requested.   Further, while Section 413(a) of the Act permits the amendment of the description of a work injury an injury description in a C&R Agreement is final and binding absent a clear showing of fraud, deception, duress, mutual mistake, or unilateral mistake caused by the opposing party’s fault, none of which Claimant alleges.  Claimant was on notice that the triggering of digits and associated medical treatment was possible before she entered into the C&R Agreement, and despite being on notice of the issue, she did not include it in that agreement or reserve the right to amend the injury description in the future.  Claimant is barred from amending the description of the work-related injury agreed upon in the C&R Agreement.

Affirmed.

 

SUPREME COURT AGREES TO HEAR A CASE

Elite Care, Rx, LLC v. Premier Comp Solutions, LLC; et al

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court

This case was decided in Superior Court of Pennsylvania in a Published Opinion, on May 23, 2023

On October 24, 2023, the Supreme Court granted the Petition for Allowance of Appeal to decide the following issue:

Can a purported medical provider seeking payment for prescription medication in accordance with the provision of the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act (hereinafter “WCA”), specifically 77 P.S. § 501(a)(1), and corresponding Medical Cost Containment Regulations (hereinafter “MCCR”), 34 Pa. Code §§ 127.1 – 127.755, circumvent the exclusivity provisions of the WCA by initiating litigation outside the forums established by and under the WCA and MCCR for adjudicating such issues? Alternatively phrased, is the liability of the Employer and its Insurer or carrier exclusive in place of any and all other liability, given the WCA provides for an exclusive remedy barring any tort action flowing from a work-related injury?

We will advise when an update is received from the Supreme Court.

 

PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATIVE REVIEW

As noted previously, there are presently pending before the Pennsylvania General Assembly, a number of Bills which seek to amend the Pennsylvania Worker’s Compensation Act in various ways.  When these Bills are proposed by Pa House members, they go through the House’s Labor and Industry Committee.   When, and if, the Bill is passed by the House, it must go through the Pa Senate for additional review.   As of this date, two of the proposed Bills have passed the House, and are under review by the Pa. Senate’s Labor and Industry Committee.  They are summarized below.  At last check the Senate L&I Committee is still reviewing these House Bills and it has not sent them back to the Senate for review, alteration or consideration.

Regular Session 2023-2024

House Bill 760

Short Title:      An Act amending the act of June 2, 1915 (P.L.736, No.338), known as the Workers’ Compensation Act, in liability and compensation, further providing for compensation payable in periodical installments.

Subject:           Direct Deposit for Workers’ Compensation

This bill seeks to amend Act 338 of 1915 (Workers’ Compensation Act) by allowing individuals who qualify for workers’ compensation to request their compensation through direct deposit into an account of their choosing. These types of payment methods would be similar to the methods that are currently used to pay benefits to those that qualify for Unemployment Compensation. Implementation of this change was recommended unanimously by the Workers’ Compensation Advisory Council (WCAC) last year.

Last Action:    Referred to LABOR AND INDUSTRY, May 9, 2023 [Senate]

House Bill 930

Short Title:      An Act amending the act of June 2, 1915 (P.L.736, No.338), known as the Workers’ Compensation Act, in liability and compensation, further providing for schedule of compensation.  Expanding Workers’ Compensation for Permanent Disfigurement

Subject:           Expanding Workers’ Compensation for Permanent Disfigurement

This bill seeks to extend existing workers’ compensation eligibility for permanent disfigurement from 275 weeks to 400 weeks and clarify that claimants are not precluded from collecting both total or partial disability benefits and disfigurement benefits simultaneously. It would also provide workers’ compensation coverage for disfigurement regardless of where it occurs on their body.

Last Action:    Referred to LABOR AND INDUSTRY, May 9, 2023 [Senate]

 

NEW JERSEY WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

CASE SUMMARIES

10/31/2023 – 11/30/2023

COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT – AUTHORIZED VEHICLE RULE

Keim v. Above All Termite & Pest Control
Supreme Court of New Jersey
No. A-30 September Term 2022; 2023 WL 8042920
Decided: 11/21/2023

Background:

Keim was employed by Above All as a pest-control technician. Above all provided Keim with an employer authorized vehicle, which he used to drive from his home to the various worksites, and then return home at the end of the workday. In the morning, Keim would clock in and see which worksites he was assigned to for the day. Above All limited the amount of supplies that could be kept in the authorized vehicles overnight. Above All allowed employees to drive their vehicles directly to the shop to replenish their supplies before going to the worksites for the day. It is up to the employee to decide when they need to replenish their supplies.

On the day of the accident, Keim clocked in and received his work schedule for the day. He decided that he needed more supplies to be able to perform the scheduled services for the day. Therefore, he drove directly to the shop and planned on following his work schedule after replenishing his supplies. Keim sustained injuries in a substantial car accident on his way to the shop.

The insurance carrier for Above All denied Keim’s initial workers’ compensation employee claim petition. Above All moved to dismiss the claim petition in its entirety, stating that the injuries did not arise in the course and scope of employment. Keim filed a motion for temporary and/or medical benefits, which Above all disputed compensability and opposed.

The WCJ heard testimony and concluded that “Keim was merely commuting to work when he sustained the injuries in the car accident.” The Judge additionally stated in regard to the “authorized vehicle rule” that although Keim needed to go get supplies, the rule was “irrelevant since he was on his way to his place of employment.”

The Appellate Division disagreed and “determined that Keim sustained injuries while in the course of his employment because he operated an ‘employer authorized vehicle’ and was on business ‘expressly authorized and directed by his employer.’” The court reversed the dismissal, reinstated the petition, and remanded for further proceedings.

Holding:

Before 1979, broad statutory language defined compensable accidents “as those arising out of and in the course of the employment.” The “going and coming rule” which denied compensation for injuries that were sustained during the routine commute to and from work. The Act was amended in 1979 to define when employment begins and ends every day.  There are four rules set out in N.J.S.A. 34:15-36 which govern when an employee is “in the course of employment” under the Act. The rules include: the “premises rule,” the “special mission rule,” the “paid travel time rule,” and the “authorized vehicle rule.”

The “authorized vehicle rule” applies “when an employee ‘utilizes an employer authorized vehicle’ with the employer’s authorization for ‘business authorized by the employer.’” It is important to note that this rule does not apply when an employee is commuting to and from work.

Keim argues that under the “authorized vehicle rule” his injuries are compensable. The word “authorized” separates actions that are unrelated to work and not compensable from those that are related to work and compensable.

This Court determined that “[b]ased on the plain language of the authorized vehicle rule in N.J.S.A. 34:15-36…an employee is ‘in the course of employment’ when (1) the employer authorizes a vehicle for operation by the employee, and (2) the employee’s operation of that identified vehicle is for business expressly authorized by the employer.”

Keim was in the course of employment when he sustained the injuries. Above All provided him with an authorized vehicle and he used the vehicle to go to the shop to replenish supplies, which is an activity authorized by Above All. The permissive approach, where employees are allowed to decide for themselves when to replenish supplies, does not change the analysis. An employer can authorize an employee to do something without expressly directing the activity. Here, Keim was not commuting to work at the time of the accident, he was gathering supplies, which is an activity authorized by his employer. At the time of the car accident, Keim was in the course of employment.

Affirmed and Remanded.

 

COVERAGE PROVIDED BY A WORKERS’ COMPENSATION INSURANCE POLICY

Alverse Cannon v. Bravo Pack, Inc. v. Employers Preferred Insurance
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division – Unpublished Opinion
No. A-1731-21; 2023 WL 7140192
Decided: 10/31/2023

Background:

An insurance policy that provided Workers’ Compensation coverage and Employers Liability Insurance was issued by Employers Preferred Insurance Company (preferred) to Bravo Pack, Inc. (Bravo). One of Bravo’s employees, Cannon, sued Bravo and alleged that Bravo was responsible for employment related injuries. This appeal concerns an interpretation of an exclusion in the Insurance Policy.

Cannon worked for Bravo as a machine operator. On his first day, Cannon was being trained by another employee when a machine caught his left hand resulting in a partial amputation of three of his fingers. Cannon received workers’ compensation benefits. Cannon sued Bravo alleging that Bravo “negligently, recklessly, grossly, negligently, and/or intentionally” caused his injuries. Bravo filed a third party Complaint and Amended Answer against Preferred alleging that Preferred breached the insurance policy by improperly denying coverage. Preferred filed an Answer that denied its obligation to provide coverage and asserting an affirmative defense which stated that coverage was excluded.

The Insurance Policy provided workers’ compensation coverage and employer’s liability coverage. The workers’ compensation portion “applies to bodily injury by accident or bodily injury by disease.” Preferred agreed to pay benefits required and assumed the duty to defend Bravo against claims, proceedings, or suits for benefits payable by the insurance. The policy stated that Preferred does not have a duty to defend against suits not covered by the insurance. The employer’s liability section applied to bodily injury by accident or disease. This section did not apply to “any obligation imposed by a workers’ compensation, occupational disease, unemployment compensation, or disability benefits law, or any similar law.” It also did not apply to “bodily injury intentionally caused or aggravated by [Bravo].” An amendment to the employer’s liability section adds that “the insurance does not cover any and all intentional wrongs within the exception allowed by N.J.S.A. 34:15-8.” Preferred stated that it had no duty to defend based on the exclusions in the Insurance Policy. Bravo argued that the amendment was “invalid, ambiguous, or contrary to Bravo’s reasonable expectations.”

The trial court held that for the claims alleging injuries that Bravo intentionally caused, Bravo was not entitled to coverage. The trial court additionally held that for the claims alleging that Bravo caused Cannon’s injuries by negligence, gross negligence, or reckless conduct, Bravo was entitled to defense.

On appeal, Bravo argues that the trial court incorrectly found that the amendment was unambiguous and denied coverage. It additionally asserts that even if it was unambiguous, the amendment “violates the public policy of the Workers’ Compensation Act, which mandates that an employer must make sufficient provisions for payment of any obligation to an injured employee.”

Holding:

It is not disputed that Preferred provided workers’ compensation benefits, providing coverage under the first section of the policy. The question here is whether Bravo is entitled to coverage under the employer liability section. The Court concluded that Preferred had no duty to defend Bravo to the extent of the claim asserting that Bravo’s conduct was an intentional wrong. The Court held that it was unambiguous as it clearly states that the policy “ ‘does not cover bodily injury intentionally caused or aggravated by’ Bravo.” The Court rejected the argument that the amendment violates public policy. Bravo argued that restricting coverage violates the mandate to obtain compulsory insurance and points out that the Workers’ Compensation Act requires the employer to make sure that they fulfill payment that comes out of their obligation to an injured employee. Here, on the intentional tort claims, Bravo was granted summary judgment and therefore sustained no indemnity obligation. The compulsory insurance referred to only addresses employee’s recovery against their employer, not employers’ recovery against their insurer. The “Workers’ Compensation Act is not inconsistent with an employer’s liability policy that excludes coverage for an intentional wrong.” The costs which Bravo is seeking, compensation for its own defense costs, is not mandated by the Workers’ Compensation Act.

Additionally, Bravo has not shown that the Insurance Policy is so difficult to understand that its expectations rule over the plain language.

Affirmed.

 

INTENTIONAL WRONG EXCEPTION TO THE COMPENSATION ACT

Alverse Cannon v. Bravo Pack, Inc. v. Employers Preferred Insurance
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division – Unpublished Opinion
No. A-1702-21; 2023 WL 7140900
Decided: 10/31/2023

Background:

Alverse Cannon worked for Bravo Pack, Inc. (Bravo) as a machine operator. An employee, who had previously trained other employees but had not received formal instructions on how to train employees, was instructed to train Cannon. Bravo was aware that the piece of equipment which Cannon trained on frequently jammed. The employee had previously removed a guard to more quickly clear jams. Although he was told not to remove the guard, his manager was aware that he often did not follow instructions. After minimal instruction, Cannon was operating the machine on his own when it jammed. He attempted to remove the jam when a blade caught his left hand and partially amputated three fingers. There were no warning signs and Cannon was not aware that there were blades in this area.

OSHA investigated and cited Bravo for violations. Following the violations, Bravo installed metal guards that were orange colored.

Cannon sued Bravo alleging that the accident was caused by intentional conduct and therefore his remedies should not be limited to the Compensation Act benefits. Bravo moved for Summary Judgment and alleged that “the exclusive remedy provision of the Compensation Act barred [Cannon’s] claims.” An order granted Summary Judgment in favor of Bravo. The Judge determined that Cannon did not have evidence of a finding that there was substantial certainty of an injury and additionally determined that there was no evidence that the incident was outside the scope of conditions that is shielded under the Compensation Act.

Cannon appealed arguing that (1) he provided sufficient proof on an intentional wrong; (2) the Judge “erred in determining that no reasonable juror could conclude that [Cannon’s] accident was substantially certain to result from Bravo’s actions;” and (3) the Judge “erred in finding that his proofs did not satisfy the context prong to prove an intentional wrong.”

Holding:

In most work-related incidents, the Compensation Act provides the employee’s exclusive remedy against the employer. There is an exception when the injury is caused by the employer’s intentional wrong. The Court explained that an “intent” analysis is used to determine what is considered an intentional wrong under the Compensation Act. It is not intent to simply know and appreciate the risk. Intent includes circumstances where the employer is substantially certain that an act will result in harm. In order to prove that an employer committed an intentional wrong, the employee must show either “(1) that the employer has a subjective desire to injure, or (2) that ‘based on all the facts and circumstances of the case … the employer knew an injury was substantially certain to result.’”  It has previously been established that substantial certainty is a high bar.

Looking at the conduct prong, the court agreed with the Judge’s determination that the employer’s conduct could be found to be grossly negligent, but it does not rise to the level of substantial certainty. The court reasoned that the manager knew that the employee often did not follow instructions but had no basis to know that the employee would disregard the instructions.

The Court also agreed with the Judge’s analysis for the second prong. This type of accident is the type of accident contemplated by the Legislature when they created the Compensation Act. There is no evidence of intentionally disabling the guard and there is no evidence of an attempt to deceive OSHA.

Affirmed.

 

JURISDICTION

Hudson Regional Hospital v. New Hampshire Insurance Company
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division – Unpublished Opinion
No. A-0978-21; 2023 WL 7985354
Decided: 11/16/2023

Background:

Hudson Regional Hospital (Hudson) operates in Secaucus and provided medical treatment to New York residents for injuries they sustained while working in New York for a New York employer. The only connection the patients have to New Jersey is the medical treatment they received. An assignment of workers’ compensation benefits was obtained from each of the patients and Hudson sought to be compensated for the medical treatment it provided to the patients before the New York Workers’ Compensation Board (NYWCB). The NYWCB awarded compensation in accordance with the New York Workers’ Compensation Act Fee Schedule pursuant to the New York Workers’ Compensation Law. Hudson was awarded less than what was billed for the treatment in each instance.

New York law allows medical treatment reimbursement awards from the NYWCB to be disputed by provided avenues. Hudson did not dispute the compensation awards.

Hudson alleged it was entitled to compensation for the medical treatment (the difference between the NYWCB award and what it would be entitled to under the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act) and filed claims with the New Jersey Division of Workers’ Compensation. The claims were dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The six possible bases for jurisdiction in New Jersey for a workers’ compensation claim include: “(1) place where the injury occurred; (2) place of making the contract of employment; (3) place where the employment relationship exists or is carried out; (4) place where the industry is located; (5) place where the employee resides; and (6) place whose statute the parties expressly adopt by contract.” Here, the patient’s only connection to New Jersey was their treatment and therefore the Division did not have jurisdiction over the claims.

Hudson then filed a complaint against the insurance carrier with the Law Division alleging the patients are entitled to workers’ compensation benefits for the treatment they received in New Jersey. Hudson alleged that by providing benefits only under the New York fee schedule and not under the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA), the insurance carrier: “(1) breached the contractual rights of the five patients; (2) was unjustly enriched; (3) engaged in bad faith and unfair claim settlement practices; and (4) breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in its policies.” Hudson additionally alleged both the insurance carrier and the employers conduct business in New Jersey. The insurance carrier moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

The trial court granted the insurance carrier’s motion and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The court stated that the Division had exclusive jurisdiction and a challenge not to award benefits must be through an appeal. Hudson must appeal the Division’s decision rather than recharacterizing the claim as a breach of contract claim.

Hudson appealed and argued that the Law Division has jurisdiction to hear the patient’s contract claims against the insurance carrier.

Holding:

The Court stated that an unfavorable decision to an employee cannot avoid the statutory structure by filing a breach of contract claim with the Superior Court. Hudson did not appeal the Division’s decision. To review the Division’s decision, Hudson must file an appeal on behalf of the patients.

The Court reviewed the decision in D’Ascoli v. Stieh, which correctly stated that a medical provider located in New Jersey can file an action with the Superior Court to recover “for medical services provided to an out-of-State patient for a work-related injury, even if that patient received workers’ compensation benefits in their home state.” The Court held that this case is not helpful here as a distinction holds the case inapplicable to Hudson’s claims. Hudson is not suing the patients for the outstanding portion of charges, rather it is suing the insurance carrier. Hudson’s claims in the complaint are a breach of contract claim in the form of the patients’ workers’ compensation benefits claims. These claims must only be raised in the Division as it has exclusive jurisdiction.

Affirmed.

CASE SUMMARIES 10/1/2023-10/31/2023

PENNSYLVANIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

CASE SUMMARIES

10/1/2023 – 10/31/2023

 

JUDICIAL DISCRETION

Marie Dennis v. Inglis House (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Published Opinion
Decided: October 12, 2023

Issues:

Whether the WCJ’s limited description of Claimant’s injuries and recovery therefrom, was in error and whether the WCJ erred in not awarding any wage loss?

Background:

Claimant filed a claim petition asserting that she was injured in the course of her employment.  Claimant alleged that she sustained injuries to her neck, right arm, right shoulder, and right hand/wrist. She sought partial disability benefits from January 14, 2020, through March 26, 2020, and total disability benefits from March 27, 2020, ongoing.  The WCJ rejected Claimant’s testimony that she could not work and that she could not do light-duty work on and after March 24, 2020, or any work after August 13, 2020. Based upon credibility determinations relating to the various experts, the WCJ determined that Claimant met her burden of proving that she sustained a work injury on January 14, 2020. The WCJ suspended Claimant’s benefits for the period between January 14, 2020 and July 17, 2020.  The WCJ determined that Claimant was fully recovered from her cervical sprain of her right hand and wrist pain as of July 6, 2020 and terminated Claimant’s benefits as of that date.  The Board affirmed.

Holding:

In a claim petition, the claimant has the burden of proving all the elements necessary to support an award, including the existence of a work-related injury resulting in disability and its duration.  Where the evidence supports a finding of disability for a closed period, the WCJ may so limit benefits.  Also, where the Board remands a matter to the WCJ, the aggrieved party cannot appeal the Board’s adjudication to this Court. Once the WCJ issues the remand decision, the aggrieved party can appeal the Board’s initial adjudication to the Commonwealth Court.  As a threshold matter, the Court addressed Employer’s contention that a substantial portion of Claimant’s appeal has been waived.  The Court rejected Employer’s contention that Claimant waived those issues in her current appeal that were raised to the Board prior to its remand as incorporation of those issues by reference was sufficient.  Claimant’s contention that the Board erred in affirming the WCJ’s limited description of her injuries and recovery therefrom was without merit.  Claimant simply challenges the WCJ’s credibility determinations and assignment of weight to the evidence, both of which are squarely within the WCJ’s province. The WCJ’s findings are supported by the substantial evidence of record and cannot be disturbed.  As to Claimant’s argument that the Board erred by affirming the WCJ’s denial of any wage loss benefits for Claimant’s injuries, Claimant waived this issue because she did not raise it at the earliest opportunity, i.e., in her original appeal to the Board, after the WCJ’s initial decision.  The general and conclusory statements in the initial, pre-remand appeal, did not sufficiently bring to the attention of the Board the specific wage loss error asserted by Claimant. It was only in the second appeal, post-remand, that Claimant enunciated a more specific attack on the WCJ’s decision.

Affirmed.

 

Ronald Cantwell v. Gunite Specialists, Inc. (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: October 16, 2023

Issue:

Whether the denial of the claim petition was supported by substantial record evidence?

Background:

Employer issued a medical-only Notice of Temporary Compensation Payable (NTCP).  Later Employer rescinded the NTCP when it issued a Notice Stopping Temporary Compensation (NSTC) and a Notice of Compensation Denial (NCD) asserting that Claimant had not actually sustained a work-related injury.  Claimant then filed a claim petition asserting that he sustained a disabling work-related lower back injury while working for Employer.  The WCJ did not credit Claimant’s evidence.  The WCJ also stated that even though employer’s expert assigned Claimant a strain injury, that diagnosis was also based on Claimant’s unreliable reporting of the asserted incident. The WCJ also credited employer’s testimony as uncontested and supported by documentation of Claimant’s attendance and disciplinary issues.  The WCJ denied the claim petition.  The Board affirmed.

Holding:

The WCJ is the fact finder, and it is solely for the WCJ to assess credibility and to resolve conflicts in the evidence. Neither the Board nor the Court may reweigh the evidence or the WCJ’s credibility determinations.  When a WCJ finds, as he did here, a claimant’s testimony non-credible as to the occurrence of a work-related incident or injury, that determination will not be disturbed on appeal so long as it is supported by record evidence, is presented in a reasoned decision, and is neither arbitrary nor capricious. The WCJ’s order denying Claimant’s claim petition was supported by substantial record evidence and the WCJ’s opinion in support of the order was sufficiently reasoned.

Affirmed

 

Tisho Ann John v. 10400 Roosevelt Operating LLC (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: October 31, 2023

Issue:

 Whether the WCJ’s decision was well reasoned and supported by substantial, competent record evidence?

Background:

Claimant filed a Claim Petition alleging that she was injured in the course of her employment as a licensed practical nurse with Employer.  The WCJ denied Claimant’s Claim Petition. Claimant appealed to the Board and the Board affirmed.

Holding:

 The critical inquiry is whether there is evidence to support the findings actually made, based upon a review of the entire record.  If the record contains such evidence, the findings must be upheld even though the record contains conflicting evidence.  The WCJ cannot simply ignore uncontroverted evidence but, rather, must adequately explain the reasons why the WCJ has rejected such evidence. While the WCJ did not doubt Claimant suffered an incident on the date alleged, Claimant’s testimony regarding the specifics of its occurrence was found to be not credible.  Claimant’s testimony was inconsistent with the purported mechanism of injury.  The claimant’s medical expert’s testimony was rejected in favor of the Employer’s expert.  Substantial evidence supported the WCJ’s decision.

 Affirmed.

 

COURSE AND SCOPE OF EMPOYMENT

Robert Lewis v. Lehigh Asphalt Paving (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Published Opinion
Decided: October 19, 2023

Issue:

Whether the Board erred in affirming the WCJ’s determination that Claimant’s injury did not occur in the course and scope of his employment where Claimant was injured as he stepped from a work area into a work vehicle?

Background:

Claimant worked in the equipment yard of Employer’s facility.  Throughout the course of the day, Claimant began to feel pain and weakness in his left calf and ankle.  At the end, after punching out, Claimant returned to the work truck he was driving and hurriedly attempted to get into the cab of the vehicle. As he pushed off with his left foot to step up into the cab of the truck, Claimant felt a popping sensation in his lower leg, which was a tear of his Achilles tendon.  Employer issued a Notice of Denial for Claimant’s injury, indicating that the injury did not occur within the scope of Claimant’s employment. Claimant filed the Claim Petition.  The WCJ issued a Decision that granted the Claim Petition.  The Board remanded the matter.  The Board observed that, while Claimant appeared to have been on Employer’s premises at a reasonable time after the end of his work shift, a finding of fact was required regarding whether the evidence established that Claimant’s injury had been caused by a condition of Employer’s premises or by the operation of the business or affairs thereon.  The WCJ determined that Claimant’s injury had not been caused by a condition of Employer’s premises and that Claimant had not been engaged in the business of Employer when injured.  The WCJ denied the Claim Petition. The Board affirmed.

Holding:

Here, Claimant was not actually engaged in furtherance of Employer’s business or affairs; he had punched out and was entering a vehicle following his shift to go home. Therefore, to be entitled to compensation, Claimant must prove that he was entitled to compensation under the Slaugenhaupt test. The first two prongs of the Slaugenhaupt test are satisfied here; there is no dispute that Claimant was on Employer’s premises, where he was required to be during his scheduled shift that had concluded a mere 15 minutes before the occurrence of Claimant’s injury. Thus, the only question is the satisfaction of the third prong of the Slaugenhaupt test – whether Claimant sustained his injury due to a condition of the premises or operation of the business.  The third prong of the Slaugenhaupt test is not satisfied in this case.  Claimant testified that, after punching out for the day, he felt a popping sensation as he pushed off the ground with his leg in a hurried attempt to get into the cab of his vehicle. It was not the ground, but rather this step up into the vehicle that caused Claimant’s leg injury. Neither party attributed his injury to any condition of Employer’s premises. Further, when an employee is on his employer’s property and is injured after having ended his shift, compensation for the injury must satisfy the requirements of the Slaugenhaupt test, and the Claimant’s status as a traveling or stationary employee is immaterial to his entitlement to compensation for an injury sustained while leaving Employer’s premises following his completed shift.

Affirmed.

 

IMPAIRMENT RATING EVALUATIONS

Howard Dunetz v. Charles H. Sacks D.M.D., P.C. (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – En Banc Published Opinion
Decided: October 26, 2023

Issue:

Whether the Board erred in affirming the WCJ’s decision to reinstate total disability benefits as of the date of the claimant’s reinstatement petition, rather than as of the date his benefits were originally modified based on the results of a pre-Protz IRE?

Background:

In May 2007, Claimant sustained a work-related injury for which he received total disability benefits.  Employer, via a Notice of Change in 2011, changed the status of Claimant’s benefits from total to partial disability as of December 2, 2010, the date of the IRE that found Claimant had an eight percent whole-person impairment rating.  Claimant did not contest the Notice of Change or otherwise challenge the 2010 Modification.  On June 12, 2020, Claimant filed the Reinstatement Petition, alleging that the 2010 Modification was unconstitutional following Protz and requested reinstatement to total disability as of the date of the original IRE modification.  The WCJ reinstated Claimant’s workers’ compensation benefits from partial disability to total disability from June 12, 2020, the date of Claimant’s Reinstatement Petition, until December 15, 2020, the date Employer obtained an Impairment Rating Evaluation (IRE) of Claimant reflecting a 17% whole-body impairment. The WCJ also modified Claimant’s benefits from total disability to partial disability as of the date of the IRE, granted Employer a credit for payments of partial disability benefits it had paid Claimant prior to December 15, 2020, and found that Claimant was no longer entitled to wage loss benefits after December 15, 2020, because he had already received the 500 weeks of partial disability benefits permitted by the Workers’ Compensation Act.  Claimant asserted that his case was an extraordinary circumstance that warranted application of the equitable balancing test in Dana Holding, and that Protz should be fully retroactive as to him.  The Board affirmed.

Holding:

As for the equitable balancing test, the Supreme Court’s statements reflected a restrained recognition of such a test as a possibility, rather than a certitude.  In support of his claims that his is an extraordinary case, that a balancing test should apply, and that his interests should prevail, Claimant cited the severity of his injury, which has left him unable to return to work for more than 500 weeks, and his financial need for the continuation of his indemnity benefits as the basis for the “extraordinary” nature of his case.  However, this is no different than that of many other claimants who also face the cessation of their WC indemnity benefits under these or similar circumstances.  Additionally, Employer’s interests must be balanced against Claimant’s unfortunate, but not extraordinary, interests. Those interests include reliance not only on the previously presumed valid IRE provisions but also on the final, unappealed decision on the IRE modifying Claimant’s benefits status. Further, employers may also have forgone other avenues of relief.  The Board properly applied the precedent regarding the applicability of Protz to cases, where the request for reinstatement was asserted in a reinstatement petition, and the equitable balancing test referenced in Dana Holding would not apply.  There was no error in its upholding the WCJ’s decision reinstating Claimant’s benefits as of the date of the Reinstatement Petition, rather than the date of the initial IRE. Additionally, because the Board properly applied the precedent regarding Act 111’s applicability to claimants whose injuries arose prior to Act 111’s enactment and authorization to employers to obtain a credit for past partial disability benefits paid, there was similarly no error in its upholding the WCJ’s decision granting Employer a credit for the partial disability benefits it had already paid.

Affirmed.

 

Joseph Perlis v. City of Wilkes-Barre (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Decision
Decided: October 6, 2023

Issue:

Whether the retroactive application of Act 111 to permit Employer to take a credit for temporary partial disability (TPD) payments it made pursuant to the 2015 IRE is unconstitutional?

Background:

Claimant sustained a work-related injury in 2012. In 2015, Employer issued a Notice of Change of Disability Status, in which it changed Claimant’s disability status from temporary total disability (TTD) to temporary partial disability (TPD) based on an impairment rating evaluation (IRE).  Subsequently, by Decision and in 2017, a WCJ granted two review petitions filed by Claimant and amended the description of Claimant’s injury.  In 2021, Employer filed the Modification Petition, although Claimant had continued to receive TPD after the 2017 decision, pursuant to newly enacted Section 306(a.3),3 to formally modify Claimant’s benefit status to TPD based on a new IRE performed using the Sixth Edition, second printing of the AMA Guides.  Claimant soon thereafter filed a Reinstatement Petition, in which he requested that his benefit status be reinstated to TTD because the 2015 IRE was conducted pursuant to former Section 306(a.2), which was held to be unconstitutional in Protz II. The WCJ granted Employer’s Modification Petition, denied Claimant’s Reinstatement Petition, and modified Claimant’s benefit status to TPD as of September 2, 2021. In denying Claimant’s Reinstatement Petition, the WCJ specifically noted that the benefits received by Claimant from 2015 through September 1, 2021 are TPD benefits for purposes of calculating Employer’s credit entitlement against the 500-week cap on such benefits pursuant to Section 3(2) of Act 111.  Claimant appealed to the Board, which affirmed the WCJ.

Holding:

As a preliminary matter the Court found that, although Claimant did not raise or brief before the WCJ or the Board the question of whether Act 111 may constitutionality be applied to his injury, he is challenging the validity of at least a portion of Act 111, and could therefore raise the issue on appeal, as he raised the issue in his petition for review.  The question of whether Act 111 may be applied retroactively to injuries that occurred before its effective date to permit employers to take a credit against partial disability payments made pursuant to IREs performed under the now-repealed Section 306(a.2) has been raised and contrary to Claimant’s arguments, the Court has squarely concluded that the credit provisions contained in Act 111 apply retroactively to provide employers with credit for payments of TTD and TPD made prior to Act 111’s effective date.

Affirmed

 

YELLOW FRIEGHT ISSUES

Mercy Catholic Medical Center v. Debra Ryan (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: October 16, 2023

Issue:

Whether the WCJ’s findings of fact that Claimant’s claimed injuries were not well pleaded was supported by substantial evidence?

Background:

Claimant filed a WC claim alleging both physical disability and an aggravation of previously existing anxiety and depression.   The WCJ circulated a Decision denying the claim petition, in part. The WCJ granted Claimant’s motion to deem all well-pleaded factual averments of the claim petition admitted because of Employer’s failure to file a timely answer, pursuant to a Yellow Freight motion.  However, the WCJ determined that the injuries Claimant asserted in the claim petition, including aggravation of her preexisting anxiety and depression, were not well pleaded, thus allowing Employer to offer evidence refuting Claimant’s alleged injuries. The WCJ denied the claim petition as to aggravation of Claimant’s preexisting anxiety and depression.  Claimant appealed to the Board.   The Board reversed the WCJ’s determination that Claimant’s averments in the claim petition regarding aggravation of her preexisting anxiety and depression were not well pleaded.  Therefore, the Board concluded that Employer’s untimely answer constituted a deemed admission of the aggravation of Claimant’s preexisting anxiety and depression and that the WCJ should have granted the claim petition as to a resulting disability and employer’s expert’s testimony was incompetent because his opinion that Claimant did not suffer an aggravation of her preexisting anxiety and depression contravened Employer’s deemed admission as found by the Board.

Holding:

Failure of an employer to timely file an answer is not the equivalent of a default judgment. The claimant still bears the burden of proving all elements necessary to support an award of compensation. Therefore, any evidence introduced before the WCJ regarding facts that were not well-pleaded in the claim petition may be rebutted by evidence presented by the defendant.  Whether an injury is causally related to employment requires a legal determination, as such, it cannot be established by default based on an employer’s late answer to a claim petition. Further, the claimant is entitled only to a rebuttable presumption that her disability continues after the last date that the employer should have filed an answer.   Here, the description of injury in the claim petition stated simply “Right shoulder. And aggravation of preexisting anxiety and depression.” Therefore, the claim petition did not present a well-pleaded averment regarding the alleged aggravation of Claimant’s preexisting anxiety and depression. There was a complete absence of explanation of this alleged injury. The vagueness of the averment is illustrated by Claimant’s failure even to indicate whether the alleged aggravation arose from the shoulder injury itself or from Claimant’s emotional discomfort with the light-duty job Employer offered her thereafter.  Accordingly, Employer did not lose its ability to contest that issue.  The Board’s order reversing the WCJ’s denial of that part of the claim petition relating to aggravation of Claimant’s preexisting anxiety and depression was reversed.

Reversed.

 

FIREFIGHTER CANCER CLAIM

Nicholas Caruccio v. Shrewsbury Borough (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: October 3, 2023

Issue:

Whether the WCJ unduly increased Claimant’s burden of proof as a firefighter-claimant, which was merely to establish that his exposure to a Group 1 carcinogen “possibly” caused Claimant’s cancer?

Background:

Claimant worked for Employer as a volunteer firefighter from 1987 to present, eventually achieving rank of fire department President. In December 2018, Claimant was diagnosed with chronic lymphocytic leukemia (CLL).  On May 4, 2020, Claimant filed a claim petition, seeking disability benefits. Claimant alleged that he sustained CLL due to his exposure to carcinogens as a firefighter.  The WCJ credited Employer’s expert’s opinion and rejected claimant’s expert’s opinion to the extent they conflicted with each other. The WCJ specifically noted the testimony that there are no IARC Group 1 carcinogens linked to the development of CLL. Claimant appealed to the Board, which affirmed the WCJ’s decision.

Holding:

First, the claimant, as a firefighter, must demonstrate that he has cancer which was caused by exposure to a known carcinogen which is recognized as a Group 1 carcinogen by the IARC.  Next, the claimant is entitled to an evidentiary presumption of compensability, provided that the claimant meets the threshold requirements of section 301(f) of the Act.  Finally, if the claimant can establish an occupational disease as defined by Section 108(r) and the evidentiary presumption of compensation as defined by Section 301(f), the burden of proof shifts to the employer, which can rebut the presumption with substantial competent evidence that shows that the firefighter’s cancer was not caused by the occupation of firefighting.  The general causation requirement serves a gatekeeping function: it recognizes that different types of cancers have different etiologies, and it weeds out claims for compensation for cancers with no known link to Group 1 carcinogens.  The provision requires merely credible evidence of a general causative link between the claimant’s type of cancer and a Group 1 carcinogen.  However, there is no requirement that a factfinder credit a firefighter-claimant’s evidence of general causation.  Claimant was unable to establish Section 108(r) general causation because he failed to demonstrate that his exposure to several IARC Group 1 carcinogens possibly caused his CLL.  Employer’s expert concluded that there was no scientific evidence demonstrating a link between Claimant’s workplace exposures to IARC Group 1 carcinogens and Claimant’s particular cancer and Claimant’s expert’s testimony was rejected.  The WCJ considered the evidence and made a reasoned decision to credit one expert opinion over another.  This decision was neither arbitrary nor capricious and is supported by substantial evidence of record.

Affirmed.

 

PROHIBITED SELF-REFERRALS

Bernice Bennett v. Jeld Wen, Inc. (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: October 6, 2023

Issues:

Whether the Board usurped the jurisdiction of the Hearing Office by granting a de novo hearing and allowing appeals nunc pro tunc of unappealed decisions of the Bureau?  Whether the Board erred in reversing the WCJ’s assessment of penalties?

Background:

Claimant sustained a work-related injury in 2010.  By a C&R Agreement approved by the WCJ on October 19, 2017 the parties resolved the wage loss and specific loss claims relative to Claimant’s work injury. The C&R Agreement indicated that Employer reserved the right to either continue administering Claimant’s medical benefits in accordance with the Act or to fund a CMS-approved MSA.  Later Claimant’s doctor prescribed a compound cream. When Carrier did not issue payment, Pharmacy filed Fee Review Applications with the Medical Fee Review Section of the Bureau.  Ultimately, 12 administrative determinations were issued ordering payment of the bills with interest, which Employer did not appeal. Employer made no payments to Pharmacy for those dates of service.  Eventually, Claimant filed the Penalty Petition.  The WCJ issued a July 2020 Decision finding that Claimant had met her burden of proving that Employer violated the Act.  The Board granted Employer’s Petition for Hearing.  The Board concluded that a de novo hearing under Section 425 was warranted to address the issue of a prohibited self-referral and to allow for submission of Hearing Officer Torrey’s Fee Review Decision into evidence.  The Board concluded that while Claimant had established that there were unpaid bills, Employer consistently defended its actions, arguing that the bills were not payable because of the relationship between prescriber and Pharmacy and asserting that its attempts to obtain the information of that relationship were consistently rebuffed.  The Board held that while any penalty would be paid to Claimant, the WCJ directed Employer to pay Pharmacy tens of thousands of dollars, allowing for the potential that prescriber and Pharmacy would reap a financial benefit from Claimant’s Penalty Petition.  Any penalty award to Claimant is tied to the potential improper conduct of her physician and pharmacy. The Board concluded that, if the improper conduct was confirmed, it would decline to allow financial benefit from it.   In the interest of justice, the Board vacated the WCJ’s grant of the Penalty Petition and award of unreasonable contest fees and ordered a de novo hearing before the Board, after which the Board would decide the issue of the Penalty Petition.  After the de novo hearing, the Board affirmed that, Employer established that it had not violated the Act, and the Board denied and dismissed the Penalty Petition. 

Holding:

The Board did not abuse its discretion or err in granting the Section 425 de novo hearing under these highly unusual circumstances, or in relying on the evidence presented therein that confirmed the unpaid bills were the result of a prohibited self-referral for which no claim for payment could be made under Section 306(f.1)(3)(iii), we affirm the Board’s denial of the Penalty Petition and Claimant’s request for unreasonable contest attorneys’ fees.

Affirmed.

 

RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

Soan D. Frias v. Amazon.com (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: October 18, 2023

Issue:

Whether res judicata and collateral estoppel barred litigation of the Review Petition where a Stipulation of Facts included express language reserving the right to further litigation of the injury description?

Background:

In 2019, Claimant sustained an injury to his lower back during the course and scope of his employment.   Claimant filed Claim and Penalty Petitions.  In 2020, the parties agreed to resolve the pending Claim and Penalty Petitions through a Stipulation. The Stipulation was approved by Decision & Order. Through the Stipulation, the parties agreed that Claimant had sustained a work-related injury in the nature of a lumbar strain/sprain. The Stipulation reserved Claimant’s right to file additional petitions in the future, including but not limited to a Review Petition to amend the injury description to demonstrate that the work injury consisted of additional injuries.  Later in 2020, Employer filed a Termination Petition alleging that Claimant fully recovered from his work injury as of the date of a 2020 IME and could return to work without restrictions.  Claimant filed a Review Petition, alleging that the description of the work injury was incorrect and did not recognize his work-related lumbar disc protrusion with radiculopathy and spondylosis, as previously diagnosed by its medical expert.  The WCJ circulated a Decision & Order granting the termination of benefits and denying the Review Petition.  Relying on Weney v Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Mac Sprinkler Systems, Inc, the WCJ then went on to say that “even if” Claimant’s evidence was credible, the Review Petition would nevertheless fail pursuant to res judicata as the Stipulation approved in the 2020 Decision resolved a Claim Petition in which Claimant offered expert medical testimony regarding the description of his work injury, similar to that raised in the current Review Petition.  The WCJ found that, even though the Stipulation reserved the parties’ rights to file additional petitions in the future, including a Review Petition to amend the injury description “whether the expanded diagnoses were present at the time of the Stipulation or arose later,” where parties stipulate to a description of injury, and the claimant knew of additional injuries not included in the Stipulation, the subsequent Review Petition to add the previously known injuries was barred by technical res judicata and collateral estoppel. The description of the injury remained unchanged and should have been litigated if the parties still disagreed. There was nothing new in this litigation regarding Claimant’s allegation of his work injury.  Claimant appealed to the Board.  The Board affirmed.

Holding:

The Court questioned whether the issue presented is one that was properly before the Court as the WCJ did not find the Review Petition was barred by res judicata. The WCJ’s discussion of the significance of the Stipulation and res judicata was in the alternative, after he had found that Claimant failed to meet his burden on the Review Petition based on the WCJ’s credibility determinations.  The WCJ only addressed the question of the res judicata effect on the Stipulation in the alternative if, hypothetically, claimant’s medical expert’s testimony had been found credible. Before the Board, Claimant did not question the WCJ’s credibility determinations or challenge the WCJ’s actual basis for denying the Review Petition. Instead, he raised an issue that had been addressed by the WCJ in a hypothetical, and which did not ultimately serve as the basis for the WCJ’s disposition and denial of the Review Petition. Perpetuating the error, the Board, in turn, addressed only that hypothetical issue. On appeal to this Court, Claimant continues to raise the issue of whether the WCJ erred by finding res judicata barred litigation of the Review Petition and misconstrued the effect of the parties’ Stipulation. However, because Claimant did not challenge the dispositive issue of whether he failed to meet his burden in the Review Petition, there was nothing further for the Court to review.

Affirmed.

 

PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATIVE UPDATES

There are presently pending before the Pennsylvania General Assembly, a number of Bills which seek to amend the Pennsylvania Worker’s Compensation Act in various ways.  When these Bills are proposed by Pa House members, they go through the House’s Labor and Industry Committee.   When, and if, the Bill is passed by the House, it must go through the Pa Senate for additional review.   As of this date, two of the proposed Bills have passed the House, and are under review by the Pa. Senate’s Labor and Industry Committee.  They are summarized below.  At last check the Senate L&I Committee is still reviewing these House Bills and it has not sent them back to the Senate for review, alteration or consideration.

Regular Session 2023-2024

House Bill 760

Short Title:      An Act amending the act of June 2, 1915 (P.L.736, No.338), known as the Workers’ Compensation Act, in liability and compensation, further providing for compensation payable in periodical installments.

Subject:           Direct Deposit for Workers’ Compensation

This bill seeks to amend Act 338 of 1915 (Workers’ Compensation Act) by allowing individuals who qualify for workers’ compensation to request their compensation through direct deposit into an account of their choosing. These types of payment methods would be similar to the methods that are currently used to pay benefits to those that qualify for Unemployment Compensation. Implementation of this change was recommended unanimously by the Workers’ Compensation Advisory Council (WCAC) last year.

Last Action:    Referred to LABOR AND INDUSTRY, May 9, 2023 [Senate]

 

House Bill 930

Short Title:      An Act amending the act of June 2, 1915 (P.L.736, No.338), known as the Workers’ Compensation Act, in liability and compensation, further providing for schedule of compensation.  Expanding Workers’ Compensation for Permanent Disfigurement

Subject:           Expanding Workers’ Compensation for Permanent Disfigurement

This bill seeks to extend existing workers’ compensation eligibility for permanent disfigurement from 275 weeks to 400 weeks and clarify that claimants are not precluded from collecting both total or partial disability benefits and disfigurement benefits simultaneously. It would also provide workers’ compensation coverage for disfigurement regardless of where it occurs on their body.

Last Action:    Referred to LABOR AND INDUSTRY, May 9, 2023 [Senate]

 

NEW JERSEY WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

CASE SUMMARIES

10/01/2023 – 10/31/2023

 

ACCIDENTS WITHIN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT

Mario Pozadas v. Capital Iron Associates, LLC; Hartford Underwriters Insurance Company
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division – Unpublished Opinion
No. A-0162-22; 2023 WL 7119507
Decided: 10/30/2023

Issues: 

(1)  Whether the Judge erred in denying Hartford’s Motion to Dismiss the insurance carrier for lack of coverage? (2) Whether the petitioner was within the course and scope of his employment at the time of his accident?

Background:

Petitioner is the employee and owner of Capital Iron Associates, a structural steel company that makes estimates for welding projects and then produces and installs the material. Petitioner’s work is about sixty percent travelling to and from projects. Petitioner regularly decides the vehicle and route he will use to get to the projects. Petitioner obtained an insurance policy from Hartford, which provided workers’ compensation coverage for the petitioner. The policy was effective October 13, 2015 through October 13, 2016. The policy expired on October 13, 2016. The petitioner emailed the insurance broker on October 14, 2016 and agreed to call her later that day to finalize changes to the policy. One of those changes included excluding himself from coverage.

On that same day, October 14, 2026, the petitioner received a call and met with a client about a project. After meeting with the client, the petitioner dropped off his company truck at his shop and used a friend’s motorcycle to travel from the shop to the project to prepare an estimate. The petitioner chose to take a longer route to the project to enjoy the nice weather, rather than taking a direct route. The Judge found that the petitioner was back on a work-related mission before the accident.

Petitioner filed a workers’ compensation claim alleging injuries arising from the accident. Hartford filed an answer denying coverage and filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of coverage. Petitioner argued that the nonrenewal did not comply with statutory notice requirements. Harford sought to withdraw its Motion to Dismiss and file a new motion in order to determine the Petitioner’s coverage. Hartford was unable to provide specified witnesses at trial and the Judge found that this denied Petitioner a speedy and efficient resolution of his claim. The Judge also rejected Hartford’s effort to withdraw the motion and file a new motion. The Judge additionally denied the original Motion to Dismiss, holding that coverage was in effect at the time of the accident. A second Judge found that the petitioner was within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident and that his injuries were compensable.

Holding:

On appeal, Hartford argues that the Judge’s decision regarding dismissing the Motion to Dismiss for lack of coverage, violated their due process rights. The Court declined to consider the due process issue as it was not raised in the workers’ compensation court.

The Court considered the definition of scope of employment in N.J.S.A. 34:15-36. The Court noted that personal errands while travelling to or from a job site are outside the scope of employment. Here, there was no evidence the petitioner performed a personal errand. It was the petitioner’s intention to go to the job site and prepare an estimate. The record supports the Judge’s factual finding that the claim is compensable.

Affirmed.